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This book is a Security Leaders’ Guide to aligning with the business. If you are a Chief 
Information Security Officer (CISO), Head of Security with a similar title, a security 
manager, or a security team member providing leadership to the business, this book is 
for you.
 Why Security Leaders Must Get the Business Fully 
Engaged
One of our Rational Cybersecurity interviews illustrated the challenge of a disengaged 
business.
THE BREACH WAS PREDICTABLE
not long ago, the former CIso of a large Us company related this story:
“We had a flat network between all our credit card processing sites and some other serious 
gaps. I went to my CIo with a request for funding, but here’s the response: ‘We’re expanding 
into [an overseas location] next year and can’t afford the projects you’re proposing. In fact, we 
need to cut your budget by 50%.’
after that, I put my resume on the market and left soon. The company retained an offshore 
managed security service provider (MssP) with advanced malware detection tools, but only 
skeleton staff for security operations stateside. Within 6 months the alarms were ringing but 
they keep hitting the snooze button.”
The rest is history as the company – a household name – suffered a bad breach and botched 
its messaging to the public during incident response. Direct and indirect costs mounted to tens 
and then hundreds of millions and the Ceo resigned within 6 months.
xx
I’ve seen way too many businesses with disengaged senior management like this. It 
takes two basic forms:
 1) Security’s not considered to be a priority.
 2) Or, the organization has budgeted for security, hired staff, and 
deems it “handled.” Executives delude themselves into thinking 
they’ve put security first even if in practice it is routinely put way 
behind other priorities.
We see the second, insidious, form of disengagement even at highly regulated 
businesses. Staff, even in the security department, are afraid to do anything other than 
put an optimistic spin on security issues reported up the chain.
Misalignment between security and the business can start at the top or happen at the 
line of business, IT, development, or user level. It has a corrosive effect on any security 
project it touches. As organizations transform themselves into “digital businesses,” they 
fall under increasing IT-related risk and regulation. Aligning cybersecurity and IT with 
business leaders and business processes becomes exponentially more important to 
digital businesses.
 The Rational Cybersecurity Journey
I chose to write Rational Cybersecurity for Business because, during my career as an 
IT research analyst and consultant, I’ve learned that successful cybersecurity isn’t 
just about the technology, it’s also about the people and organizations. I realized 
midway through this project, however, that I could write the book for security leaders 
as the primary audience or for business leaders, but not for both. Therefore, Table 1 
summarizes what this book IS and IS NOT.
InTRoDUCTIon
xxi
You won’t find many security professionals disagreeing about the need to align 
security and the business. But although technical books on cybersecurity abound, there 
are relatively few business-focused ones, and none that I’ve found written specifically 
for security leaders with comprehensive and specific advice on how to align with the 
business.
I feel strongly that if we can improve their business alignment, security programs can 
be much more effective. A business’s security team will be adequately resourced. It will 
have a seat at the table when IT or risk is part of any business decision or strategy and 
will be brought in early to review new projects, vendor relationships, or system designs. 
Security leaders won’t act like “Dr. No” when a potentially risky business proposal or IT 
release lands on the table, and they won’t emit fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) like 
frightened octopuses spewing ink when challenged. Instead they’ll quantify the risks 
and propose realistic alternatives. The security team can act as a coach to business or IT 
managers and staff. Together, business and security leaders can make the secure way to 
operate in the business also be the easy way.
Last but not least, I decided to open source the book’s digital editions because 
cybersecurity-business alignment is such an important topic. I want to create an open 
information flow. Look for the pointers at the end of Chapter 10 on how readers can 
continue the discussion we’re about to begin here.
Table 1. What the Book Is For
THE BOOK IS IS NOT
Written for the security leader audience and 
informed by interviews with business and IT 
leaders
noT attempting to be an easy read for 
businesspeople without a background in IT
a leadership guide on how to align six Rational 
Cybersecurity priorities to the business
noT a highly technical or comprehensive 
manual on everything in cybersecurity
scaled to fit many types of businesses – from 
the very large organization down to ones that 
are small but still big enough to have a security 
department
noT intended for tiny organizations with 
minimal security program needs
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 How the Book Is Organized
Cybersecurity is a vast topic, and many kinds of businesses exist with different cultures, 
drivers, missions, models, and products or services. Facing a general problem statement 
of “How should security align with business?”, one could easily get lost in the matrix of 
what to align with what.
It can be hard to stay focused on alignment while trying to explain just enough 
detail about many cybersecurity topics and to share so many good security practices for 
people, process, and technology. Therefore, this book applies the 80–20 rule (aka Pareto 
Principlei) to cybersecurity as its organizing framework.
The Cybersecurity Pareto Principle
How can security leaders get 80% of the benefit by doing 20% of the work?
To this question, I ended up choosing six priority focus areas to cover in the book’s 
chapters. They are: security governance and culture, risk management, control baseline, 
IT and security simplification, access control, and cyber-resilience.
To stay focused on alignment within these areas, I also provide more than 50 specific 
keys to alignment within the narrative. These keys are called out as follows in the text.
1
Buy into the need for business and security alignment and  
get curious about what that means for security and business 
stakeholders. 
Less often, I cite numbered cybersecurity myths, starting with this one.
1




Although the book isn’t overly technical, it does require background in basic IT and 
security terminology. However, if you run into a term you’re not familiar with or are 
curious about how I’m using a term, please check on the Glossary provided at the end of 
the book.
Here’s how the book’s ten chapters address the Cybersecurity Pareto Priorities:
• Chapter 1: Executive Overview. Defines Rational Cybersecurity, 
summarizes the book, and describes the six cybersecurity priority 
focus areas.
• Chapter 2: Identify and Align Security-Related Roles. Explains how 
the people in the business each contribute to the secure operation of 
the business and the various security-related roles they can fulfill.
• Chapter 3: Put the Right Security Governance Model in Place. 
Contrasts basic security governance structures that businesses can 
use and provides guidance on how to select one and make it work. 
It describes core elements of the security program such as steering 
committees and security policy lifecycle management. It also offers 
guidance on where the CISO should report in an organization.
• Chapter 4: Strengthen Security Culture Through Communications 
and Awareness Programs. Brings the cultural subtext that can make 
or break a cybersecurity environment into the foreground. It analyzes 
the components of security culture and provides guidance on how 
to devise a security culture improvement process and measure its 
effectiveness. User awareness, training, and appropriate day-to-
day engagement with the business can all play a part in forging a 
constructive security culture.
• Chapter 5: Manage Risk in the Language of Business. Clarifies 
why risk management must be the brains of the security program. 
It must analyze, monitor, and communicate what potential losses 
or circumstances constitute the business’s top risk scenarios. An 
effective tiered risk analysis process can efficiently address myriad 
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risk issues from multiple sources, help apportion accountability and 
responsibility, and prioritize controls or other risk treatments.
• Chapter 6: Establish a Control Baseline. Lists the 20 security control 
domains security leaders must consider when creating a minimum 
viable set and maps to control frameworks such as ISO 27001 and 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. It also details which business 
functions security leaders must align with to implement safeguards 
within the control domains, how to scale and tune requirements 
for different types of businesses, and how to share responsibility for 
delivering the controls with third parties.
• Chapter 7: Simplify and Rationalize IT and Security. Argues that 
security leaders have a stake in the IT strategy and provides guidance 
on how security leaders – who don’t own IT – can still engage IT and 
digital innovation leaders to help develop and deliver on the strategy.
• Chapter 8: Control Access with Minimal Drag on the Business. 
Explains why access control is a critical balance beam for business 
agility, compliance mandates, and the security program. It addresses 
the need for information classification, data protection, and identity 
and access management (IAM) controls to implement access 
restrictions as required to reduce risk or attain regulatory compliance 
but do so in a way that enables appropriate digital relationships and 
data sharing with internal and external users.
• Chapter 9: Institute Resilience Through Detection, Response, and 
Recovery. Guides readers on how to formulate contingency plans, 
strategies, and programs for detection, response, and recovery which 
together comprise cyber-resilience.
• Chapter 10: Create Your Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan. 
Takes readers through an exercise to create a personalized “Rational 
Cybersecurity Success Plan” using the Success Plan Worksheet1 as a 
template. This worksheet provides a template for readers to capture 
their assessments and improvement objectives for their existing 




security environment. It’s designed to be used over a 90-day period, 
but readers can extend it or create additional copies for new periods.
 How to Get the Most Out of the Book
To maximize the value from this book, readers can
• Read Chapter 1 for a detailed summary of the book and note areas of 
immediate or special interest.
• Read or review all chapters for comprehensive guidance on the six 
Rational Cybersecurity focus areas for security to business alignment.
• Select the chapter(s) that corresponds most closely to current 
pain points or active projects as their priority topics for reading. 
For example, someone working in data governance or enterprise 
authorization for a financial service might concentrate their attention 
early on to Chapters 3 (governance), 5 (risk), and 8 (access control 
and data governance).
At the end of each chapter, a “Call to Action” section contains a quick summary 
of core recommendations and instructions for completing the next part of your 
personalized Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet.
After completing the first nine chapters and/or your priority topics, turn to Chapter 10  
and complete any parts of the worksheet that you haven’t tackled during the earlier 
chapters.
 Call to Action
This book can be a powerful resource for security leaders who believe that business 
engagement and alignment is one of their key performance indicators. Look back on 
your career path and think of at least three times a lack of business alignment has been 
a challenge for your security projects and also remember times when effective business 
alignment has enabled your projects to succeed.
Buy into the need for business and security alignment and get curious about what 
that means for security and business stakeholders.
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And then read on to Chapter 1 for a deeper dive into what cybersecurity-business 
alignment means, an explanation of the six Rational Cybersecurity priority focus areas, 
and an executive overview of the book. Consider how the six priority focus areas could 
relate to your organization.
 Note
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CHAPTER 1
Executive Overview
To even begin to achieve the promise of cybersecurity, security and business leaders 
must align to rationalize cybersecurity. They must go beyond the myths – such as the 
one that cybersecurity is just a technical problem – that still mislead many in the market.
Myths aside, basic concepts of Rational Cybersecurity are already conventional 
wisdom. We’ve all heard that “Security is about people, process, and technology.” But 
that can sound like overly general advice not calibrated to our type of IT environment or 
business. And where do we begin? Conventional wisdom advises starting with a security 
assessment and devising a plan for the security program.
Such conventional wisdom is fine as far as it goes, but security leaders need more 
detail. I propose to provide that with specific guidance for aligning security programs to 
the business through six priority focus areas 
• Build a healthy security culture and governance model
• Manage risk in the language of the business
• Establish a control baseline
• Simplify and rationalize IT and security
• Govern and control access without creating a drag on the business
• Institute cyber-resilience, detection, response, and recovery
Although these priorities are a pretty good fit for most organizations, it’s important 
to understand they’re not an ordered list and they need to be scaled for a business’s 
industry, size, complexity, level of security pressure, and maturity level.
2
This chapter provides an executive overview of the book’s content in the following 
sections:
• Understand the Rational Cybersecurity context
• Start the Rational Cybersecurity journey (by defining security for 
your business and beginning to gain executive support and align with 
stakeholders)
• Set Rational Cybersecurity priority focus areas for the security program
• Scale security programs to your organization type
Let’s begin by understanding why cybersecurity-business alignment on a well- 
defined, prioritized security program is so critical.
1.1  Understand the Rational Cybersecurity Context
As security leaders, you may not need a cybersecurity backgrounder. But stick with me: 
I’ll keep it short, and I think we’ll find it worthwhile to get on the same page about our 
overall challenge in defending the business and how it’s exacerbated by some “myths of 
cybersecurity.”
Let’s start with the word “cybersecurity” on which our profession is founded. We 
often use it synonymously with “IT security,” “information security,” or “security.” What’s 
so special about it?
Figure 1-1. Etymology of the Term “Cybersecurity”
The common dictionary definition of the root term “security” includes “freedom 
from risk or danger.” Hmm… not likely in cyberspace, or in physical space. What about 
the word “cyber”? It comes from the Greek term kybernḗtēs meaning “helmsman” or 
“steersman.” Doesn’t that seem to connote forward-looking, or future-looking? “Cyber” 
was also popularized from the word “cyberspace,” first coined by scifi writer William 
Gibson in the book Neuromancer, which 30 years later is still a great read. Cyberspace 
means the space where people and machines converge.
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The words cyber and cybersecurity have been sensationalized by politicians and the 
media for public consumption without much clarity. That’s why I’ve coined the term 
Rational Cybersecurity, which I define as
Rational Cybersecurity “an explicitly-defined security program based on the 
risks, culture, and capabilities of an organization that is endorsed by executives 
and aligned with its mission, stakeholders, and processes.”
1.1.1  Risk and the Digital Business
As of 2019, much of the business world had been actively discussing the “digital 
transformation” for well over 5 years. Gartner, Inc. (the world’s premier IT research and 
advisory service and my former employer) calls this trend digitalization. According to 
surveys from Gartner, more than 87% of senior business leaders say digitalization is a 
company priority. But Gartner cautions that only 40% of organizations have brought 
digital initiatives to scale.1
In early 2020, the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic forced most businesses 
to send their staff home to “shelter in place” or shut down in-person operations 
such as malls, movie theaters, or manufacturing plants entirely. A great many of the 
business processes that continued operating did so only through digital processes and 
telecommuting. As the crisis continues, not only are massive numbers of employees 
working at home, but many business processes are shifting online in order to operate at 
all. It is as if COVID-19 has pressed the gas pedal on the digital transformation.
Digital transformation demands more cybersecurity, not just because it means “more 
IT” but also “riskier IT.” Newer technologies – such as mobile devices, social networks, 
cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), and the Internet of Things (IOT) – are all 
seeing accelerated adoption during the pandemic. Unfortunately, new technologies often 
emerge without adequate security built in. Deeper blends of the virtual, physical, and 
social worlds merge into something new, often with profound security implications. In 
extreme cases, digital outages or cyberattacks could stop elevators, crash vehicles, start 
fires, explode pipelines, or turn off medical devices.
1 “Accelerate Digital Transformation,” Gartner, Inc., 2020, accessed at www.gartner.com/en/
information-technology/insights/digitalization
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Cyberattackers can steal vital trade secrets and purloin personal identity records 
from business databases for use in credit card fraud and identity theft exploits. They 
also conduct extortion schemes, such as ransomware attacks which encrypt digital 
information and demand payment for the key to unlock it. Even mature remote access 
systems, web-based applications, and business processes can be highly vulnerable 
when deployed without adequate testing, hardening, and procedural controls. The 
early days of the COVID-19 crisis saw increased cyber-fraud as business processes 
such as accounting or payroll underwent forced digitalization. For example, a member 
of this book’s marketing team reported that his Head of Admin received a fake email 
purportedly from him requesting a change to his direct deposit account number. Luckily, 
she called his home office to verify the request rather than putting it through.
THE SURPRISING STORY OF NOTPETYA AND AN UNLIKELY DIGITAL BUSINESS
Imagine shipping containers piled on the docks of Hoboken, New Jersey, with nowhere to go. 
During the NotPetya ransomware epidemic, global shipping giant Maersk discovered it literally 
could not deliver or send on unloaded shipping containers without access to the electronic 
manifests.2 You wouldn’t consider a maritime tanker company a digital business, but clearly it 
is in part. Digital businesses cannot operate without IT.
Note  the ransomware problem is getting worse since the Notpetya events of 
2017. Many small or medium businesses (SMBs) in the united States affected by 
ransomware have been forced to cease operations.3
Cybersecurity for the digital business addresses “information risk,” which includes 
both “cyber-risk” (from attacks on IT) and “IT operational risk” (from IT errors, failures, 
and outages). It’s the security leader’s job to propose controls or workarounds to protect 
the business, whenever possible in a way that doesn’t impede or slow innovation. It is 
the business leader’s job to work with security to balance opportunity and risk.
2 “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Andy Greenberg,  
WIRED, September 2018, accessed at www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine- 
russia-code-crashed-the-world/
3 “Wood Ranch Medical Announces Permanent Closure Due to Ransomware Attack,” HIPAA 
Journal, December 2019, accessed at: https://www.hipaajournal.com/wood-ranch-medical- 
announces-permanent-closure-due-to-ransomware-attack/
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1.1.2  Compliance and the Duty to Protect
Regulatory obligations also create digital business risk. They spell out duties to protect 
personal privacy, health-care or financial information, critical infrastructure, and 
more. Courts of law haggle over liability. For example, did a breached business follow 
“reasonable” protection practices, did it even uphold its own policies, or should it have 
invested more money in security?
What are your business’s protection objectives? See Table 1-1 for a list of some 
regulations covering various vertical industries to give you some idea. Note that although 
we tried to hit the main regulatory topics (privacy, critical infrastructure, health, finance, 
and public company accounting), Table 1-1 shows only a small sampling. However, 
it’s a safe bet that your business is subject to some of these or to similar regulations in 
countries all over the world.
Table 1-1. A Small Sample of Compliance Regulations
Industry Regulations
all uS public 
companies
Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOx) requires companies to report on internal controls 
over accounting and other critical it systems. the Securities and exchange 
Commission (SeC) guidance pushes companies to report material cybersecurity 
risks to shareholders and potential investors.
all business in 
personal data
eu General Data protection regulation (GDpr) and various other countries’ 
privacy regulations protect personal information; they require informed consent 
for using the information along with other individual rights. uS state laws require 
organizations to report loss of sensitive personal or financial information and 
offer victims free credit reporting services. violating any of these regulations 
leads to fines, liability, and reputation damage. the California Consumer privacy 
act (CCpa) brings GDpr-style regulation to the uSa.
all electronic 
records
the uS Federal rules of Civil procedure (FrCp) sets requirements for retention 
and accessibility of electronic records for use in legal proceedings’ discovery or 
evidentiary processes.
(continued)
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Information risks (compliance related or otherwise) are far from the only risks 
that businesses must deal with. Businesses also face financial risks, operational risks, 
market risks, project risks, and even the risk of NOT embarking on new strategies. 
Business success or even survival may depend on the ability to undertake bold 
digital transformation initiatives. For example, many retailers failed to excel at online 
commerce (yesterday’s digital transformation). Today, many of them are gone or in 
decline. In general, businesses that are further along with digitalization are more likely to 






uS Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the Singapore Monetary authority, and other national 
regulations protect personal financial information. Other regulations: New York 
Department of Financial Services (DFS) Cybersecurity regulation, anti-money 
laundering (aML) and know your customer (KYC) regulations in multiple 
countries, payment Card industry (pCi) Data Security Standard (DSS).
the Basel 3 accords require reporting of operational and other risks and require 
capital to be set aside to cover those risks.
health care uS health insurance portability and accountability act (hipaa) addresses privacy 
and requires covered entities like hospitals and insurance companies (and 
third-party business associate companies) to protect patient privacy and give 
patients some control over their records. the uS Food and Drug administration 
(FDa) Code of Federal regulations (CFr) title 21 part 11 regulates handling 




the NerC Cip (North american electric reliability Corporation Critical 
infrastructure protection) plan is a set of requirements designed to secure 
the assets required for operating North america’s electrical grid. utilities are 
required to identify and protect critical assets, perform risk assessments, 
enforce it controls, and maintain contingency plans for protection. in europe, 
the Directive on Security of Network and information Systems (NiS Directive) 
specifies legal measures to boost the overall level of cybersecurity in the eu.
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1.1.3  Taking Accountability for Risk
After walking through the digital business risks and compliance issues, one would 
think it should be easy to gain executive-level support and information risk ownership. 
But as we’ll see in the “Address Common Challenges” sections of Chapters 2 and 4, 
cybersecurity still isn’t considered strategic by many executives.
What is creating this “cybersecurity deficit”4 not only in executive awareness but 
in security programs themselves? I believe the core reasons are the lack of specific and 
actionable guidance on how to align security with the business and some common 
misconceptions (or myths) about information risks. Simply put, risk is the core topic for 
Rational Cybersecurity. It is so important that I’ll do a bit of a deep dive on risk up front.
We read about information risk scenarios daily. Over the last few years, we’ve seen 
hackers compromise or disrupt the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) staff 
database, some UK National Health System hospitals, the Maersk shipping line, and 
countless other organizations catalogued at the “World’s Biggest Data Breaches & Hacks” 
website.5 We’ve learned that Intel or AMD chips in every computer could be vulnerable 
and experienced exploits against virtual machines, C programming language libraries, 
Windows, Linux, and all operating systems almost without exception.
With all the news coverage of cyberattacks and vulnerabilities, there’s a sense of 
drowning in information risk, that cybersecurity is getting worse. But there’s no clear 
accounting of how bad it is, how we can fix it, how much that should cost, and what we 
should do today.
What if we could account for information risk? Imagine risk appearing on a 
business’s future- or forward-looking accounting ledger or forecast, as shown in 
Figure 1-2. Much as forecasted operating assets and revenues comprise the “assets” side 
of the ledger, outflows from risks that could materialize into losses could join forecasted 
business expenses on the “liabilities” side.
4 “Cybersecurity Deficit: More than a Skills Shortage,” by Dan Blum, January 2020, accessed at 
https://security-architect.com/cybersecurity-strategy-deficit/
5 “World’s Biggest Data Breaches & Hacks,” David McCandless, Information is Beautiful, accessed  
at www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/
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The typical business doesn’t actually have a ledger like the one in Figure 1-2. 
However, risk is the context and raison d’etre for security programs. What’s less well 
understood is that just as business executives are accountable for the financial bottom 
line, they’re also accountable for information risks. Business leaders – such as the CEO 
and lower- level line of business (LOB) leaders – are the “risk owners.” (The CEO is 
accountable to the public, and lower-echelon risk owners are accountable or responsible 
to the CEO). Risk owners must ensure that actual losses remain at a tolerable level, and 
to do that, it requires risk management.
1- 1
Place accountability for information risk at the business leadership 
level where the resources, budget, and fiduciary responsibilities lie. 
Then manage risk in the language of business.
Some businesses do track risks at the enterprise level using a “risk map” or “risk register.” 
The risk map is a common tool used in enterprise risk management (ERM) to represent the 
top risks to the business. Top risks may be presented as a simple list from 1 to N or displayed 
on a graph ranking each one’s likelihood of occurring and the potential impact. For example, 
a large manufacturing company might consider the failure of a sole-source factory that 
produces a critical component to be one of its top concerns. One information risk scenario 
that security leaders could weave into the risk map would be ransomware infecting that 
same factory’s controllers and logistics systems to cause the failure.
Figure 1-2. Risk on a Conceptual Accounting Ledger
Chapter 1  exeCutive Overview
9
Standing in the way of making information risk more transparent and manageable to 
business leaders, however, is our second myth of cybersecurity.
2
It is not possible to quantify information risk in any useful way.
Ten or fifteen years ago, myth #2 might have been generally true. We didn’t have 
a good risk quantification model, tools, or much actuarial data then. I can remember 
starting a security research service for Burton Group (a company later acquired by 
Gartner) around 2004. At the time my research team of security experts all agreed 
quantifying risk wasn’t useful.
Fortunately, we now have the model and some tools to work with for the purpose 
of calibrating risk estimates. The Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) model has 
been standardized by The Open Group.6 Open FAIR provides a taxonomy for calculating 
risk as the probable frequency and magnitude of future loss, which can also be described 
as annualized loss expectancy. These calculations aren’t trivial, and it is still necessary 
to have subject matter experts who can be used to develop calibrated estimates on the 
frequency of attacks, effectiveness of controls, and magnitude of losses. However, we’ve 
made tremendous progress with FAIR.
1.1.4  Aligning on Risk
We’ll delve deeper into risk frameworks in Chapter 5. For now, just recognize that we’re 
looking specifically at loss events that occur due to the action of a threat agent, such as a 
person or a force of nature. The threat acts against vulnerabilities, and, if it can overcome 
the target’s resistance strength (and in-place controls), the business experiences adverse 
impacts.
Figure 1-3 makes a critical point: Security program alignment to the business begins 
with alignment on accountability for risk and with assigning roles and responsibilities for 
risk management. Quantitative risk management is a core competency for alignment.
6 “Open Group Standard: Risk Analysis (O-RA) (C13G),” The Open Group, 2014. Accessed at 
www2.opengroup.org/ogsys/catalog/C13G (free registration and login required)
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The components of information risk are
• Business information assets including tangible servers, applications, 
and bank accounts as well as less tangible intellectual property, 
reputation, or brand equity
• Vulnerabilities of information systems or assets to all kinds of logical 
(technical) or physical attacks or social engineering exploits against 
authorized users
• Threat actors
• Countermeasures or controls protecting the assets
• Potential losses to stakeholders from adverse events on the assets
Threats: Broadly speaking, some of the major threat actors include everything from 
criminals, hacktivists, and nation-state attackers to disgruntled insiders and to forces 
of nature such as hurricanes, fires, and pandemics. Even well-meaning users on your 
business’s staff can, without meaning to, damage digital assets through errors. They may 
also create a breach by sharing business information with the wrong people.
Vulnerabilities: These come with the IT territory, and few systems are invulnerable. 
Vulnerabilities in people and process are just as common as vulnerabilities in 
technology. Vulnerabilities are so numerous that we must any discussion of them by 
calling out yet another myth.
Figure 1-3. Reward – Risk Analysis for Digital Business
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3
The technical security department can close off all our vulnerabilities by 
implementing all the controls in our compliance checklist.
Cyberattacks: There’s been so much publicity about hacking, malware, and so on 
that many people in business, or the general public, have veered from the myth that all 
vulnerabilities can be fixed to an opposite, defeatist extreme called out in myth #4.
4
We (or they) were hit by an advanced persistent threat (APT) and could 
not have prevented it.
In fact, most cyberattackers are not APTs and most exploits don’t use sophisticated 
“zero days” or high-tech gadgets. In most cases, cyberattackers can succeed by exploiting 
known technical vulnerabilities and credulous users through commodity tools and age- 
old con artist tricks.
Countermeasures and Controls: The good news is that businesses can deploy 
people, processes, or tools as countermeasures to mitigate every single threat- 
exploiting- vulnerability scenario described. Good operational security in the form of 
governance, training, third-party management, and configuration management can 
drastically reduce the incidence of error and abuse events. On the cybersecurity side, 
good operational security can often deter or prevent hacking or malware from gaining 
a foothold. Even if a cyberattacker does compromise a password or malware does take 
over an computer, an organization with good security monitoring tools and processes 
should be able to detect the attacker and block further progress. When attackers 
compromise a valuable objective, the organization should have cybersecurity response 
processes to contain the compromise and recovery processes to restore damaged 
systems from backups, collect cyber-insurance, and so on.
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1- 2
Weave information risks into the enterprise risk map presented to 
executives. Engage business and IT managers to develop assumptions 
on potential business impacts and make security concerns more 
transparent to the business.
Just as business and security leaders must align on risk management (the Big Why), 
managers and staff down the organizational ladder must align on identifying assets 
at risk, their vulnerabilities, and the threats to them (the Big What) as well as security 
countermeasures and controls for managing the risk (the Big How).
1.2  Start the Rational Cybersecurity Journey
Earlier in the chapter, we defined information risk and discussed why digital 
business heightens this type of risk. And yet, many top business executives don’t treat 
cybersecurity and risk as a top business priority even though it can, in fact, wreak havoc. 
Why is that?
1.2.1  Define Rational Cybersecurity for Your Business
According to one security leader who’s worked as a Chief Information Security Officer 
(CISO) for almost 20 years, a lot has changed in the security space by 2020, but two 
things remain the same:
 1. Senior executives don’t prioritize cybersecurity enough for 
security programs to be fully effective.
 2. The reason for (1) is not that executives don’t care – they do, and 
they don’t want their name in the headlines after a breach – but 
that they lack a clear definition of security.
Let’s face it, the dictionary definitions of “security” or “cybersecurity” – as well as 
more technical definitions based on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability triad of 
security objectives – are much too vague to either give top executives a concrete sense of 
what could be at stake or to build a working security program.
Therefore, this book describes the process through which business and security 
leaders can create a state of Rational Cybersecurity – an explicitly defined security 
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program based on the risks, culture, and capabilities of an organization that is endorsed 
by executives and aligned with its mission, stakeholders, and processes – as follows:
• Chapter 2’s “Clarify Security-Related Business Roles” includes a 
high-level Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed (RACI) 
matrix.
• Chapter 3’s “Charter the Security Organization” recommends 
creating a security charter document endorsed by the CEO and 
defining the security program’s mission, operating principles, 
governance, and reporting structure.
1.2.2  Gain Executive Support and Risk Ownership
The security program will rise and fall in direct proportion to its level of executive 
support, the business risk owners’ sense of accountability for risk, and the priority they 
give to security. Therefore, security leaders must work through the challenges described 
in the following sections:
• Chapter 2’s “Cybersecurity Not Considered Strategic” explains 
that even many larger organizations don’t have a CISO in place, don’t 
consider cybersecurity strategic, and may lack enough business 
experience with cybersecurity on their Board of Directors to exercise 
effective oversight.
• Chapter 4’s “Business Executives Not Engaged at the Strategic 
Level” cites research showing that although business executives 
have a high threat awareness, they have a low sense of mastery 
over cybersecurity and self-assess as not being personally or 
professionally well prepared.
The book provides plentiful guidance on improving security-related 
communications to business executives and getting top-down support:
• Chapter 2’s “Head of Security or CISO” explains that the CISO 
(or Head of Security by whatever title) must act as the authoritative 
“champion” for cybersecurity. CISOs must continually educate 
executives on what they need to know about cybersecurity from 
the business perspective, but frame the communication in terms of 
business risks, impacts, or opportunities.
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• Chapter 5’s “Board Communication” offers guidelines on how 
CISOs can communicate most effectively with the Board of Directors.
In addition, some of the guidance on communication skills and strategies in the next 
section, “Align Stakeholders on the Security Program,” may be effective with the C-Suite. 
But I can’t promise that gaining executive support and risk ownership will be easy. 
Business executives may limit security leaders’ access to them or resist good advice for 
any number of reasons. In the worst case:
• Chapter 3’s “Perverse Incentives” details scenarios where top 
executives are blind to risk, are indifferent to risk, or pursue plausible 
deniability by ignoring or suppressing reports of risk.
However, in most environments where business executives are working in good faith 
for the good of the business, your efforts will eventually be rewarded with understanding 
and acceptance. As security leaders, we must play the long game, always working to 
increase executive support and stakeholder alignment as we pursue prioritized security 
projects.
1.2.3  Align Stakeholders on the Security Program
The need for the CISO to function as more of a business leader and communicator than 
a technologist and to align security with the business is well understood. What’s less well 
documented is that CISOs must also lead their security teams to engage and align with 
the business at all levels, as shown in Figure 1-4.
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Once business leaders and staff see cybersecurity for the strategic program that it is, 
and perceive the security team as a business partner, security leaders will be more able 
to count on businesspeople to perform the security-related duties related to their roles. 
Business risk owners can also be coached to make better information risk decisions. 
The book provides plentiful guidance on improving role definitions, processes, and 
communications in pursuit of better cybersecurity-business alignment.
Chapter 2 will define our alignment problem space as follows:
• Cybersecurity-Business Alignment “A state of agreement or 
cooperation among persons or organizations with a common 
security interest. It is enabled through security governance structures, 
processes, communications skills, and relationships that engage the 
business. When in a state of alignment all business leaders, staff, and 
security-related processes act in accordance with clear roles and 
responsibilities to support the security program and strategy.”
Figure 1-4. The Cybersecurity-Business Alignment “Stack” 
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1.3  Set the Rational Cybersecurity Priorities
Information risk has multiple components – too many threats to assess individually, 
too many vulnerabilities to patch all at once, and many choices among controls. Where 
to start? What’s the priority? In his book “Advanced Persistent Security”,7 Ira Winkler 
tantalizes readers with the notion that it should be possible to get 95% of the benefit 
expected from a security program for 5% of the work. Winkler works in the area of 
security awareness, so it’s no surprise he believes the low-hanging fruit grows in the field 
of developing a healthy security culture.
I don’t disagree with Winkler about the importance of security culture and have 
devoted a whole chapter to the topic. But I think there are at least five other areas where 
businesses can take action to make the difference between a Sisyphean slog uphill to 
cybersecurity mediocrity versus an opportunity to quickly reduce the most severe risks 
and run a strong, business-aligned program for the long haul.
Can we find a way to gain 95% of the benefits for 5% of the work in cybersecurity? 
Or even just the proverbial Pareto Principle, aka the 80-20 rule? I think that we (security 
leaders) can, if we align with the business on the core Rational Cybersecurity priority 
areas shown in Figure 1-5.
Figure 1-5. Rational Cybersecurity Pareto Priorities
7 “Advanced Persistent Security: A Cyberwarfare Approach to Implementing Adaptive Enterprise 
Protection, Detection, and Reaction Strategies,” Ira Winkler and Araceli Treu Gomes, Syngress, 
2017.
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Mastering all these priorities is a long-term effort. Which one to do first, in what 
order, what granular controls to focus on, and how far to take the effort depends on the 
type of business and its process-level maturity. However, significant improvement can be 
made for most businesses by working on them incrementally.
Like most 80-20 rules, the Cybersecurity Pareto Priorities are a generalization to 
which there are some exceptions. For example, any business whose primary product, 
service, or mission requires intensive software development must elevate the Secure 
Software Development and Application Security Control Domain (see Chapter 6) right 
to the top of the list. Similarly, an electrical utility or gas pipeline operator must prioritize 
the Physical Security Control Domain. However, I’m confident that these six priorities 
should be top of mind for most businesses.
The following sections explain each priority and end with quick chapter overviews. 
The chapter overviews start with the chapter titles and summarize the chapters. The 
quoted text in each summary contains a partial list of section titles in each chapter and 
will be hyperlinked to the section if the digital book platform supports that.
The final chapter in this book – Chapter 10 – encourages security leaders to create a 
success plan using a worksheet I’ve provided. Using the instructions for the worksheet 
in Chapter 10, security leaders can kill two birds with one stone by reviewing the book 
as they create a personalized action plan with metrics on how to employ the Rational 
Cybersecurity guidance.
1.3.1  Develop and Govern a Healthy Security Culture
To paraphrase Winkler, a security culture is a set of customs and behaviors shared by 
a community, the correct practice of which minimizes the risks of being subverted or 
targeted for sabotage.
Too often, business leaders subscribe to our myth #1 that cybersecurity is just 
a technical problem to be left entirely in the hands of technical people. They don’t 
seriously consider security and risk in their interactions with other executives and 
managers. This indifference weakens the business’s ability to find synergistic security 
solutions, set ambitious goals to reduce or avoid its most serious risks, or even enforce its 
own security policies and compliance requirements.
On the other hand, business and security leaders and staff can treat cybersecurity as 
an important requirement. They can cooperate to define what Rational Cybersecurity 
means for their business. They can do this by developing a set of governance structures, 
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management processes, and defined roles or responsibilities which then improve 
security-related attitudes and behaviors at various levels of the organization.
Chapter 2, “Identify and Align Security-Related Roles”: Introduces some core 
concepts that Chapters 3 and 4 build on to describe how businesses can develop and 
govern a healthy security culture. Chapter 2 discusses psychological and behavioral 
factors in the “people pillars” of cybersecurity. The following sections advise using 
positive messaging and creating a sense of efficacy to accomplish the following goals:
• “Earn Trust and Cooperation from Users”
• “Hire, Motivate, and Retain Key Security Staff”
• “Clarify Security-Related Business Roles”
Chapter 3, “Put the Right Security Governance Model in Place”: The security- 
related roles discussed in Chapter 2 must be enacted in security governance and 
established in security policy. Chapter 3 describes trade-offs between centralized, 
decentralized, and matrixed security governance models. It explains security governance 
functions and the importance of aligning the security governance structure with 
the organizational structure, culture, executive intentions, and maturity levels. It 
also describes the components of security governance and how to optimize security 
governance activities. It advises security leaders on how to
• “Understand and Apply the Optimal Security Governance Model”
• “Reset (or Define) Security Governance”
• “Charter the Security Organization”
• “Specify CISO Reporting”
• “Institute Cross-Functional Coordination Mechanisms”
• “Manage Security Policy Libraries, Lifecycles, and Adoption”
• “Budget in Alignment with Risk and the Governance Model”
Chapter 4, “Strengthen Security Culture Through Communications and 
Awareness Programs”: Recommends that security leaders make enhancing 
communication a top priority and use targeted awareness training programs both to 
improve security behaviors and, strategically, improve the security culture. Note that 
improving security culture is a two-way street, requiring “attitude adjustments” both 
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in the business and in the security team itself. The following sections advise security 
leaders to
• “Make Enhancing Communication a Top Security Team Priority”
• “Target Awareness Campaigns and Training Initiatives”
• “Coordinate Awareness Messaging with Managers and Key 
Influencers in Target Audiences”
• “Commit to Improving Security Culture”
• “Measure and Improve”
1.3.2  Manage Risk in the Language of Business
Simply put, risk is the core topic for Rational Cybersecurity, I wrote earlier. For business 
risk owners to step up to taking accountability or responsibility for information risk, 
they will need to understand it in business terms like time to market, monetary losses, 
opportunity cost, and the brand.
In their book How to Measure Anything in Cybersecurity Risk,8 Douglas Hubbard 
and Richard Seiersen call a rigorous approach to risk management “the one patch 
most needed for cybersecurity.” In my experience, not quite all security professionals 
would agree. Some dispute whether a small business, or a business in its early stages 
of maturing a cybersecurity program, really needs to focus on risk management to the 
extent of building formal processes.
“Threats are all around us,” they might say. “We can’t predict exactly what they’ll do. 
Shouldn’t a security program just focus on implementing a good control baseline to fix 
the vulnerabilities?” That’s a great question, but in my view it’s never too early to begin 
risk management, and no organization is ever too small to need it, at least at a basic level.
Risk management is a top priority even for small organizations or security programs 
in their early stages for the following reasons: Without enough attention to risk analysis 
and risk management, business leaders can’t effectively assume accountability. 
Security leaders can’t make a rational case on spending and priorities. They can’t make 
8 How to Measure Anything in Cybersecurity Risk, Douglas Hubbard and RichardSeiersen, John 
Wiley & Sons, 2016
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defensible arguments on which risks to accept or avoid or even prioritize which security 
controls to implement first within their discretionary budgets.
The risk management models and processes we’ll discuss in Chapter 5 give the 
business the tools to determine which risks to care about and to quantify those risks in 
business terms such as the potential time and money impact of a breach against a new 
product launch or one of the business’s key customers.
Chapter 5, “Manage Risk in the Language of Business”: Begins by discussing how to 
address common challenges such as the lack of consistent information risk terminology, 
subjective qualitative analysis methods, and a myopic focus on controls. It recommends 
adopting the quantitative FAIR model within the ISO 31000 risk management framework 
and working with business and IT leaders to implement an information risk management 
program. It provides guidance for security leaders on how to
• “Establish the Context for the Risk Program”
• “Define Accountabilities, Risk Appetites, and Risk Processes”
• “Implement Tiered Risk Assessment”
• “Treat Risks Holistically”
• “Monitor Issues and Risks Continuously”
• “Communicate Risk to Stakeholders Effectively”
1.3.3  Establish a Control Baseline
To mitigate risks that could materialize into losses, businesses must establish a set of 
baseline controls. The optimal controls will vary for different types of businesses. The 
key thing to recognize is that there is some subset that your business should implement 
as a matter of basic security hygiene. Put another way, if any of these controls were 
completely absent, the business would be a sitting duck exploitable by any adversary 
with a room temperature IQ.
Chapter 6, “Establish a Control Baseline”: Covers common challenges such as 
lack of a unifying control architecture or risk models and the need to avoid instituting 
controls out of line of the business culture. It introduces control standards such as the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 
and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27001 series. It guides 
security leaders to
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• “Select a Control Baseline from the Essential Control Domains”
• “Serve up a Balanced Diet of Controls” (per NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework’s Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover categories)
• “Develop Architectural Model and Plans for Control Implementation”
• “Use a Two or Three Lines of Defense Model for Control Assurance”
• “Apply a Shared Responsibility Model to the Control Baseline”
• “Scale and Align the Control Baseline”
1.3.4  Simplify and Rationalize IT and Security
What you cannot manage, you cannot secure. A control baseline can’t be fully or efficiently 
implemented across a chaotic IT environment. Many IT organizations have accumulated 
technical debt by not rationalizing their infrastructure platforms and application 
portfolios. A former colleague of mine once characterized IT organizations as “curators of 
their own IT museums.” They have too many platforms, too many applications performing 
similar functions, and too many vendors. The systems don’t interoperate unless stitched 
together by complex integration tools, some developed in- house but often undocumented 
and unmaintainable once their original programmers depart.
A large organization may have multiple business units running parts of multiple IT 
stacks in silos. The security issues – especially those created by the integration between 
systems maintained by different groups – may be neglected. Security budgets go to waste 
building a security infrastructure that rivals the IT infrastructure in complexity.
Chapter 7, “Simplify and Rationalize IT and Security”: Shows how security leaders 
can, just by doing their job well, be a catalyst for IT improvement and thereby help 
security’s cause. It advises security leaders on how to
• “Help Develop a Strategy to Consolidate and Simplify IT”
• “Learn from Digital Initiatives”
• “Provide Security for a Governed Multicloud Environment”
• “Include Security Services in the IT Service Catalog”
• “Upgrade IT Operations with DevSecOps and Disciplined Agile”
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1.3.5  Control Access with Minimal Drag on the Business
Every business has rules and requirements for how information assets should be 
accessed, shared, or used. The business should determine these requirements based 
on its needs and opportunities primarily, risk and compliance secondarily, and only 
then based on IT constraints and dependencies. Regulations such as GDPR have made 
the control domains concerned with identity and access management (IAM) as well as 
data governance even more critical. But IAM has always been a challenging domain for 
businesses to master because it requires cross-functional engagement across silos from 
businesses that lack the maturity in security or access governance to do this well.
Chapter 8, “Control Access with Minimal Drag on the Business”: Explains IAM 
and data governance models. It identifies challenges such as the typical organization’s 
immaturity and/or outdated deployments. It describes a tendency for some business 
cultures to emphasize prescriptive rules for access and others to give staff overly broad 
privileges to “get the job done.” It recommends that security leaders work with their 
organizations to
• “Balance Access Control and Accountability”
• “Modernize IAM to Enable Digital Business”
• “Take a Proactive Approach on Privacy”
• “Monitor Identity-Related Events and Context”
• “Build Up Identity, Privilege, and Data Governance Services”
• “Risk-Inform Access Management Functions”
1.3.6  Institute Resilient Detection, Response, 
and Recovery
According to the 2018 Verizon breach report,9 the “dwell time” for cyberattackers or 
malware once having penetrated a business network was measured in “months” for 
68% of breaches. As similar numbers had been reported in previous years, these reports 
contributed to the perception of omnipotent organized cybercriminals and nation-state 
9 “2018 Data Breach Investigations Report,” Verizon, Inc., April 2018, accessed at https://
enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/DBIR_2018_Report.pdf
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attackers always overrunning hapless defenders (“you’ve already been breached, you 
just don’t know it yet” or “it’s not a question of ‘if’ it’s a question of ‘when’ ”).
Although there is some truth in these cautions, the good news is that businesses can 
and should aspire to keep (notionally) 98% of the attackers out of their networks, detect 
and eradicate most that do penetrate within minutes or hours, and at all times keep 
them away from the business’s “crown jewels.” Even top-shelf cybercriminals and nation- 
state operatives (the 2%) can be resisted, detected, and delayed for some time by the 
right set of cyber-resilience measures.
Chapter 9, “Institute Resilience Through Detection, Response, and Recovery”: 
In addition to the “dwell time” challenge, it highlights issues with business 
unpreparedness for response, difficulty staffing state-of-the-art security operations 
center (SOC) functions, and the lack of visibility to all IT systems. It describes good 
practices for security monitoring in a broad sense, including processes to coordinate 
defense with users, business stakeholders, and external parties. It also provides 
guidance on how a cross- functional Computer Security Incident Response Team 
(CSIRT) should respond to incidents in alignment with groups such as security 
operations, public relations (PR), legal, HR, and (in some cases) business continuity 
management (BCM). The BCM team must also enable the business to recover from 
incidents whether they are caused by IT outages or cyberattacks. It advises security 
leaders on how to
• “Identify Critical Business Assets, Risk Scenarios, and Contingency Plans”
• “Detect Cybersecurity Events Consistently and Promptly”
• “Coordinate Detection with Users, Business Stakeholders, and 
External Parties”
• “Respond to Incidents”
• “Plan for Incident Response”
• “Establish the IR Program”
• “Evolve the IR Program for Cyber-Resilience”
• “Recover from Incidents Caused by Cyberattacks and Operational 
Outages”
• “Activate Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plans”
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1.4  Scale Security Programs to your Organization Type
Cybersecurity isn’t a one-size-fits-all proposition. Executives and Boards of Directors 
always want to know: How much is enough? What approaches to cybersecurity are right 
for us? There aren’t easy answers to these questions; however, common sense dictates 
one must scale the cybersecurity effort to the kind of business one is in and the IT 
realities of the business.
Throughout the book, we’ll use the following cybersecurity scaling factors to help 
guide readers’ thinking about how this material applies to their own businesses:
• Size of the organization
• Complexity of the IT infrastructure
• Security pressure
• National and industry origins
• Maturity
1.4.1  Size of the Organization
As a rule of thumb, “large” organizations have more than $2 billion in revenue, 
“medium” organizations have from $200 million to $2 billion, and “small” organizations 
have less than $200 million. One can also gauge size by the number of employees. 
Overall headcount affects organizational complexity, security governance structures, 
and available resources for protection. In most cases, the larger the revenues, the larger 
the headcount and facility footprint of the business as well.
Larger organizations have more IT and security staff and more systems. This means 
that they need more security infrastructure, processes, and policies and that they have 
resources to manage them. This book is intended for security leaders, managers, or 
architects in organizations with at least two people dedicated to work on security. That 
is still a small business or organization, but it probably has between at least 50 and 200 
employees depending on its industry and technology footprint.
Chapter 1  exeCutive Overview
25
1.4.2  Complexity of the IT Infrastructure
Complexity of the business itself (number of regions, lines of business) tends to increase 
the complexity of IT as each part of the business generates unique requirements for and 
may build or operate part of the IT infrastructure. We also consider
• The number of infrastructure platforms
• The number of applications
• The number of integration tools exchanging data between platforms 
or applications, monitoring, or applying centralized policy
• The degree to which an organization develops custom applications 
for its line of business
What makes one organization have “low complexity” vs. another have “high 
complexity?” All else being equal, organizations that customize off-the-shelf tools or 
services – or build new ones unique to their lines of business – are more complex than 
organizations that stick to standard configurations and off-the-shelf solutions. Also, 
an organization with many duplicate infrastructure platforms or applications (e.g., 
running both SAP and Oracle ERP suites) tends to be more complex than one that has 
standardized on a single infrastructure or application solution for each business need.
1.4.3  Security Pressure
An organization under “high” security pressure is one continually targeted by top- 
tier threats and/or subject to intense regulatory requirements or public scrutiny. 
Financial services, government agencies, high technology, and other businesses with 
high value digital assets tend to experience high security pressure, as may some critical 
infrastructure operators, telecommunications, energy businesses, or health care. A few 
organizations – such as the military and intelligence agencies – fall under “very high” 
security pressure. They must stay on constant alert for cyberattacks and often engage 
in offensive security measures or counterattacks not legally permitted to most other 
businesses. (Those scenarios aren’t covered in this book.)
Organizations in retail, business services, manufacturing, and other industries may 
have “low” security pressure so long as they have a relatively low dependence on IT and 
are in lines of business with relatively few compliance concerns.
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Organizations that don’t fit the profile for “low” or “high” security pressure can be 
characterized as having “medium” security pressure.
1.4.4  National and Industry Origins
What countries or regions of the world the business operates in, where it has its 
headquarters and sources executive leadership, are likely to drive business culture and 
therefore the security culture. Chapter 4 includes some discussion on the effects of 
national origins and other cultural factors on the security program.
1.4.5  Maturity
In the short term, the level of maturity at a business will determine what cybersecurity 
measures it can successfully undertake. For example, we might not recommend 
advanced data governance or matrix security governance for an organization with low 
maturity levels.
When we scale recommendations or guidance to maturity in a few of the chapters, 
we’ll use the cybersecurity maturity model shown in Figure 1-6. The maturity levels 
cited are used for my security architecture consulting practice and are like those 
defined by the Carnegie Mellon Institute’s Capability Maturity Model. I describe the 
security maturity levels in more detail on my blog.10 As Figure 1-6 suggests, the model 
is holistic in that as consultants we measure a capability’s maturity based not just on 
technology but also on people and process. At higher maturity levels, we expect to see 
an alignment between the security, business, and IT functions; to score as “managed,” a 
capability should be well supported by affected business leaders as well as the security 
organization.
Most businesses can operate comfortably with some capabilities at the “Defined” 
and others at the “Managed” level. Businesses with higher levels of security pressure 
require higher levels of maturity; the larger the mismatch, the worse for them. However, 
few if any need to take all their capabilities at all locations to the “Optimized” level. The 
required level of maturity must – like everything else in cybersecurity – be linked to risk.
10 “How to Assess Security Maturity and Make Improvements,” Dan Blum, Security 
Architects Partners, February 2019, Accessed at: https://security-architect.com/
how-to-assess-security-maturity-and-roadmap-improvements/
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1.5  Call to Action
The core recommendations for security leaders from this chapter are to
• Establish Rational Cybersecurity; i.e., an explicitly defined 
security program based on the risks, culture, and capabilities of an 
organization that is endorsed by executives and aligned with its 
mission, stakeholders, and processes.
• Create shared accountability and responsibility between business 
leaders and security leaders as the starting point for alignment 
on information risks. Business leaders own the risks, and security 
leaders should manage risks under the business direction.
Figure 1-6. The Rational Cybersecurity Maturity Model
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Get Started with the Success Plan Worksheet
The Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet11 is provided in a Microsoft 
Word file as a template for readers to record their progress pursuing cybersecurity- 
business alignment. The Success Plan uses a simple methodology with just a few steps:
 1. Scope out priority focus areas (using the six Pareto Priorities in 
this chapter)
 2. Identify stakeholders (in security-related business roles)
 3. Make a quick assessment of your current state
 4. Define improvement objectives (within your priority focus areas)
 5. Identify metrics
 6. Track progress
Scope Out Your Priority Focus Areas
The Success Plan Worksheet is structured to help readers work on improving 
cybersecurity-business alignment through projects related to any or all the six Pareto 
Priorities. Here’s how to decide whether to focus on all of them or just some.
New Heads of Security, new CISOs, or CISOs with a mandate to expand or reshape 
the security program should consider acting on all six Rational Cybersecurity priorities. 
Other security leaders – such as well-established CISOs just wanting to tweak their 
program, part-time interim CISO caretakers, or security managers under the CISO – 
should primarily focus on the priorities within their own area of responsibilities or where 
they see the greatest gaps and opportunities.
Action
Check mark your Priority Focus Areas in Table 1, Section 1, of the Success Plan 
Worksheet. Although most security leaders at most businesses should not need to add 
additional rows, some should. If you need to, add additional rows for priorities such as 
“Secure our customer-facing services” to the table.
11 “Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, May 2020, 
accessed at https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet
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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license  
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
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Most technical security controls, or processes, do little without people in control. 
Firewalls require administrators to install and configure them. Access request systems 
need managers to review who should have access to the target application or database. 
Secure software coding depends almost entirely on the coders learning the right 
practices and testing or scanning tools. Everyone in the business has some part to play. 
Therefore, this chapter introduces some core concepts that Chapters 3 and 4 will build 
on to describe how businesses can improve security governance and security culture.
Cybersecurity requires leadership. It cannot operate in a silo and be effective but 
must be aligned with many different business functions. Therefore – especially in large 
or mid-sized businesses – multiple business and IT leaders have security-related roles 
to play. The core security leadership role is often given to a Chief Information Security 
Officer (CISO), but strong leaders must also be in place for risk management, business 
continuity management, compliance, and audit. A few of those functions may report to 
the CISO, but others usually do not.
Cybersecurity works best when the business explicitly acknowledges its cross- 
functional reality and gives security leaders the resources and support structures 
required to be effective. Many businesses haven’t got to this point. It takes an 
enlightened executive (such as the CEO) and/or a charismatic, determined, and 
knowledgeable CISO to impress this realization on the business and sometimes on 
his or her own staff. Thus, the security leaderships’ “soft” communication skills  
(e.g., CISO to Board of Directors’ presentations) can be just as important as their 
“hard” technical skills.
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In general, the security team should improve its communication skills and learn 
a bit of practical psychology to engage businesspeople and earn their trust. Spreading 
awareness of the shared mission (the definition, or Why?) of cybersecurity and clarifying 
security-related roles are vital. Business managers and staff can be motivated and 
trained to support the security program and make intelligent risk decisions, such as 
which vendors to work with and when to share or not share sensitive data with partners.
The chapter provides guidance for security leaders on how to
• Recognize the people pillars of cybersecurity defense
• Understand business and security-related roles
• Address common challenges
• Hire, motivate, and retain key security staff
• Make engaging the business the first order of business
• Clarify security-related business roles
• Earn trust and cooperation from users
2.1  Recognize the People Pillars of Cybersecurity 
Defense
A business can’t run a security program by dint of the security team’s efforts alone. 
Business leaders need to communicate the importance of supporting security to the 
whole organization. Table 2-1 provides a brief layout of basic security functions across 
the organization. The rest of this chapter goes into much more detail, breaking out these 
functions and how they work together.
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The security program rests on the shoulders of many people with security-related 
roles. These roles must be aligned. For the purpose of Rational Cybersecurity, we define 
alignment as follows.
CYBERSECURITY-BUSINESS ALIGNMENT
“a state of agreement or cooperation among persons or organizations with a common security 
interest. It is enabled through security governance structures, processes, communications 
skills, and relationships that engage the business. When in a state of alignment all business 
leaders, staff, and security-related processes act in accordance with clear roles and 
responsibilities to support the security program and strategy.”
Table 2-1. The Broad Security-Related Role Categories Throughout the Business
People 
Category





Board of directors, 







officer (CIo), Chief 
Information Security 
officer (CISo) or 








line of business 
or corporate 
administration 



















Build or operate 
loB or business 
administration 
functions effectively 
and securely with the 
help of security staff
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2.2  Understand Business and Security-Related 
Roles
Although security leaders head up the security function, they also report to a business 
leader such as the CIO or CEO. In general, top business leaders are responsible for 
“owning” information risks as part of enterprise risk management, overseeing the 
operations of security leadership, and setting cybersecurity budgets and strategic 
priorities for their areas.
To effectively carry out their security oversight functions, business leaders must 
understand the business impacts of information risk and the value of cybersecurity as 
a business enabler that helps organizations grow, or operate, with confidence. Business 
leaders set the “tone at the top” which determines whether business staff will treat 
security policies as mandatory requirements or as optional ones to be followed when 
convenient. Senior business executives must also adjudicate any disputes between the 
security function and business managers or staff.
Unfortunately, business leaders don’t always understand what’s needed for them to 
control and oversee the security function. After all, this wasn’t on the Business School 
curriculum at university in the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s when most of them got their 
degrees; digital businesses and organized cybercrime simply did not exist at the time.
2.2.1  Board-Level Oversight
Historically, not all business leaders understood the need or importance of cybersecurity 
oversight, and many considered or still consider cybersecurity as just a technical issue. 
Fortunately, that myth is starting to be dispelled by none other than the US National 
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).
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SELECTED NACD PRINCIPLES FOR CYBER-RISK OVERSIGHT1:
• “directors need to understand and approach cybersecurity as an enterprise- 
wide risk management issue, not just an It issue
• Boards should have adequate access to cybersecurity expertise, and 
discussions about cyber-risk management should be given regular and 
adequate time on board meeting agendas
• directors should set the expectations that management will establish an 
enterprise-wide cyber risk management framework with adequate staffing and 
budget”
NACD Director’s Handbook on Cyber-Risk Oversight
How closely Boards follow NACD’s guidance varies regionally and by industry. 
Boards of many larger companies in regulated industries are formally instituting these 
kinds of practices. Overall, we see an increase in Board accountability and awareness for 
cybersecurity.
However, many Boards continue to lack the expertise or structure that would enable 
them to actively oversee cybersecurity. Professor James Tompkins, Kennesaw State 
University, performed in-depth interviews with 20 Board Risk Committee Chairs. He 
found that many Boards did not have a Risk Committee, did not have a formal process 
for categorizing and reviewing risks, and lacked the ability to quantify risks. Citing 
examples such as Enron’s accounting and Wells Fargo’s prefinancial crisis mortgages, 
Tompkins said, “Any major corporate scandal may be an example of poor risk oversight.”
1 “NACD Publishes Five Cybersecurity Principles Every Board Director Needs to Know,” Christophe 
Veltsos, Security Intelligence, February 2017, accessed at https://securityintelligence.com/
nacd-publishes-five-cybersecurity-principles-every-board-director-needs-to-know/
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Although the Board of Directors should not manage details of 
security programs, it should have a good understanding of what 
information risks mean to the business and a committee structure 
through which it can set direction for risk management.
2.2.2  Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
The buck stops with the top business executive, whether he or she is called the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), President, University Dean, Head of Agency, and so on. Chief 
executives are the captains of the cybersecurity ship. They can delegate to security 
leaders but remain accountable to the Board and general public for any serious failure.
As the number of cybersecurity breaches has increased in the 2000s and 2010s, so 
have the consequences for CEOs. In recent years CEOs from companies such as Equifax, 
Sony PlayStation, Target, Ashley Madison, and Experian in the United States resigned or 
were forced out after a breach. Globally, senior executives from Austrian aerospace parts 
manufacturer FACC, the Bangladesh Central Bank, and doubtless many others lost their 
positions as well.2
CEOs are beginning to understand they could be held accountable for cybersecurity, 
but many are still failing even to ensure a “defensible” cybersecurity stance for their 
business. In a blog post, Gartner cites eight common CEO-level failings, such as leaving 
cybersecurity “buried in IT” or not establishing transparent and quantitative risk 
management or accountability.3
Although cybersecurity begins with the proverbial “tone at the top,” CEOs’ 
responsibilities go beyond just setting the tone. CEOs must also address cybersecurity- 
related objectives with their direct reports and ensure the right people are in place and 
managing cybersecurity. This gives us our next key to cybersecurity-business alignment.
2 “Cyber Security Breach CEO Retired, Fired, Gone,” Ultimate Business Continuity, 2017
3 “Keep Your Job After a Cyberattack,” Susan Moore, Gartner, July 2019, accessed at www.gartner.
com/smarterwithgartner/keep-your-job-after-a-cyberattack/
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CEOs should think of cybersecurity as a business as well as a 
technical problem, oversee a sound security program by appointing an 
empowered security leadership, and if necessary, intervene to ensure 
their direct reports are supporting the security program.
2.2.3  Head of Security or CISO
Although the CEO is accountable for security, almost all technical and operational 
functions must be delegated due to their complexity. Therefore, in almost every sizable 
modern business, there is some recognized CISO, or “Head of Security” going under 
another title, responsible for the core security organization.
The CISO operates and communicates as the champion for cybersecurity. He or she 
should continuously educate executives on what they need to know about cybersecurity 
from the business perspective, but always frame the communication in terms of business 
risks, impacts, or opportunities.
In smaller organizations, the CISO may be the proverbial jack of all trades, that is, 
serving as the line manager for risk, operations, and more. In a large company with 
multiple divisions, multiple business information security officers (BISOs) may serve as 
liaisons to business units for the CISO or work more or less autonomously.
Important this book often uses the terms “CISo” and “top security leader” 
interchangeably with “head of Security.” It uses the term “security leader(s)” to 
refer to functions that could be handled either by the CISo or another security 
manager or staff member taking a leadership role.
Using these titles interchangeably is OK if we remember that the “CISO” title implies 
a “chief officer” role as well as a security role. It creates an expectation that the titleholder 
can represent the security program to the Board of Directors, external regulators, and 
other stakeholders as well as sit in on top business and IT leader meetings as a peer. Top 
security leaders without the CISO title might have similar executive visibility, but there’s 
less of a presumption that they will.
In fact, many businesses don’t have a person with the CISO title. Even among 
large private companies in the United States, one survey found that 38% of the Fortune 
500 didn’t have a CISO and fewer than 4% of those who did listed the CISO on their 
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company’s leadership pages.4 Leaving aside so-called Virtual CISOs (V-CISOs), it’s a 
safe bet that the majority of smaller organizations probably don’t have a person with the 
CISO title and the role that it implies.
Giving a security leader the CISO title and providing him or her with the business 
access and visibility the role presumes comes at a higher cost than retaining just any 
technically qualified security leader. But businesses need a top security leader with 
strong business acumen as well as managerial and technical skills. I strongly recommend 
that large or mid-sized businesses under medium or higher security pressure as well as 
any smaller businesses under high security pressure formally anoint the top security 
leader with the “CISO” title.
2.2.4  Other Chief Executives (CXOs)
Operational executives – such as the Chief Operations Officer (COO), Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO), or other “CXOs” – often proxy for the CEO internally to the company. 
Although CEO accountability can’t be fully delegated, the CXO may take some 
responsibility for cybersecurity oversight from the CEO. This can be successful if it is a 
stable arrangement and the CXO has, and is seen to have, the CEO’s full backing.
The Chief Information Officer (CIO) or other “heads of IT” often report to a CXO 
below the CEO. Even if the CIO reports to the CEO, the position is usually one level down 
from the CEO’s inner circle in terms of power and influence in the organization.
2.2.5  Audit, Compliance, and Other Security-Related 
Functions
Beyond the basic business-security leadership hierarchy, organizations have many 
additional security-related functions. Figure 2-1 illustrates some of these functions and 
their relationship to business stakeholders. The figure shows stakeholders on the outer 
edge of the circle closest to the functions that affect them.
4 “Fortune 500 Faces Major CISO Challenges,” DH Kass, MSSP Alert, October 2019, accessed at 
www.msspalert.com/cybersecurity-talent/fortune-500-ciso-challenges/
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The five additional security-related functions in the figure work as follows:
• Risk management plays out at multiple levels. Some businesses 
have a formal enterprise risk management (ERM) practice to deal 
with financial, market, project, business continuity, and other risks 
in addition to information (i.e., IT and cybersecurity) risks. ERM may 
be headed by a Chief Risk Officer (CRO). A large organization under 
significant security pressure may have a whole team dealing just with 
cybersecurity and IT operational risk.
• Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) coordinates 
with law enforcement, Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 
(ISACs), Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), and managed 
security service providers on monitoring cyberattacks and other threat 
intelligence. Often part of the security organization, the CSIRT leads the 
response to major incidents and during those emergencies may take 
temporary control of security operations staff and other functions.
Figure 2-1. More Security-Related Functions and Business Stakeholders
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• Business continuity management works with IT operations to 
assure availability and reliability in the event of cyberattacks, logical 
or physical system failures, or errors on the part of staff. It ensures 
that business services comply with their service-level agreements 
(SLAs) to internal or external customers and partners. It develops 
business continuity/disaster recovery (BC/DR) plans. It oversees 
backup systems, and warm or cold standby data center or cloud 
computing capacity. It tests contingency plans that utilize the 
standby sites or other emergency facilities. It monitors the SLAs of 
the service providers and vendors the business depends on.
• Privacy and compliance management works to ensure that 
personal information is protected and that other compliance 
requirements are met. Recall Table 1-1 (compliance regulations) 
from Chapter 1; most businesses have sector-specific regulations 
that may cause the compliance function to work closely with 
security operations, business continuity, or both. The team works 
with internal or external Data Protection Officers as required by 
regulations such as GDPR for privacy. It provides guidance and 
tools to support compliant customer-facing sales, marketing, and 
operations processes. In health care, pharmaceutical, and some 
manufacturing operations, the compliance function must also work 
with internal and external quality control or safety inspectors.
• Audit management concerns itself with many corporate functions, 
including IT and security. Most regulated organizations – any large public 
company or university in the United States, for example – have an internal 
audit team. Audit management also manages the communication 
between business executives, IT, and external auditors. Audit is an 
important “check and balance” on the other IT security functions.
A large organization typically has many security, business, and IT leaders performing 
these functions with entire departments under them. Medium or small organizations 
may just have one person performing each of these functions. In the extreme case, one 
security officer might handle all of them.
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2.2.6  Corporate Administration
Executives from corporate administration functions such as human resources (HR), 
finance, legal, facilities management, and sales and marketing have specialized roles to 
play in cybersecurity. Many organizations also have a centralized program management 
and vendor (or third-party) management offices.
In smaller organizations, each of these functions tends to be a small group, and the 
CISO (or other team members) may deal with the functional executives directly.
In larger organizations, these functions tend to contain many people. The CISO can 
sometimes interact with the functional executives via a security steering committee 
(see Chapter 3’s section “Institute Cross-Functional Coordination Mechanisms”), and 
managers or staff under the CISO should work directly with counterparts to handle 
incidents or issues, define policies or processes, and run projects. In a decentralized 
business, the security team may need to work with multiple corporate administration 
functions distributed across LOBs.
Human resources (HR) performs background checks on new hires and has a role in 
onboarding all new staff as well as hiring staff for the security team. It also has oversight 
of or provides input and approval for the following security-related functions:
• Personnel-related security policy (e.g., for acceptable use policy or 
bring your own device (BYOD) policy)
• Security-related roles and responsibilities (e.g., do they comply with 
personnel policies, union rules)
• Disciplinary actions for security policy violations
• Incentive programs to promote better risk management or security 
behavior
• User awareness training content
Finance approves or manages the security budget and typically has input and 
approval on the following security-related functions:
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCI DSS), American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) Service Organization Control 2 (SOC 2), and 
other financial audits which cover internal controls
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• Quantitative risk management models used for information risks
• Estimating financial risk
• Cyber-insurance policy procurement and interaction with the carrier
• Procurement of IT and security tools and services
• Vendor management or contractor management
Legal approves or manages security-related content contracts with employees, third 
parties such as vendors and contractors, and the participants in mergers, acquisitions, 
and joint ventures. It has input and approval on the following security-related functions:
• Audit, compliance, and HR-related security issues
• Breach investigations, response, and notifications
• Security policies
• Estimating liability risk
Facilities management provides physical security for business’s physical plant, 
including offices, data centers, and other operational facilities.
Sales and marketing are on the front line, simultaneously generating revenue 
and creating information risk for the business. Marketing may have an internal 
communications group that can support the security team’s user awareness and training 
programs. A public relations (PR) department within marketing needs to be engaged in 
security incident response.
2.2.7  Line of Business (LOB) Executives
LOB executives may function as CEOs of subsidiaries or operate departments with 
considerable autonomy. In private companies, they may have P&L accountability for 
their group or at least major responsibility for the LOB (aka business unit) strategic and 
operational decisions. Larger LOBs sometimes dominate the IT function of the parent 
organization; the CIO from the largest or most profitable business unit may even provide 
shared services to the others. LOBs often contain their own corporate administration 
functions that operate in a fully or partially autonomous manner.
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2.3  Address Common Challenges
Common challenges with people and organization in cybersecurity on the business side 
include
• Business and security leaders working at cross-purposes
• Cybersecurity not considered strategic
• Poor coordination between security-related functions
• Security leaders struggle with stress and overwhelm
• Frustrated and under-resourced security teams
2.3.1  Working at Cross-Purposes
A core challenge in the 2020 cybersecurity landscape is that business and security 
leaders – each of whom has a part to play – often work at cross-purposes. This puts the 
business at risk and distracts from productive business operation and growth.
Figure 2-2. Is Your Security Culture Functional or Dysfunctional?
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A 2017 Information Security Governance survey5 conducted by Gartner, Inc., found 
that LOB executives or managers rarely (<15%) constitute the primary membership 
of organizations’ cybersecurity governance bodies, such as an Information Security 
Steering Committee. Business unit engagement in developing the content of security 
policies that will affect them, such as information classification, isn’t much higher. 
Gartner interprets such low engagement as reflective of the continuing difficulties 
security leaders have in convincing business leaders on the value of cybersecurity and 
the necessity of support from administration functions such as legal, HR, finance, and 
supplier management as well as LOBs.
Speaking plainly for the cybersecurity industry as of early 2020, security leaders have 
a sense of overwhelm, and many business leaders are disengaged. Why is that?
In their seminal book on “CISO Soft Skills”,6 authors Ron Collette and Mike Gentile 
teamed up with sociologist Skye Gentile to diagnose cybersecurity’s core people problem 
as one of apathy, myopia, the struggle for political primacy, and a state of relative infancy 
in society’s understanding of the cybersecurity space. The authors also describe security 
programs using system theory, in which the dysfunctional mindsets they have identified 
are both polluted inputs to the program and toxic exhaust from it. They pinpoint poor 
communication, a sense of powerlessness, and disruptive changes as being among the 
causes of these problems.
Often, the trouble begins at the top.
2.3.2  Cybersecurity Not Considered Strategic
Although numerous surveys and observations show increased Board of Directors and 
Executive concern for cybersecurity, many business leaders don’t consider cybersecurity 
strategic. According to PwC’s “Global State of Information Security Survey 2018”,7 
only 44% of survey respondents say their corporate boards actively participate in 
5 “Survey Analysis: Information Security Governance, 2017,” Wam Voster, Gartner, October 2017
6 “CISO Soft Skills”: Securing Organizations Impaired by Employee Politics, Apathy, and Intolerant 
Perspectives, Ron Collette, Mike Gentile, Skye Gentile, CRC Press, 2009
7 “Global State of Information Security Survey,” PWC, 2018, accessed at www.pwc.com/us/en/
services/consulting/cybersecurity/library/information-security-survey.html
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their companies’ overall security strategy. A survey of CISOs8 by Nominet, a UK-based 
provider of network security services, echoes PwC’s findings. Of the 460 CISOs Nominet 
surveyed, 65% cited the lack of senior management buy-in to the advice of security 
employees as a problem, and only 6% reported having ANY Board member “highly 
knowledgeable” about cybersecurity.
Rather than despairing at these kinds of statistics, security leaders should help raise 
business leader awareness. It’s critical, anyway, for security leaders to cultivate the 
necessary communication and business engagement skills per sections “Make Engaging 
the Business the First Order of Business” and “Earn Trust and Cooperation from Users.”
2.3.3  Poor Coordination Between Security-Related 
Functions
The level of commitment and experience that leaders or staff performing any of the 
security-related functions outside of the core security organization have also varies. 
In a mid-sized or large organization with high security pressure and a mature security 
program, it’s likely that auditors, risk officers, privacy officers, and so on will be 
experienced, certified, and committed. In a large organization with decentralized IT or 
security governance, however, the security-related functions may be heavily duplicated 
across different business units, and staff experience, commitment, and process maturity 
can vary widely; in these and smaller organizations, some functions may be missing 
entirely or be occupied by inexperienced personnel.
As businesses become more dependent on digital technologies that blur logical/
physical and social/technical lines, cybersecurity risk spills further into business 
functions. Like the CISO, leaders of centralized or LOB-level security–related risk, 
compliance, and other functions must have “soft” business and communication skills 
as well as technical skills as they may be called upon to perform advisory or consulting 
roles to LOBs. These leaders also need specialized, industry sector–specific skills.
8 “Life Inside the Perimeter: Understanding the Modern CISO,” Nominet, February 2019, accessed 
at https://media.nominet.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/12130924/Nominet-Cyber_CISO-
report_FINAL-130219.pdf
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The degree of direct control that the CISO has over security-related functions 
outside of the core security organization varies. Some CISOs have control over all 
security operations and policies, others just over policy or just over operations. With the 
increasing complexity and uneven maturity of security-related functions scattered across 
the business, coordination is a major cross-functional challenge.
2.3.4  Security Leaders Struggle with Stress and 
Overwhelm
The Nominet survey echoed PwC’s findings that cybersecurity is not considered strategic 
from the perspective of 460 CISOs interviewed.
SELECTED FINDINGS FROM NOMINET’S “LIFE INSIDE THE PERIMETER SURVEY”
“BOARDS STILL DON’T UNDERSTAND, CREATING JOB INSECURITY,” Nominet.
CISo’s surveyed believe too few board members have an in-depth understanding of 
cybersecurity and do not accept it’s strategic importance. although 60% of CISos think the 
board understands a breach is inevitable, many expect to be fired or disciplined should a 
breach occur. Most CISos remain in the job for less than 3 years.
“CISOs FIND IT HARD TO DISCONNECT AND ARE EXPERIENCING DAMAGING STRESS 
LEVELS,” Nominet.
CISos unanimously agree the role is stressful. almost all live with moderate to high stress and 
60% report that they rarely disconnect. “Worryingly,” writes nominet, “a quarter think the job 
has had an impact on their mental or physical health, with the same stating that it has had an 
impact on their personal and family relationships. nearly 17% of CISos are either medicating 
or using alcohol to deal with job stress.”
The average CISO’s job tenure is, depending on what source you believe, at best 
about 18–30 months. An effective CISO may tend to want to stay somewhat longer. 
However, according to the “Life and Times of Cybersecurity Professionals” survey from 
the Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) and Information Systems Security Association 
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(ISSA),9 two of the top three reasons CISOs leave are “organization does not have a 
culture that emphasizes cybersecurity” and “CISO is not an active participant with 
executive manager and/or Board of Directors.”
Another Nominet report called “Trouble at the Top”10 surveyed business executives 
rather than CISOs. On the positive side, the report found that executive awareness 
of cyber threats and a sense of breach inevitability are increasing. However, many 
executives still lack basic knowledge of cybersecurity and are not empowering CISOs to 
take charge during breaches, not providing enough financial resources, and not making 
CISOs (who are under stress and overworked) feel valued and supported.
2.3.5  Frustrated and Under-Resourced Security Teams
Besides the CISO, security managers and staff design, implement, operate, or oversee 
cybersecurity capabilities for the business. Security architects, engineers, administrators, 
and other security specialists also play critical roles in the business.
Below the CISO level, the stress level is likely less than detailed in the Nominet 
report. But other ISSA/ESG survey findings shown in Figure 2-3 are troubling.
9 “The Life and Times of Cybersecurity Professionals,” Jon Oltsik, Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) 
and Information System Security Association International (ISSA), April 2019, accessed at  
www.esg-global.com/esg-issa-research-report-2018
10 “Trouble at the Top: The boardroom battle for cyber supremacy,” Nominet, June 2019, accessed 
at www.nominet.uk/boardroom-battle-for-cyber-supremacy/
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A chronic global shortage11 of an estimated 3 million skilled cybersecurity managers 
and staff doesn’t help matters. The lack of adequate security staff and training of 
nontechnical employees has been found to be a leading cause of security incidents 
and breaches. Hiring qualified security engineers can take up to six months. In the 
meantime, the security team is under-resourced, and it must overwork the security 
staff it has or put unskilled workers on the job. When a business also has “security tool 
sprawl” (see Chapter 7, on overly complex IT and security environments), the problem 
worsens.
Only about 39% of staff security respondents from the ISSA/ESG 2019 survey 
reported being “very satisfied.” Most are solicited by recruiters at least a few times a 
month in what the survey authors called “a ‘seller’s market’ for cybersecurity talent along 
with salary inflation, high attrition, and cutthroat competition for skilled applicants” 
in which “the three-year research trend clearly indicates that organizations are not 
improving their ability to deal with the cybersecurity skills shortage.”
Figure 2-3. Security Teams’ Frustration with the Business (Source: ISSA/ESG 
survey)
11 “Cybersecurity Skills Shortage Soars, Nearing 3 Million,” (ISC)2, October 2018, accessed at 
https://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/2018/10/cybersecurity-skills-shortage-soars-
nearing-3-million.html
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2.3.6  Crisis Conditions
I’d be remiss not to mention that as this book goes to print, much of the world’s 
economies are partially shut down as entire states and countries seek to contain the 
spread of the COVID-19 virus by restricting people’s ability to move or gather. This book 
will be read (hopefully) long after the quarantine is over, but the effects of the pandemic 
will likely be felt in reduced economic activity and revenues for some time.
Many of us old enough to recall the 2008 financial crises or the dot-com bust in 
the early 2000s well know what comes next: IT and security budget cuts. To generalize 
this challenge – under crisis conditions – businesses may need to find new products, 
services, or ways to compete in the market. Severe cost pressures may hinder efforts to 
work or think strategically. Even on the security team, individuals’ priorities may shift 
from “information security” to “job security.” Fortunately, these crisis conditions aren’t 
always in effect and they will pass, but while they are here, the common challenges of 
security programs multiply.
Security leaders may need to sacrifice some projects, meetings, or activities once 
considered important. But they should not compromise on getting a clearer perspective 
on risks and protecting what matters. Continue to take opportunities to align with your 
business executives and their risk assumptions. Try to understand their concerns and 
how cybersecurity can be part of the solution.
2.3.7  Bottom Line
To address the challenges of dysfunctional security programs and struggling security 
leaders and staff, businesses will need to
• Hire, motivate, and retain security staff
• Make engaging the business the first order of business
• Clarify security-related business roles
• Earn trust and cooperation from users
2.4  Hire, Motivate, and Retain Key Security Staff
If the core security organization is not well led and staffed by motivated people, it’s 
difficult to see how to address this chapter’s list of formidable security challenges. One 
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hopes that organizations have a strong and motivated CISO in place. The CISO must 
then hire, motivate, and retain the right security staff.
According to the ISSA/ESG survey, the top factors for motivating and retaining 
security resources are
• An environment enabling cybersecurity staff to advance their careers
• Competitive salaries and compensation
• Business management commitment to strong cybersecurity
• The ability to work with highly skilled and talented cybersecurity staff
The following example indicates reducing stress levels and increasing the 
effectiveness of the security program itself are important to morale and retention.
HEALTH-CARE CISO’S STORY
“Over 2 years ago in my current role, I had to learn a lot about people and how to be a leader. 
When I came into the organization, there were major challenges with turnover. I had a 42% 
annual attrition rate before my first anniversary. I brought in a change management expert to 
see what was causing the problem. The expert found two primary issues:
• No clear vision for security
• Staff overworked
We worked with the department in a 9-month process to define a future state with 4 traits:
• Risk-based rather than compliance-driven
• Frictionless processes
• Modernized access technology (aka zero trust in every context)
• Realization-focused culture that measures results to get the value from tools or 
processes
Results are highly encouraging since putting the program in place with 7 months of 0% attrition.”
Anonymous CISO
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It remains to be seen whether the health-care CISO’s impressive attrition 
improvement can be sustained over time or if other organizations can duplicate it. 
It seems likely that many if not most organizations will continue to have turnover. In 
addition to reducing the level of turnover – businesses need an active hiring program. 
Some recommendations for effective hiring and retention are
• Train from within to retain relatively junior security staff and provide 
them the opportunity to advance up the ladder to more responsible 
positions
• Create a “security championship” program in IT (see Chapter 7) with 
opportunities for transfer into the security organization
• Work with internal and external recruiters with a strong emphasis 
and track record for being effective at matching the business’s 
cybersecurity needs with the right people
• Supplement scarce resource pools from additional diverse talent 
sources
• Reduce staffing needs where possible through judicious use of 
automation and outsourcing to external service providers
SECURITY STAFFING: A RAY OF HOPE?
Staffing expert deidre diamond cites statistics that over 70% of cybersecurity professionals 
are open to leaving their current employers and 89% are interested in hearing from a recruiter. 
“In my experience, the root cause is almost always not seeing an opportunity to advance, due 
to a lack of succession plans (or career tracks), burn out from doing more than one person’s 
job, insufficient time or budget for training, and/or lack of support or respect from leadership.
These facts create opportunity for a hiring manager. If you are a leader that has a story about 
how you will take care of the people that work for you and help them develop and grow 
you can hire and retain if you’re true to your word. If you are that leader – and you can get 
staff to be productive and hold them accountable through transparent expectations for roles 
and projects – you can hire! You can take your pick from 84% of the labor market right now 
because the labor market wants a better home.”
Deidre Diamond, Founder and CEO of CyberSN and Secure Diversity, a nonprofit
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Another major success factor to building a sense of effectiveness for the security 
team and throughout the business is to align security functions (inside and outside the 
security organization) with the various security-related business roles.
2.5  Make Engaging the Business the First Order 
of Business
To increase business engagement with security programs, leaders on both sides of the 
aisle who “get the picture” should work together to spread the meme that “business 
leaders own the risk, security leaders provide the tools to manage it.”
As I see it, CISOs often have two related engagement challenges to overcome:
 1. Getting chief executives to consider cybersecurity more strategic 
and prioritize it
 2. Clarifying security-related roles and responsibilities
RISK MANAGER’S STORY SHOWS CYNICISM IS ALIVE AND WELL IN OUR PROFESSION
“Increasingly its politics. The further up the chain the more dysfunctional risk management 
gets. British Petroleum CEO Tony Hayward was elected by the Board after proposing to cut 
costs. He politically screwed with risk management and that may have been a precipitating 
factor in the disastrous Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
The Risk Officer watching these things happen can only document, escalate, and try to get 
executives to sign a Risk Acceptance memo. During the credit crunch, the only thing that 
saved me at the Fund Company where I worked was asking the following question in writing: 
‘What do we have for margin calls?’ As for CISOs, they can align with the ISO 27000 
methodology, even just a lean version of it. Nobody will fault you for trying to do the 
right thing.”
Anonymous Risk Manager
Making cybersecurity strategic: Suppose you’re a CISO, or on the CISO’s 
management team, in a business whose executives don’t consider cybersecurity 
strategic. You believe that the too low priority on security significantly blocks you from 
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doing the work that needs to be done. Then, as a diligent professional who wants to be 
effective, you have two choices:
 1. Stand on the position that you’re diligently identifying the risks 
and implementing the controls that you’re budgeted for.
 2. Become an agent of change.
I would suggest CISOs take both these choices; do the work that you can do in the 
organizational climate while protecting your career, but also make efforts to change the 
climate for the better. To gain mindshare, CISOs can try to get more of the security and 
risk message in front of Executives and the Board. Seek auditors, third-party assessors, 
and external Board–level speakers who are known for advocating a more active Board 
role in cybersecurity and a strong executive tone at the top.
CISOs can also pursue either a low-key or overt organization change strategy. At the 
low-key level, keep doing what CISOs should do anyway:
• Create a sense of urgency by identifying cybersecurity’s many risks 
and opportunities.
• Look for support from business mentors and key influencers in the 
executive ranks.
• Develop and sell a cybersecurity vision and strategy.
• Engage with LOB leaders or their direct reports in security-related 
roles. (In larger businesses, the major LOBs tend to have their own 
business information security officers (BISOs) as well as finance and 
legal executives.)
For additional communication tips and advice on security culture change strategies, 
see Chapter 4.
2.6  Clarify Security-Related Business Roles
Part of the security leaders’ job is to work with the business to clarify their own, and 
business leaders’, security-related roles. Security leaders should work to increase buy-in 
from executives and also endeavor to push the cybersecurity message down and across 
the ranks.
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Security-related roles should be formalized in security policy and reinforced 
through awareness, training, and communications programs. Although in an ideal world 
business and IT leaders or staff would comply with all security policies, they often don’t. 
However, security leaders can follow up with business leaders to ensure they understand 
and buy into policy. Clarifying security-related roles in itself gets business and security 
leaders much more engaged. See Chapter 4’s section “Or Your Best Opportunity?” for a 
vision of what it looks like when the players understand and fulfill their security-related 
roles in a healthy security culture.
“take away the places where apathy likes to hide. nothing eliminates the ‘It’s 
not my job’ mentality faster than clarity of definitions, roles, responsibilities, and 
milestones.”
Source: CISO Soft Skills
Use Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed (RACI) matrices; they are useful 
tools for creating better role definitions. Even if policies don’t actually contain a RACI, 
they can be more effective if they contain the kind of specific role information a RACI 
provides. Moreover, business and security leaders can take already-existing RACIs from 
the COBIT 512 standard and scale or adapt them to the needs of the business.
As an example, Table 2-2 provides a RACI for the four highest-level risk and security 
management practices discussed in Chapter 1, where you’ll recall establishing business 
ownership for risk is a major emphasis. This RACI clarifies the roles that security, IT, 
corporate administration, and other business leaders should have for managing business 
value, risk, the security program, and security operations.
12 COBIT 5, International Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), 2012, available to ISACA 
members at https://cobitonline.isaca.org/about
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This RACI is loosely based on the role assignments from COBIT 5’s Evaluate, Direct, 
and Monitor (EDM) and Align, Plan, and Optimize (APO) practices to Ensure Benefits 
Delivery, Direct Risk Management, Manage Risk, and Manage Security. I have simplified 
the COBIT roles somewhat to scale the discussion for mid-sized as well as larger 
businesses. Even so, many businesses won’t have all these roles. That’s OK. Focus on the 
ones you have.
2- 3
Understand and get general agreement on which persons or 
departments fulfill security-related roles. Describe security-related 
roles and responsibilities in policy as a starting point for security 
governance.
Now that we’ve covered some of the CISO’s top priorities for engaging the business 
leadership, we’ll turn to the challenge of engaging staff or users. We’ll also come back to 
the topic of working with business and IT leaders on security alignment to IT, security 
culture, and security governance at more depth in later chapters.
2.7  Earn Trust and Cooperation from Users
(Nonsecurity) business staff members and managers (aka users) also have security roles 
to play. Users should follow the business security policies, such as those for password 
and credential management, or acceptable use of business resources. They should 
exercise caution in their daily interactions with email, web browsing, and the Internet to 
avoid contracting malware on their PCs or smartphones.
As emphasized earlier, it is important for security leaders to gain top executives’ 
support and to formalize security-related roles and responsibilities in security policy. 
The goal is to get IT or business managers and staff to always follow the desired security 
policies or practices.
But some policies are more clear-cut than others, and sometimes it’s difficult for 
the user to judge whether the policy applies. For example, sales staff must understand 
whether a particular product plan is confidential or not and what is the information 
classification policy, or else they are likely to share product plans with prospects to make 
the sale they are incentivized to make for the benefit of the business.
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13 “Dancing Pigs or Externalities? Measuring the Rationality of Security Decisions,” Elissa 
M. Redmiles, Michelle L. Mazurek, and John P. Dickerson, University of Maryland, 2018, 
accessed at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.06542.pdf
When an IT or businessperson doesn’t understand what the policy requires in a 
complex, real-world situation, will they ask the appropriate security, compliance, or 
corporate administration team for guidance? Very often, the answer is no. But if they 
believe the security team has their back, that it is looking for ways the businesspeople 
can get the job done with less risk, then they’re more likely to ask. Security teams can 
increase the likelihood businesspeople will come for guidance by earning their trust 
and cooperation.
As a security leader, you must understand the users’ perspective. Going about 
their day-to-day business, users have a job to do and that is their priority. Studies 
(such as a behavioral economics experiment13 simulating bank account login, strong 
authentication, and risk of losing money to cyberattacks) have found that more than 
50% of participants make rational (e.g., utility optimal) decisions on how much of their 
personal time to spend reducing an expected amount of security risk.
Security professionals at all levels must “communicate effectively” and with a 
“sense of efficacy.” Treat users as the rational and supportive team members you 
need them to be. That could mean explaining why they should always follow the 
policy without question, or how to calculate the risk and decide, or the importance 
of escalating the question. Explain the risk as best as possible in terms of the users’ 
business function and the reason why it is important to follow the policy or accept 
other security requests and tasks. Send positive messages that by following the security 
team’s recommendations, users can make a real difference to their personal security 
as well as the business’s cybersecurity posture. Chapter 4 provides more guidance on 
user awareness programs.
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A CYBERSECURITY MEETS HUMAN NATURE STORY
language is key. In an article for educause, Jessica Barker argues that fear-based messaging puts 
security leaders on the wrong side of five mental heuristics: social proof, the optimism bias, the 
psychology of fear, the stereotype threat, and self-efficacy. In phishing tests, for example, Barker 
writes: “do you say that 30 percent clicked on the link (bad!), or do you say that 70 percent did not 
click on the link (good!)…next time, join your colleagues in being part of the majority.”
given research that 80% of people are wired toward being optimistic, no matter how many 
dire statistics are thrown at them, many will believe the dire impact will not happen to them. 
“While using a tone that is more optimistic and more empowering, cybersecurity professionals 
can tell people: ‘The threat is real, but you can do a lot of things that are quite straightforward 
and that will bring the threat down to a great degree.’ Even though optimism is generally more 
powerful than facts, when people feel that there is a point to changing their behavior, that they 
can actually make a difference [i.e., be efficacious] in their level of cybersecurity, they are 
more likely to engage in the behaviors we recommend.”
Jessica Barker, Chair, ClubCISO from “The Human Nature of Cybersecurity”14
2.8  Call to Action
The core recommendations for security leaders from this chapter are to
• Develop strong business communication skills in the security 
organization.
• Actively work to hire, motivate, and retain security staff.
• Endeavor to engage the business and to elevate the level of 
cybersecurity discussions. When necessary, become an agent of 
change.
14 “The Human Nature of Cybersecurity,” Jessica Barker, Educause, May 2019, accessed at 
https://er.educause.edu/articles/2019/5/the-human-nature-of-cybersecurity
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• Rather than using technical or fear-based messaging, convey a sense 
of efficacy (“we can do this”) and partnership to earn trust and 
cooperation from the business.
• Work to get business leaders’ security-related roles clarified in 
security policy and clearly understood.
Identify and Prioritize Stakeholders to Align With
Section “Clarify Security-Related Business Roles” and Table 2-2 contain a list of 
typical stakeholder roles. In a small business, some of the roles may not exist and others 
will be combined in a few people. In a large business, multiple people may fill some of 
the same roles across business units.
The Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet15 provides a structure for 
security leaders to identify stakeholders to align with. Depending on the size and 
complexity of the business, and a security leader’s priority focus areas, it may be 
necessary to prioritize relationships with many stakeholders or with just a few covering 
the priority focus areas.
Action
Fill in the name of the person holding each role identified in Table 2 of Section 2 in 
the worksheet. If a role doesn’t exist or is called something else at your organization, 
then remove, edit, or annotate the row. In the Contact Plan column, note whether the 
person should be contacted now or later and who will be the relationship manager (i.e., 
you or someone else from the security team). Fill in the Topics to Cover column with any 
known issues, projects, or pain points to cover with the stakeholder.
15 https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet
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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license  
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
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CHAPTER 3
Put the Right Security 
Governance Model 
in Place
Just as a Constitution sets forth how to govern a nation, security charters and policies 
can formally define security-related roles and responsibilities for a business. Security 
governance is a set of processes and capabilities operated jointly by security and 
business leaders. The combined leadership manages cybersecurity risk, policy, budgets, 
and reporting to executives or stakeholders.
When security governance is well defined, the CISO has the right balance of 
authority and responsibility. Business and security leaders can handle security issues 
in a collaborative manner. Executive security steering committees, or forums, enable 
security and business leaders to align responsibilities and projects or resolve issues.
This chapter contains recommendations on how security leaders can
• Address common challenges
• Understand security governance functions
• Understand and apply the optimal security governance model
• Reset (or define) security governance
• Institute cross-functional coordination mechanisms
• Manage security policy libraries, lifecycles, and adoption
• Budget in alignment with risk and the governance model
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3.1  Address Common Challenges
Failures of business and IT teams to engage in the security-related activities relevant to 
their security-related roles are often failures of security governance. Perhaps the security 
function in the organization isn’t structured right, or the security policy doesn’t reflect 
the business priorities. Symptoms of security governance model challenges, or lack of 
maturity, include disengaged business units and perverse incentives for the security 
program.
3.1.1  Security Governance Model Not Aligned 
with Organizational Structure or Culture
I’ve seen three basic types of security governance models: centralized, decentralized, 
and matrixed. Which one is optimal? Generally, the model should align with the way that 
the business itself is governed and/or the way it provides IT services. For example, if the 
business has subsidiaries each operating their own IT fiefdoms, security cannot be fully 
centralized.
Many medium and large, complex organizations are tending to become more 
decentralized in the age of the digital business. To fulfill enterprise security requirements, 
they tend to need some form of matrixed security governance. For example, a CISO might 
provide overall security leadership, while operations are farmed out to IT groups in various 
business units. The CISO position itself could report to IT, or it could report to another 
executive business function such as the CEO or the Chief Risk Officer (CRO). There are 
advantages and disadvantages either way, and the right answer must be aligned with the 
business and IT culture and any operational or regulatory requirements.
Friction with business units can result from having the wrong security governance 
model, and security-related activities become more difficult to accomplish.
3.1.2  Lack of Security Governance Maturity
As we’ll see in the section “Understand and Apply the Optimal Security Governance 
Model,” a matrixed model is often the best solution for a complex organization, such as 
a multinational company. However, operating matrixed security governance requires 
more sophisticated (or mature) security management committee structures,  cross- 
functional alignment, and security policies. Without the maturity, matrixed governance 
may fail to govern.
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3.1.3  Security Leadership Disengaged from Business 
Units
In Chapter 7, we identify digital business and cloud-first strategies as trends that tend 
to weaken business unit engagement with traditionally minded IT departments. The 
security organization may be tightly embedded under an IT department riven by 
technical debt and hollowed out by shadow IT. Business units are rapidly adopting 
cloud solutions, and the overall IT environment is becoming more decentralized. 
Cybersecurity still is, and should be, a management concern, but the security 
department may have no room to maneuver because of any (or all) of these reasons:
• The security leadership lacks credibility, or it is discouraged from 
engaging LOBs to support their initiatives.
• No matrix governance structure exists to engage LOBs.
• The security organization is swamped with the work of protecting 
the shared IT environment and legacy core applications. It has no 
bandwidth or mandate to support LOBs.
As described in Chapter 7’s section “Discern the IT Strategy and Align the Security 
Road Map to IT,” security leaders can take advantage of the inherently cross-functional 
nature of security to work with IT to develop IT and security strategy, align security 
priorities with strategic platforms, and engage with LOB initiatives.
However, the security governance function may need a reset (see the section “Reset 
(or Define) Security Governance” in this chapter).
3.1.4  Perverse Incentives
Even when business leaders are aware of cybersecurity issues, they are often subject to 
perverse security incentives. It's possible for business executives to place such strong 
demands on staff for secure outcomes that they create a perverse incentive for insecure 
behavior. A former financial services company CISO we interviewed (who prefers to 
remain anonymous) recalled that “The business and security staff at my employer from 
the Chief Counsel on down were more afraid of the CEO and the Board reaction to 
regulatory reports than they were of breaking the law.”
Chapter 3  put the right SeCurity governanCe Model in plaCe
64
“Ironically,” our ex-CISO colleague continued, “I don’t think 
the executives were even conscious that they were pushing staff 
towards making false reports. As far as they were concerned, they’d 
put security first. They’d granted the full budget we asked for.”
This is a tough challenge! More alignment in top-level thinking will probably be 
needed to pull off a successful security governance reset. Security leaders who choose 
to stick around and face the challenge can take a leaf out of the “crucial conversations”1 
book I keep out on my office reading stack; it provides useful scripts to prepare for 
difficult discussions. It could also be helpful to engage an executive change management 
consultant or another senior mediator.
3.2  Understand Security Governance Functions
What does security governance govern or do? Its main functions are to
• Charter or mandate the security program: Define “security” 
or “cybersecurity” for an organization in terms of its mission, 
governance, reporting structure, and operating principles. 
Formally specify which organizations or roles within the business 
have authority over security strategy, policy, projects, budgets, 
committees, and operations.
• Manage, control, and report on risk: Identify, track, manage, and 
report information risks to the executive level along with other 
enterprise risks. Ensure the security strategy and project portfolio are 
aligned with business risks and risk appetites.
• Coordinate security projects and manage issues: Set up, sponsor, 
and chair forums engaging multiple stakeholders including the CISO, 
CIO, CRO, head of audit, and LOB executives critical to the success 
of projects and processes. Mediate issues escalated to the business 
cybersecurity governance level.
1 “Crucial Conversations: Tools for Talking When the Stakes are High,” Patterson & Greeny & 
McMillan & Switzler, McGraw Hill, 2012
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• Manage security policy: Work with the business, IT, and other 
areas to develop security policies, standards, processes, and 
procedures; gain agreement and formal adoption; and manage the 
policy lifecycle.
• Allocate security budgets and resources: Decide how to pay for 
security program capital and operating expenses (CAPEX and 
OPEX). Allocate funds and resources to the security organization and 
other groups responsible for delivering security projects or services. 
Approve proposed budgets and major expenditures.
3.3  Understand and Apply the Optimal Security 
Governance Model
The security organization is just one organization in the business. It must work with 
executives, IT, development, corporate administration, and LOBs. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, many security-related roles must be carried out by business leaders and staff 
outside the core security organization.
The security governance model, or structure, defines the way the security 
organization and the security program relate to the rest of the business. There are 




Any of the three models can work if applied in the right way in the right place. 
However, in some cases security governance structures result more from happenstance 
and personalities than from well-thought-out organizational thinking and thus may not 
be properly aligned with the business culture. Figure 3-1 shows the three models and the 
way that each of them can thrive.
Chapter 3  put the right SeCurity governanCe Model in plaCe
66
3- 1
The security governance model should generally follow the IT 
organizational structure unless management supports the notion that 
security should act as a matrix function over decentralized IT units. 
Both security and IT governance models should align closely to the 
business culture or management intentions for the culture.
3.3.1  Centralized Models
In a centralized security governance model, one person or department makes all the 
important decisions, controls operations, resolves disputes, and sets the strategy and 
the budget for security. Responsibilities can be delegated but managers still report 
directly to a single leader who serves as a central authority. Centralized governance with 
strict hierarchy is typical of military and often civilian government and some corporate 
organizations.
CENTRALIZED NETWORK SECURITY GOVERNANCE STORY
I was subcontracted recently to perform a network segmentation architecture for a large 
financial services company in the United States. In the first draft of our current state analysis, 
my engagement partners and I noted the company needed better processes for making 
security zoning more risk based. However, the client told us risk management was out of 
scope; network security should be based on prescriptive rules only. We learned that the CISO 
of this company has a legal background and runs security “very much behind the door.” 
Figure 3-1. The Three “Pure” Security Governance Structures
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That is, risks and high-level decisions about them aren’t generally discussed in a transparent 
fashion even within the security organization itself.
This kind of centralized security governance model is suitable for some security cultures and 
industries. But outside of those, it may face challenges as digital businesses become flatter, 
more decentralized.
3.3.2  Decentralized Models
In the decentralized model, multiple organizational units operate security programs 
independently. This is common among multinational organizations or businesses that 
have grown by acquisition. Each organizational unit in this model has its own security 
team.
The decentralized model doesn’t preclude the business from requiring units to 
coordinate on developing shared services or from following some common standards. 
But if a decentralized organization has a CISO at the enterprise level, this CISO will tend 
to be in a weak position. Don’t be fooled by the “Group CISO” title you sometimes see 
in this case. In the decentralized model, each line of business (LOB) manages IT and 
security according to its own needs.
STORY OF CONSENSUS-BASED STANDARDS IN A DECENTRALIZED IT ORGANIZATION
In the early 2000s, I worked with a team of consultants to help a large pharmaceutical 
company develop a network architecture and, later, an identity and access management (IAM) 
architecture. These turned out to be large projects with high visibility because the company 
governed IT through a biweekly half-day CIO council meeting. The executives would come 
together as equals and decide on standards to make their autonomous systems work together. 
We spent a few months on each project facilitating consensus with extended teams of 
architects from the different units. Ultimately, the CIO council approved the architectures.
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3.3.3  Trade-offs
If we were to imagine a continuum between highly centralized and decentralized 
security governance models, we wouldn’t have to go too far toward either extreme before 
seeing issues and disadvantages.
Too centralized means rules for security governance may be too rigid. Some LOBs 
need more flexibility and, in the end, may not cooperate with security strictures. Too 
decentralized and LOBs will likely duplicate security efforts (or make inadequate efforts) 
creating inconsistent security controls that make it hard for the business to respond 
coherently to common threats or compliance requirements.
STORY OF DECENTRALIZED FIREWALLS PUTTING A UNIVERSITY AT RISK
In early 2015, I worked on a security assessment for a large US-based university that did not 
have a centralized firewall infrastructure. Each of more than 50 colleges and other units had 
its own firewall; without a core network security competency, many of the firewalls were found 
to have an insecure configuration, and some were beyond product end of life.
Figure 3-2. Trade-offs Between Centralized and Decentralized Models
Given the trade-offs between centralized and decentralized models, organizations 
often turn to the matrix model in search of a sweet spot.
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3.3.4  Matrix Models
Matrix security governance structures can coordinate the management of cybersecurity 
for very large organizations. Figure 3-3 illustrates an example that operates governance 
at four levels.
• Lines of business and IT services
• Cross-functional working groups
• Executive committees
• Board (and executive-level) meetings
Let’s decompose how the matrix works at each level.
Figure 3-3. The Matrix Model
Lines of business and IT services: At the lowest level, LOBs or regions in Figure 3-3 
run their own IT functions; however, some commoditized services such as email systems 
and endpoint anti-malware may be shared. LOBs and regions may also use cloud 
computing services from diverse vendors.
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More strategically in the matrix model, local business units can plan for future 
iterations of the applications and shared services they need. They may share in the costs 
for shared services. There may be representatives from the CISO function on liaison 
to the business units, or business unit staff may have a dotted line responsibility to the 
Group CISO.
Cross-functional working groups: Moving up a level, matrixed organizations 
typically have an enterprise CISO and CIO function, for example, a “Group CISO.” 
However, larger business units beneath them may also have CISOs. Note that the 
diagram is drawn to put the Group CISO and CIO together for graphical convenience 
and is not meant to suggest this reporting structure is universal. Exact titles vary between 
companies, as do reporting structures.
Figure 3-4. Cross-Functional Working Groups
The Group CISO/CIO organizations provision and protect the shared services. They 
continually interact with the local functions to enable, approve, or coach the lower 
echelon security management. The Group CIO manages the architecture and operations 
for shared services, and either the CIO or CISO manages security services or security 
components of shared IT services.
Executive committees: The Group CIO and CISO also interact on a peer-to-peer 
basis with the heads of business administration, that is, HR, legal, and finance, to address 
share budgeting and procurement processes. Cross-functional working groups may exist 
permanently or form temporarily to undertake major risk assessments, approve changes, 
or develop new architectures. The executive committees report up to the Board and 
executive levels. For complex organizations - such as multinational corporations with 
subsidiary legal entities - multiple layers of reporting may be required.
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As with the centralized governance model a security team or department reports 
to the CISO. But in the matrixed model, some members of the team may work for other 
functions but have “dotted line” reporting to the CISO.
In general, matrix structures require well-articulated cross-functional and 
cross-divisional roles and working groups, processes, accountabilities, and lines of 
communication and control. Key questions: Is the matrix structure well designed or not? 
Does it suit the organization’s culture?
Operating a matrix organization is challenging precisely because of the cross- 
functional dimensions. Research suggests that most cross-functional teams are 
dysfunctional.2 Why then do so many organizations adopt the matrix model and then 
struggle with it? The answer: Once an organization gets to a certain size, or a certain 
level of complexity, there may not be an alternative. Perhaps, for large or complex 
organizations, one might repurpose an old joke about democracy: “Cross-functional 
governance is the worst form of governance there is except for all the others.”
Figure 3-5. Cross-Functional Working Groups, Executive Committees, and 
Executives
2 “75% of Cross-Functional Teams Are Dysfunctional,” Behnam Tabrizi, Harvard Business Review,  
June 2015, accessed at https://hbr.org/2015/06/75-of-cross-functional-teams-are-
dysfunctional
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Another interesting point: Many matrix governance structures are not pure; they don’t 
look like those in Figure 3-3. Organizations often have hybrid or composite governance 
models. An organization with composite governance could be decentralized as a whole 
but contain one or more large lines of business that operate in a centralized or matrixed 
manner. Each LOB might be large enough to form an enterprise. Corporate conglomerates 
and large national or state governments often have composite governance.
3.4  Reset (or Define) Security Governance
If business units aren’t fulfilling security-related activities, or if the security leadership 
itself isn’t aligned across an organization, a security governance “reset” may be required.
A well-defined security program should have a charter documented as security policy 
and approved by the CEO, a security policy library, and a security governance function 
scaled to the business’s size and circumstances. The governance structure should operate 
at maturity Level 3 or higher. Security leaders at businesses without these process artifacts, 
operating below Level 3, or experiencing some of the common challenges can directly use 
this chapter’s recommendations to reset the program. Security leaders at businesses with 
more mature security governance can check their status against the governance practices 
described herein and use this guidance to fill any gaps.
3.4.1  Choose the Appropriate Security Governance Model
Occasionally businesses just decide “we’re going to have centralized, decentralized, or 
matrixed IT or security” and then have a big reorganization. More often, one of those 
structures simply results from how lines of authority and decision rights are allocated 
over time. Nevertheless, understanding which governance structure a business has vs. 
which structure it should – perhaps – have is a useful thought exercise.
Security leaders rarely if ever get to choose the governance model themselves, 
but they should always be ready to discuss the matter intelligently. Which is the right 
security governance model: centralized, decentralized, or matrixed?
Most small organizations can use a centralized model and most large ones should 
make some attempt at formal or informal matrixed governance. But it would be a cop 
out to stop at that, because there’s much room for variance with different businesses. 
The decision tree in Figure 3-6 provides a more nuanced answer than “small equals 
centralized, larger equals matrixed” by using criteria based on the structure and maturity 
of the business.
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Per the decision tree, a small organization or a large one with a hierarchical and 
relatively homogeneous structure (and culture) might go the centralized route for greater 
control and efficiency. A larger, more complex business tends toward decentralization; 
however, if management seeks to drive greater consistency and control, it can push 
toward the matrixed model as IT and security programs gain maturity. Any decentralized 
security arrangements should be buttressed with clear accountability for all security 
leadership and operations functions.
3.4.2  Charter the Security Organization
The business should specify the security program mission and define the program’s lines 
of authority and decision rights in a security charter document. The security charter 
document contains the business’s definition of security and of the security program. It 
must also identify how the security organization coordinates with the business and how 
it relates to audit, compliance, risk management, and other functions.
The charter should be a short, plain language document intended for broad 
consumption. It should be signed by the organization’s CEO or equivalent position to 
give it the gravitas to serve as the business mandate and the foundation component of 
the security program. It should define security for the business by describing the security 
Figure 3-6. Choosing a Security Governance Model
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program’s mission, operating principles, governance, and reporting structure. For 
example, the security program’s mission statement could describe security objectives 
including confidentiality, integrity, availability, safety, and privacy in terms of the 
business’s specific high-level goals and requirements. The charter should also reference 
core governance principles; the following is a short sample
• The Board of Directors (BOD) and CEO (or BODs/CEOs in a legal 
entity with subsidiaries) are accountable to the public for risk.
• Business leaders are ultimately accountable to the CEO(s) for risk in 
their LOB or administrative function. Executive leadership sets the 
risk appetite and thresholds for the organization.
• Business leaders delegate security operations and incident response 
to security leaders and rely on security leaders to advise them on 
cybersecurity risk.
• Compliance to all applicable regulations must be the logical 
consequence of an effective risk management framework and 
program of internal controls.
• Operations, assurance, and audit functions are organized to provide 
three lines of defense (see Chapter 6, section “Use Two or Three 
Lines of Defense Model for Control Assurance”).
Security is everybody’s business according to their role. While avoiding specific 
job titles, the charter and subordinate policy documents should spell out the 
accountabilities and responsibilities for cybersecurity for general business roles such as
• Executives and business risk owners
• Risk, compliance, and audit functions
• Security program executive sponsor
• Security management and staff
• Asset or data owners and data stewards
• All staff
The charter should call for establishing a cross-functional coordinating committee 
(aka security steering committee) as a security governance forum for business, IT, and 
security leaders to authorize and oversee major security projects, budgets, and changes. 
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The charter should also define the security policy hierarchy. Few or no details are 
required in the charter itself other than basic scoping of the committee's basic makeup 
and purpose.
The charter explicitly defines the security governance model. It can specify whether 
the organization shall have a security leader with the CISO title. It can also specify where 
the CISO or security leader reports and the scope of responsibilities. The following 
guidance is intended especially for businesses that have formally appointed a CISO in a 
corporate officer position.
3.4.3  Specify CISO Reporting
Per Chapter 2’s section on the “Head of Security or CISO,” the “CISO” title sets an 
expectation that the security leader can represent the security program to the Board of 
Directors, external regulators, and other stakeholders as well as sit in on top business 
and IT leader meetings as a peer. Where a security leader, or CISO, reports in the 
business hierarchy is also an indicator of whether he or she is empowered to drive a 
cybersecurity program for the business.
In my experience, most CISOs – at least half – report to the CIO. Strong arguments can 
be made that this is a good thing, for if the CISO is responsible for IT security, shouldn’t the 
position associate closely with IT? However, many security experts argue against putting 
the CISO too low in the organization chart or against creating a potential conflict of interest 
between security and a CIO whose performance objectives, such as application time to 
market, may run counter to security. Experts with this view advocate having the CISO 
report to a senior executive outside of IT – such as the CRO or CEO (aka CXO).
For the purposes of Rational Cybersecurity, there isn’t one right answer. Suppose 
the Board considers this question: “What’s more important for our Cybersecurity? 
Operational effectiveness and Security-to-IT alignment, or strengthening security by 
making it an independent function?” Directors of highly regulated organizations tend to 
have separation of duty requirements and prefer CXO reporting, whereas organizations 
under less security pressure are more likely to choose CIO reporting. Depending on the 
business’s cybersecurity maturity level, management style, and executive personalities, 
either reporting structure can work, with caveats.
CIO reporting structure caveats: In most organizations where the CISO is directly 
responsible for conducting or overseeing IT security operations, one of our CISO 
contributors observed: “As the CISO, it is critical to be no more than one level removed 
from the Board (or CEO) and to have my name on the security section of the Corporate 
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Board Reports.” Without that visibility, and the opportunity to present important security 
initiatives and budgets to executives, the CISO position might be too weak to conform to 
the expectations created internally and externally by using the “CISO” title.
3- 2
Once businesses reach a certain size or level of security pressure, 
they should give their top security leader the “CISO” title. Leaders 
with the “CISO” title should have access and visibility to executive 
management and the Board.
Also, note that empowering an independent internal audit function, whether or not 
it is required by regulations, may provide an adequate check and balance on the CIO 
even though the CISO reports to IT.
CXO reporting structure caveat: If a business places the CISO function outside 
IT, bear in mind that IT staff may consequently be responsible for more of the security 
operations. A dotted line reporting arrangement could be set up between these staff 
and the CISO provided the maturity in governance and awareness exists to enable such 
matrixed functions to work well. More than one security or business leader I spoke to 
in more than 60 interviews while writing the book agreed that this could be the right 
arrangement but requires maturity.
Change is the only constant: More than one CISO I interviewed noted: Not only 
does the optimal reporting structure depend on hard-to-quantify management style 
factors, these factors change frequently.
“organization design and placement of the CiSo (or CSo) function needs to be 
dynamic, depending on who has which strengths and who doesn’t. the tuckman 
model (forming-storming-norming-performing)3 applies as executive teams or it 
teams change.”
David Cross, Senior Vice President, Chief Security Officer at Oracle SaaS 
Cloud
3 “Tuckman’s Stages of Group Development,” Bruce Tuckman, Wikipedia, 1965, accessed at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuckman%27s_stages_of_group_development
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There’s clearly much more to say on the subject, and if you’re interested all 
three authors of the “CISO Desk Reference Guide” opine on the role and reporting 
considerations right in their first Chapter - “The CISO”.3
3.5  Institute Cross-Functional Coordination 
Mechanisms
Even for smaller businesses that don’t think of themselves as needing matrixed 
governance, many security projects tend to be cross-functional and face the same 
challenges as in larger organizations. Harvard Business Review research found: “Projects 
that had strong governance support – either by a higher-level cross-functional [executive 
team] or by a single high-level executive champion – had a 76% success rate, according to 
our research. Those with moderate governance support had a 19% success rate.”
Businesses should have a formal executive coordinating function responsible for 
cybersecurity. In addition, consider chartering an executive-level risk management 
committee (such as the Board Audit Committee or others) to act as the risk management 
forum for information risk. Finally, processes should exist for security governance to 
oversee IT or security projects and processes.
3.5.1  Cross-Functional Security Coordination Function or 
Steering Committee
A large enterprise can establish a dedicated steering committee for security-related 
operations, projects, and business decisions. However, mid-size organization may 
reasonably combine the function into a general IT leadership committee as one of its 
recurring work topics. We’ll refer to the coordinating function generically as a “steering 
committee.” The level of security pressure is another factor determining whether to 
have a dedicated committee: In 2017 and 2018, I consulted for a US-based systemically 
important financial market utility (SIFMU) with just a few hundred staff but a regulatory 
requirement to focus heavily on security at the highest levels of the business.
4 “CISO Desk Reference Guide,” Bill Bonney, Gary Hayslip, Matt Stamper, CISO DRG Joint Venture, 
2019
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The steering committee authorizes and at a high level can direct security projects, 
oversee security policy, and control the security organization structure. The heavy hitters 
among the leadership – those holding CISO, CIO, Chief Risk/Privacy/Compliance offices, 
legal, HR, and third-party management positions (or roles, in a smaller business) – should 
be represented on the committee. So should key LOB leaders such as manufacturing, sales, 
distribution, and operations. The business and security executives themselves can attend 
or appoint leaders with signoff authority delegated on their behalf. (In larger businesses, 
major LOBs may have their own business information security officers (BISOs) as well as 
finance and legal representatives on the steering committee.)
The steering committee should meet approximately monthly. The sponsor and/
or chairperson should have administrative support to maintain a formal agenda, track 
issues, manage any subcommittees or activities that require attention between meetings, 
and publish minutes and reports. Typical activities are
• Authorize and oversee major projects necessary to create the security 
program or achieve important goals
• Approve organizational changes, budgets, and resources for cross- 
functional security projects
• Direct and oversee cross-functional projects that impact multiple 
business units or address strategic risks being tracked by the Board
• Monitor regulatory and audit findings and the timely response to the 
findings
• Mediate any conflicts arising out of projects or other security-related 
incidents and activities
3- 3
Ensure LOB and corporate administration business leaders are 
engaged with the steering committee by reflecting their concerns on 
the agenda, giving them important roles on the committee (possibly 
through a rotating chairperson function) and involving them in 
meaningful planning, decision-making, and approval activities.
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3.5.2  Risk Management Forums
What I’ll refer to generically as the “risk management forum” could be chartered as a 
committee dedicated to information risk. The CISO or a Risk Manager on the CISO’s staff 
can chair this type of forum.
However, the forum may instead be part of an enterprise risk management (ERM) 
program. ERM covers financial, operational, market, competitive, and other risks as well 
as information risk which rolls up into it. An ERM forum doesn’t fall under information 
security governance, but the CISO (or a delegate) should be a member or participant.
Financial services businesses (depending on size and jurisdictions) tend to require 
ERM programs. Many other kinds of businesses – whether larger or small – have 
corporate social responsibility, ethics, and/or compliance committees to monitor 
enterprise risks at the highest level. Any of these executive committees (or a new group) 
could become the risk management forum. The forum:
• Helps executive management and the Board determine 
accountability and responsibility for specifc risks, define risk 
appetites and create guidance on preferred risk treatment strategies
• Translates executive risk guidance into policies and procedures for 
monitoring and controlling the top risks to the business
• Maintains a list of top risks, often using tools such as a “risk register” 
or “risk map”
• Tracks the risk exposure from each top risk, how it is being managed, 
and the status of projects related to it
• Oversees risk reporting to the Board and to external stakeholders 
such as investors, auditors, and regulators
3- 4
Empower the risk management forum to support executives in taking 
accountability or responsibility for, and review their performance on, 
managing information risks.
Chapter 5 contains additional guidance on the activities of the risk management forum.
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3.5.3  Interaction with IT Projects and Other Security 
Processes
Standing governance forums such as the security steering committee and the risk 
management forum are necessary and important. As the security program matures, 
especially in a larger enterprise with matrixed security governance, more and more 
issues can require regular agenda time.
Security leaders may be tempted to establish multiple standing subcommittees of 
the main steering committee or risk management forum but should be careful not to 
overdo it. Digital business demands more agility from businesses. Keeping standing 
security forums lean helps ensure that security doesn’t get in the way of reasonable 
business initiatives through overly bureaucratic processes. Rather, the business can 
use existing security, IT, or corporate governance processes to promote collaboration 
between security business leaders and oversee security projects. These can include
• Security architecture reviews: Security architecture reviews occur 
as part of a project management “gate,” through which projects move 
on their path to completion. Disciplined Agile processes can operate 
more iteratively with security being addressed in the “Sprint 0” and 
later sprints for quality assurance.
• DevSecOps: A fully or partially automated “pipeline” can produce 
test reports and documentation through which new functionality 
from development is promoted to production. See Chapter 7 for more 
details on DevSecOps and Disciplined Agile.
• Third-party assessments: Assessments of suppliers, vendors, 
contractors, cloud service providers (CSPs), and so on are required as 
part of procurement and change management.
3- 5
Avoid making standing governance too heavyweight. Instead, 
work with IT, development, and corporate administration groups 
to help them understand and build enough security into their own 
processes.
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3.6  Manage Security Policy Libraries, Lifecycles, 
and Adoption
When managed with tight alignment to the business, a core set of security policy 
documents can evolve into a collaboratively developed and formally agreed 
“Constitution” providing the structure for a positive security culture. Develop policies in 
a vacuum and they’re at risk of gathering dust on the shelf.
3- 6
Ensure business unit representatives provide input to security 
policies that will affect them. Take pains to obtain cross-functional 
buy-in from all affected parts of the organization.
Businesses should manage security policy documents in a hierarchical structure and 
develop a policy management process. The governing security policy should
• Be owned by the security organization and the chartered steering 
committee but endorsed by the CEO and the Board.
• Define a process for changes, documentation formats, review and 
expiration, approval procedures, and enforcement. It can be reviewed 
on an as-needed basis or approximately once every three years.
• Require that all policies specify the roles of the security or business 
functions that own, approve, and are covered by policies. In general, 
avoid explicitly referencing individuals or groups that are too low in 
the organization and likely to be frequently moved or reorganized.
• Establish the principle that directives or guidance should link to 
risk as it is understood in the enterprise and IT risk management 
framework in a manner flexible enough to accommodate multiple 
risk levels as well as changing risks and risk appetites. For example, 
the tiered third-party risk management process discussed in  
Chapter 7 could initially be established through a policy.
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3.6.1  Types of Policy Documents
The term “policy” in security often conflates four or five types of control documents: 
a top-level security “policy” and standards, guidelines, processes, and procedure 
documents. Figure 3-7 displays the relationship and hierarchy among those types of 
documents.
Figure 3-7. Policy Document Hierarchy
Each control document or type of “policy” at a lower level of the hierarchy must 
operate within the permitted scope of any related higher-level documents. For example, 
the organization’s highest-level security policy may operate under the security charter. 
More detailed policy or standard documents set requirements for topics such as 
acceptable use, access, network security, encryption, and so on. Guideline documents 
and processes provide instructions. In general, the higher-level documents specify the 
required business security outcomes (the “what”) and subordinate documents specify 
the ways and means (the “how”).
Businesses should also articulate guiding principles, scope, and purpose in the 
top-level policies (the “why”) to help management and staff understand the policies’ 
intent in all situations. Although top-level policies should not contain promises of future 
improvements or plans, guiding principles expressed in the policies can indicate future 
direction in a general manner where appropriate. Table 3-1 identifies (in general) which 
kinds of security and business leaders own, are affected by, and must be aligned with 
each type of policy document.
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Table 3-1. Types of Policy Documents
Document 
Type










for the applicable 
C-level function, i.e., 













reporting to the 
executive responsible 




staff, regulators, and 
auditors
2–4 years
processes describe the 
interactions and flows 




reporting to the 
executive responsible 




staff, regulators, and 
auditors
1–3 years
procedures prescribe specific steps 
or checklists required 
to accomplish specific 




to the department 
responsible for 
carrying out the 
procedure or a 
departmental manager
narrow management 
and staff audience. 











be combined with 
standards
Manager reporting 
to the executive 
responsible for the 
higher-level, governing 
policy or standard
intended to be helpful 
to management and 
technical audiences
1–3 years
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3.7  Budget in Alignment with Risk and the  
Governance Model
Multiple budgets for security activities often exist across different organizational units 
in the business. Along with the security governance model, budgeting and resource 
allocation must be rationalized.
Figure 3-8. Security Spending in the Business
Figure 3-8 maps out where budgets for security-related activities tend to exist in 
the business. The security organization typically has a core budget for the activities it 
controls directly, but many other security budget items fall into gray areas of the IT, 
shared services, and even LOB’s budgets. With the expansion of cloud computing and 
digital business initiatives, LOBs have many options for sourcing IT. In some cases, over 
half of IT spend is now controlled by business units. Many LOB development projects 
must include activities such as application security testing.
The fact that security gets funded from multiple sources is yet another reason 
why it is important to be mindful of selecting, or maturing toward, the right security 
governance model. Table 3-2 offers some observations on budgeting in the different 
governance models.
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Through the security steering committee and risk management forum, the business 
can endeavor to take a holistic, risk-based approach to prioritizing funding and 
resources for security regardless of which budgetary pot it comes out of. Security leaders 
must help the business understand current risks as well as the risk mitigation options 
and required funding. Security deficiencies can be linked to risks, business impacts, and 
the accountable executives. The following are good practices for budgeting:
• Let risk analysis inform budgeting: Some organizations build 
checklists of controls meant to satisfy perceived compliance 
requirements and fund those controls without analyzing their cost- 
effectiveness at reducing risk. Instead, security teams should use 
risk analysis to determine the top risk scenarios, control priorities, 
and budgets. In quantitative risk analyses, such as Factor Analysis of 
Information Risk (FAIR, see Chapter 5), the most serious losses due to 
Table 3-2. Budget Considerations in the Governance Models
Centralized Governance and 
Multiple Budgets
Decentralized Governance and 
Multiple Budgets
Matrixed Governance and 
Multiple Budgets
regardless of who is paying 
for the security activities, 
the security team carries out 
security activities. this can 
result in good coordination.  
But be careful to ensure the 
security organization doesn’t 
become an unnecessary 
bottleneck; today’s loBs  
expect agility.
there’s likely to be little or no 
coordination of security activities 
ongoing in different groups under 
different budgets. however, a 
security leader with “group CiSo” 
responsibility should perform an 
assessment to identify, and then 
fix, any significant risk exposure or 
unnecessary costs that could result.
Matrixed security 
governance can coordinate 
multiple groups and their 
budgets. however, it’s 
important to gain maturity 
in risk management and 
governance before adding 
governance complexity. 
otherwise, time and 
money could be lost to 
cumbersome processes. 
resources could go the 
most politically connected 
groups rather than the 
optimum risk treatments.
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noncompliance show up as “secondary loss events” that materialize 
only after a primary loss event (e.g., a breach) occurs. Avoiding the 
primary loss event in the first place may be the best path to reducing 
potential costs of noncompliance. This is just one example of how 
risk analysis can identify the most cost-effective controls to fund.
• Be creative about looking for low-cost risk treatments: In some 
cases, the business can achieve a required security or compliance 
outcome through business or security process changes rather than 
costlier technology deployments. For example, changes in how the 
organization uses consumers’ personal information, or obtains 
consent in advance from consumers, can reduce the need for many 
protective or responsive controls later on in the event of cyberattacks, 
breaches, and data subject requests.
• Find a way to represent technical debt in security cost accounting 
and use it to reduce costs in the security product portfolio: If 
the security organization has staff with accounting skills working 
on the security budget, it may be helpful to work cost of ownership 
into business cases in a way that represents the corrosive effects of 
technical debt, and promotes strategies to reduce technical debt in 
the IT security portfolio.
• Review budgets quarterly or bi-annually and build in contingency 
plans: Be prepared to reallocate funding if a high-priority project 
is having difficulties, especially if other projects on the road map 
depend on it. Contingency plans must also prepare the security 
organization to deal with budget cuts that can occur due to changes 
in the business’s fortunes or the economic cycle.
3-7
Link budget and resource requests to a business plan which 
demonstrates quantified risk reduction and other benefits to the 
business. Don’t rely on fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) to drive 
funding approval.
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3.8  Call to Action
The core recommendation for security leaders from this chapter is for them to 
define (or reset) cybersecurity and risk governance by
• Creating a security charter to define security’s mission and designate 
lines of authority or decision rights
• Establishing an executive security steering committee and a risk 
management forum (or other cross-functional coordination function 
scaled to the size and type of business)
• Ensuring LOB and corporate administration leaders are engaged 
with the security steering committee function and empower the risk 
management forum function to hold business leaders accountable 
for information risks
• Avoiding heavyweight security governance processes in favor of 
embedding just enough security-related activities into business-as- 
usual processes or projects that come and go
• Developing a security policy lifecycle management function and 
ensuring business leaders provide meaningful input on the policies 
that affect them
• Aligning and risk-informing security funding and activities that come 
from multiple budgets
Action – Make a quick assessment of the state of the organization’s security 
governance
Ask yourself the following short set of questions and score the answers in the Success 
Plan Worksheet’s4 Section 3, Table 3. Base your score on whether you would answer most 
of the questions with a strong “no” (1), a strong “yes” (5), or something in between.
5 “Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, May 2020, 
accessed at https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet
Chapter 3  put the right SeCurity governanCe Model in plaCe
88
 1. Does the security governance structure align well with the way IT 
and the business are organized?
 2. Is the business’s definition of security (mission, governance, 
reporting structure, and operating principles) captured in the 
security charter, and is it reflective of the way the business really 
works?
 3. Does a security steering committee meet regularly; do security, IT, 
corporate administration, and LOB representatives with signing 
authority regularly attend it; and is it effective at addressing cross-
functional security issues and moving security projects forward?
 4. Does a risk management forum exist, and does it hold business 
risk owners accountable for risks and serve as a useful venue for 
reviewing top risk analyses and treatment recommendations?
 5. Are security policies, standards, processes, and procedures 
generally up to date, and do day-to-day practices in the business 
generally follow them?
 6. Is the security budget centralized, or are multiple security budgets 
rationalized in the sense that relatively little overlap exists?
Action – Define 1–3 improvement objectives for security governance
Note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 5a, of the worksheet. The following 
are examples of security governance–related improvement objectives:
• Create or revisit the security charter and work on getting business 
buy-in for a definition of security that is fully aligned with the 
business needs.
• Review Chapter 2’s Table 2-2 listing security-related business roles to 
find any that seem appropriate for a business like yours but  
aren’t being fulfilled. Communicate with stakeholders and find out 
the reason.
• Plan for a security policy refresh and identify business stakeholders 
affected by the current policy documents and potential new ones.
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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license  
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
• Review the minutes or records from the last 6–12 months of security 
steering committee (or other coordinating group) meetings, 
assess the committee's strengths and weaknesses, and propose 
improvements.
• Work with the business finance office to collect information on all 
security budgets, sources of funding, and funded project charters. 
Call out any obvious gaps or overlaps.
Don’t limit yourself to these examples. Also consider other improvement objectives 
that fit the gaps and priorities you’ve identified for your business.
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Human error or misconduct of one kind or another must be either the direct cause or 
a contributing factor to almost every security breach or outage. Whether it is the user 
clicking a phishing link, an operator accidentally deleting the corporate directory, a 
manager approving excessive privileges, a receptionist letting a thief or spy into the 
building, or an incident responder hitting the snooze button on the wrong malware 
alarm, the examples are legion.
Security leaders should strive to improve security-related behavior through user 
awareness and training programs. Sometimes these programs succeed in bettering 
security-related behaviors, sometimes they don’t. Wouldn’t it be nice to know why? It 
turns out that people’s behavior is related to a larger issue of security culture, which is 
itself a part of organizational culture.
Formally adopted security policies, well-defined security governance, and clear 
security-related roles in the business are prerequisites for a successful security program. 
But in the background behind the visible security governance and security program 
machinery is the organization’s security culture. A security culture is the part of an 
organization’s self-sustaining patterns of behavior and perception that determine how 
(or if ) the organization pursues security. A positive security culture can provide your best 
opportunity to secure the business; a negative one can be your greatest vulnerability.
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“Culture eats strategy for breakfast, lunch, and dinner.”
Peter Drucker, Management Guru
Modern organizational thinking – and marquee schools such as Wharton or Harvard 
Business School – sees organizational culture as paramount for business outcomes. Hard 
to define, as likely to change the executive as to be changed, and usually neither all good 
nor all bad – culture is pervasive in the business.
Security leaders can use communications and awareness programs to gradually 
enhance security culture throughout the organization as well as improve specific user 
behaviors such as resisting and reporting phishing messages and becoming good 
stewards of customer information. Over a period of time, security teams can cultivate a 
network of influencers throughout the business to create a healthier security culture.
The chapter provides guidance for security leaders on how to
• Address common challenges
• Understand security culture and awareness concepts
• Make enhancing communication a top security team priority
• Use awareness programs to improve behaviors and security culture
• Commit to improving security culture
• Measure and improve
4.1  Address Common Challenges
According to ISACA/CMMI’s 2018 “The Cybersecurity Culture Gap,” 95 percent 
of global survey respondents identify a gap between their current and desired 
organizational culture of cybersecurity. Today, organizations face multiple challenges 
with engaging business units and executives at the strategic level and shifting the 
business towards a healthier security culture. Ineffective security communication 
styles can exacerbate these challenges.1
1 “The Cybersecurity Culture Gap: An ISACA and CMMI Institute Study,” ISACA/CMMI, 2018, 
accessed at:  https://www.isaca.org/-/media/info/cybersecurity-culture-report/index.html
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4.1.1  Business Executives Not Engaged at the Strategic 
Level
The average executive has probably been briefed on, or read about, security threats often 
but tends to be personally less knowledgeable than the general public about cybersecurity 
practices and self-assesses his or her business as not being well prepared. Moreover, we 
previously cited evidence that business executives tend to not consider cybersecurity 
strategic (see Chapter 2’s section “Cybersecurity Not Considered Strategic”).
According to a KPMG “U.S. CEO Outlook” study,2 executive awareness of 
cybersecurity threats is high, but that doesn’t translate to being ready.
• 33% of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) identified cybersecurity as 
their top threat to growth.
• 92% can identify new cyber threats (i.e., from the news).
• 89% consider protecting customers’ personal data “hugely 
important.”
• But only 41% consider their company well prepared to deal with 
threats.
At the same time, business executives overall have relatively low detailed awareness 
of basic computer protection, privacy, and physical security according a MediaPro 
survey:
• 41% of executives’ personal security and privacy survey scores put 
them in the “at risk” category compared to only 29% of the general 
population.3
4.1.2  Business Units at Odds with IT and Security
As discussed in Chapter 2’s section “Working at Cross-Purposes,” business leaders may 
be at odds with IT (and security) for all sorts of reasons – personal, organizational, and 
political reasons. Disruptive changes to IT and immaturity of security governance or 
2 “US CEO Report,” Lynne Doughtie, KPMG, May 2018, accessed at https://assets.kpmg/
content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2018/05/kpmg-ceo-outlook-2018.pdf
3 “State of Executive Cybersecurity Awareness,” David Self, MediaPro, July 2018, accessed at  
www.mediapro.com/blog/infographic-executive-cybersecurity/
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risk management models contribute to the disconnect. Chapter 7’s section “Address 
Common Challenges” identifies additional structural difficulties for IT. Namely, digital 
business strategies often lead to decentralization or fragmentation of IT control as trends 
such as cloud computing, bring your own device (BYOD), and a new generation of power 
users devolve application and infrastructure management to business units  
and/or cloud service providers (CSPs).
In some cases, IT (and security teams) are on board with the growing momentum 
toward cloud-first strategies and acting as brokers/providers. In others, they are facing 
a diminishing role as providers of premise-based services with shrinking business unit 
buy-in. If the business and IT managers or staff perceive any of the following, it can have 
a corrosive effect on the security culture:
• Central IT hasn’t been effective at providing timely solutions or 
services (e.g., many days or weeks to fulfill a request for new virtual 
machines, storage capacity, or application access), lacks an effective 
cloud strategy, and/or resists the LOBs’ own IT or cloud initiatives.
• Security leaders have acted like the “Department of NO,” failed to 
offer helpful alternatives and solutions when they identify a problem, 
or not tried to understand the LOB’s drivers or pain points.
• In large multinational organizations with different geographies, 
languages, and cultures, some LOBs are not engaged with IT or 
security programs from the headquarters or some of the meaning of 
these programs is lost in translation.
If cybersecurity isn’t considered strategic or business units are disengaged, business 
leaders are less likely to support sustained efforts to improve security culture. This 
chapter and the book as a whole proposes multiple recommendations to build better 
bridges to the business and improve the security culture. But first security leaders must 
look inward, at their organization, themselves, and their communication styles.
4.1.3  Hard to Change Culture
One definition of business culture is “The self-sustaining pattern of behavior that 
determines how things are done,” and it is further characterized as “An elusively complex 
entity that survives and evolves mostly through gradual shifts in leadership, strategy, 
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and other circumstances.” The same authors argue that cultures are hard to change: 
“Cultures are constantly self-renewing and slowly evolving: What people feel, think, and 
believe is reflected and shaped by the way they go about their business. Formal efforts 
to change a culture (to replace it with something entirely new and different) seldom 
manage to get to the heart of what motivates people, what makes them tick. Strongly 
worded memos from on high are deleted within hours. You can plaster the walls with 
large banners proclaiming new values, but people will go about their days, right beneath 
those signs, continuing with the habits that are familiar and comfortable.”4
In my experience, security culture inherits many attributes of the business culture. 
The good news is that security culture is a smaller problem space, and many security 
behaviors can be improved through targeted awareness campaigns, process changes, 
and even user experience (UX) changes to technologies – without changing the core 
business culture.
4.1.4  Ineffective Security Communication Styles
Every security organization has a culture of its own and the opportunity to influence the 
security culture across the entire organization it serves. An unhealthy business security 
culture can emerge, however, when the security organization’s subculture is out of line 
with the broader business culture.
Both the CISO and the security team create the security organization’s subculture. 
Although a larger security organization will have multiple teams, one or just a few 
predominant personality archetypes (e.g., the “cop,” “ex-military,” “auditor,” “techie,” 
or “business school” type) will tend to dominate the security organization and its 
communication style. If this style is out of line with the business culture (e.g., highly 
authoritarian in a consensus-oriented culture or vice versa), the security organization is 
unlikely to be well regarded.
Even without cultural dissonance between the security organization and the 
business, security leaders tend to find communicating with executives or peer business 
leaders challenging. Security leaders, even CISOs, serve a nonrevenue-generating 
function that’s often positioned too low in the organization chart or informal executive 
pecking orders. They are often the bearers of bad news about incidents, vulnerabilities, 
4 “Ten Principles of Organizational Culture,” Strategy+Business, February 15, 2016, accessed at 
www.strategy-business.com/feature/10-Principles-of-Organizational-Culture
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deficiencies, and unwelcome regulatory requirements. To top it off, they may lack strong 
communication skills. An effort to overcompensate and overplay the fear, uncertainty, 
and doubt (FUD) card can get attention in the short run but lead to a loss of credibility 
when feared consequences don’t soon materialize.
4.1.5  Measuring Culture Is a Soft Science
Security culture is more than awareness, and as a social phenomenon, it is an outlier 
to both the business financial metrics and the security technical metrics domains. 
Measuring whether efforts to improve security culture are effective (or that any single 
awareness and training campaign has succeeded) is important for our ability to 
understand what works. However, taking such measurements is challenging.
Organizations and practitioners who are unaware of methods to measure security 
culture may turn to measuring proxies, such as number of attendees and completion 
rates of awareness training courses. These metrics are not very useful because they only 
measure (at best) one or two points along a continuum of security behaviors and ignore 
other cultural attributes.
If the purpose of security awareness training is to improve the overall culture and not 
just a single behavior (such as reporting phishing messages), then a set of metrics must 
be devised to measure a broad set of security culture attributes. Unfortunately, there 
is no ISO or NIST standard for how to do this nor much research to provide empirical 
evidence that conventional awareness programs are effective. Such efforts that have 
been made to measure awareness effectiveness typically use only counts or trends of 
security-related events and incidents.
Measuring incidents in isolation just creates confusion. If more incidents are 
reported, does that mean security is getting worse or just that incidents are – at last – 
being reported? Incident metrics alone won’t resolve uncertainty.
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MEASURING SECURITY CULTURE – A PRACTITIONER’S STORY
Kai Roer, who developed the Security Culture Framework process5 and has made a career 
out of security culture projects, explained: “Our process included a measurement phase. 
But no standard metrics existed. Although we did measure changes, we did not know if they 
were improvements or not. When we did security culture work as consultants, we also had to 
consider political factors. Initially there was lot of bias in the measurement.”
In 2015, Roer teamed up with socio-informatics expert Dr Gregor Petritc to create a Norwegian 
company called CLTRe (pronounced “culture”). CLTRe is a software-as-a-service (SaaS)-based 
measurement application loaded with the best security culture metrics the two of them could 
devise. Roer and Petritch also began producing an annual security culture report with industry 
metrics. In 2019, CLTRe was acquired by the US-based awareness firm KnowBe4, Inc.
In the “Measure and Improve” section, we’ll discuss Kai Roer’s approach to 
measuring security culture as well as additional strategies.
4.2  Understand Security Culture and Awareness 
Concepts
A security culture is the part of a business culture’s self-sustaining patterns of behavior 
and perception that determine how (or if) the organization pursues security. It is an 
amalgamation of perceptions about and behavior toward the business’s own IT and security 
systems, security policies, and operational security practices or projects. Security culture is 
not fixed, it is constantly evolving based on people’s experiences and social interactions.
Security culture can impact an organization’s risk levels, compliance posture, and 
costs or benefits in both positive and negative ways. Business and security leaders ignore 
it at their own risk, or they can leverage it to get better outcomes.
A security culture strategy is a conscious effort by security and business leaders to 
transform their de facto security culture into one that’s more conducive to information 
protection and risk management. The strategy also seeks to sustain security culture at 
the desired state as the business changes over time.
5 “The Security Culture Framework” website, CLTRe, accessed at https://securityculture 
framework.net
CHAPTER 4 STRENGTHEN SECURITY CULTURE THROUGH COMMUNICATIONS AND AWARENESS PROGRAMS
98
The way that the security organization communicates and aligns with the business 
along with user awareness and training programs is a primary tool for improving the 
security culture. In a healthy security culture, the security team’s communications 
and the awareness programs have a higher chance of success. Even in a more negative 
setting, the right communications and awareness messaging carried out over time can 
help improve the security culture. A stronger security culture will then ease many other 
cybersecurity challenges.
4.2.1  Your Greatest Vulnerability?
Thought leader Edgar Schein once said about business culture in general: “If you do not 
manage culture, it manages you, and you may not even be aware of the extent to which 
this is happening.” Likewise, security culture can make or break a security program.
In fact, the root cause of many security breaches is not technology, but a “people” 
vulnerability such as an employee being tricked by a phishing message or other social 
engineering exploits into giving away credentials or installing malware. In other cases, a 
failure to follow a process, such as change control, is the culprit. Often, multiple things 
go wrong. A breach rarely is, and in fact should not be, caused by just one vulnerability.
Consider your own organization’s security culture, and ask yourself what would 
happen in the following “day in the life of a security program” examples:
• When budgeting comes around and the CISO presents a reasonable 
plan, but the CFO criticizes “unnecessary expenses”
• When the development manager waives the security design review 
because the project is behind schedule
• When the Agency Director demands immediate firewall rule changes 
that could expose taxpayer databases to the Internet
• When a potential breach is discovered for the business’s French 
customers’ data, there’s no detailed response plan, and the CISO goes 
to the Chief Counsel with a warning about 72-hour General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) breach notification requirements
• When a mutating zero-day virus has been reported at three sites, and 
the CISO recommends shutting down the network to affected regions 
with critical business applications
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• When the VP of Sales receives a demand from the company’s largest 
account in Dubai for contact information on all attendees at a recent 
business conference, even though sharing this personal data was 
not in the conference agreement and could violate compliance 
regulations
When faced with an apparent no-win choice between business and security values, 
what will the management team do? Will it reason through the issues to find the least- 
bad choice or brainstorm a third way out, learn from the experience, and update 
company policies to clarify similar circumstances in the future?
Or will a series of unproductive meetings end with escalation to the CEO, bad 
choices, acrimony, and blaming? How did the organization get to this point?
FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANY HEAD OF INTERNAL AUDIT’S STORY
“Since more than 80% of the company’s applications were custom developed, the global Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO) played a critical role. In conversation, it was clear to me that, the CTO 
understood the need for secure application development and the underlying risks. However, 
he felt that development organizations did not have additional budget to incorporate these 
practices and capabilities.
I recall attending a meeting with the CTO and senior engineering and development executives 
to get them aligned on the urgent need for secure development and operating practices 
for their transaction processing systems. Surprisingly, the development executives were 
vigorously resistant: ‘Why can’t engineering take care of security? We are development and we 
need to focus on building product quickly – our focus is on writing code that is fast, optimizes 
the user experience, and enables us to get features to market quickly.’
To help the CTO further understand the risk, I asked a question: ‘So across the 
infrastructure, is traffic encrypted?’ No one seemed to have a definite answer and after 
substantial discussion, the conclusion, was: ‘No.’ I continued: ‘Then where is the data 
security coming from if confidential transaction data travels are over public spaces and 
physical pipes?’ Much to my surprise, the application development and infrastructure 
security teams started pointing fingers at each other instead of taking ownership and 
working the problem together. At this point I could see the CTO was losing interest in this 
topic. There were more important things to do.
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My next stop was to brief the CEO. At the end of a long and very interactive discussion with 
the CEO, which included the CTO who sat quietly appearing non-committal, I summarized 
‘We are not secure. And the central issue is that each technology team is saying that 
security is not a priority requirement for them and needs to be provided at another layer or 
by another team.’ The CEO’s response was lukewarm. The CEO felt that the CTO was doing 
enough. The recurring subtext seemed to be: ‘Yeah, we know we are highly regulated and 
while certain processes may not appear to be great, nothing bad has happened – ever! 
We’re going to be ok.’
Eventually, the company experienced a serious data breach, where vulnerable applications 
were exploited early in the kill chain.
The unfortunate event was not surprising. I have seen this storyline play out so many 
times across a variety of companies and industries. Complacency results from diffused 
accountability and a decision culture that discourages responsibility for risk taking across 
teams and the management layers of a company. It becomes difficult to encourage informed 
decisions and a calibrated sense of urgency in a culture that is sclerotic, overconfident, and 
focused on constraints rather than solutions.”
Anonymous
The preceding story illustrates multiple problems. Security-related roles, 
responsibilities, and accountabilities were unclear, and the CEO placed a low priority on 
security. Thus, IT, development, and executive management failed to support deploying 
even such a basic control as data-in-transit encryption. The last paragraph of the story 
explains in the head of internal audit’s own words why the company’s woes with security 
stemmed from a cultural problem.
4.2.2  Or Your Best Opportunity?
When security issues loom, the business’s fate may hinge on a ripple of knee-jerk 
reactions preprogrammed into the security culture. We’ve highlighted the possibility 
of failures – the things you want to avoid. Let’s also consider how a healthy security 
culture can help an organization avert security failures in most cases and respond well or 
recover quickly even from serious incidents. Is your organization ready? Do the leaders 
and staff really value security? Do they realize that it requires teamwork between security 
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and business functions and what role they are to play? Do they buy into the policies 
they’re expected to observe and know what principles to consider when pressed to make 
a difficult decision?
Maybe not all that – yet. There probably is no perfect security culture out there. But 
there are plenty of good models that leading organizations can aspire to:
• Active executive oversight: Executives aren’t just going through the 
motions to review a quarterly report and react only when findings or 
incidents are too serious to ignore. Instead, at least a chosen few are 
actively meeting and discussing cybersecurity with security leaders 
from time to time and helping the rest of the executive team and the 
Board exercise oversight. The CEO or another top executive works 
with the security leadership to understand and prioritize the business 
impact of security risks and projects.
• Coordinated management: A cross-functional cybersecurity 
coordination group (such as a security steering committee at larger 
businesses) is in place. It is sponsored from the executive level, and 
the committee chair dedicates quality time to it. Although not every 
security issue bubbles up to the group, those that do to get resolved 
through principles-based deliberation, as much as possible to the 
benefit of both business and security.
• Engaged stakeholders: Business and security leaders or staff 
perform their security and risk management roles – such as data 
owner, data steward, risk owner – with the right mix of empowerment 
and control. A network of informal partnerships between security 
and business functions complements the official organizational 
structures and processes.
• Supportive workforce: End users are aware of the awareness program 
and often apply its advice or training to their work and personal 
computing activities. They tend to understand that security rules 
and policies are there to protect the business and themselves. They 
appreciate the security department’s efforts to “make the secure way 
the easy way” through tools such as password managers and mobile 
device management. They often report suspicious emails or other 
indicators of compromise to the security team.
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• Secure IT users: Business and security staff are aware of 
cybersecurity risks impacting their job function, make few errors, 
and practice secure behaviors they have been trained for, such as 
configuring strong passwords, locking workstations when away 
from the desk, and shutting down or disconnecting workstations 
immediately if suspecting malware.
• Stable and motivated security organization: The security leaders 
and team(s) are with the business for the long haul. They share the 
business’s general goals and values and cultivate partnerships with 
counterparts at the business level. They work closely with IT and 
developers to build in security solutions that are often unobtrusive 
and generally complementary to other business goals. They act like 
coaches rather than cops.
Bottom line: Businesses can create a security culture that is hospitable to positive 
models and outcomes like these by establishing and aligning effective security 
governance, user awareness and training programs, and a process to continuously 
measure and improve the security culture itself.
4.2.3  Attributes of Security Culture
Earlier, we defined security culture as an organization or group’s amalgamation of 
perceptions about and behavior toward its own IT and security systems, security 
policies, and operational or social security practices and projects.
Figure 4-1 illustrates the interrelationship of perceptions and behavior with other 
security culture components as described in the report “Security Culture 2018: Measure 
to Improve.”6 Observe that in a security culture, attitudes, norms, cognition, and 
communication shape perception and behavior. Group perceptions and behavior create 
better or worse security outcomes. Each component of culture can be measured and has 
complex interactions with the other components.
6 “Security Culture 2018: Measure to Improve,” CLTRe AS, Kai Roer, 2018, accessed at  
https://get.clt.re/report
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Observe how the inputs and impacts (or outputs) of security culture form a feedback 
loop in Figure 4-1. The book “CISO Soft Skills” (discussed in Chapter 2) analyzes the 
security program and security culture using system theory. In the authors’ model and 
this one, negative inputs degrade the system, producing negative outputs and a vicious 
circle that degrades the culture. Positive inputs and outputs do the opposite. All security 
cultures have a mix of positive and negative attributes and flows.
4.2.4  Security Culture Styles
Security culture in an organization is part of the larger business culture and needs to 
align with it. Figure 4-2 depicts various organizational culture concepts which are helpful 
for security leaders to understand.
Figure 4-1. Attributes and Outcomes of Security Culture
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General business culture can, according to the Harvard Business Review’s  
“The Culture Factor’s” research,7 be understood in terms of eight distinct cultural 
styles that fall along two dimensions: how people interact and how they respond to 
change. In another model, Hofstede Insights analyzes organizational cultures along six 
dimensions,8 including whether they are means oriented or goal oriented, internally 
or externally driven, easygoing or strict in work discipline, local vs. professional, open 
vs. closed, and employee oriented or work oriented. Hofstede also provides tools 
organizations can use to measure their cultures.
National cultures can be compared in many ways and must be considered as well 
as the general business culture in determining which security culture strategies and 
governance models (e.g., centralized, decentralized, and matrixed) will be effective. For 
example, organizations in a country typified by a high power distance9 are likely to have 
7 “The Culture Factor,” Harvard Business Review, January–February 2018 Issue, accessed at 
https://hbr.org/2018/01/the-culture-factor
8 “Organizational Culture,” Hofstede Insights, accessed at https://hofstede-insights.com/
models/organisational-culture/
9 “How Power Distance Influences Leadership,” Florida Tech Online Blog, accessed at www.
floridatechonline.com/blog/psychology/how-power-distance-influences-leadership/
Figure 4-2. Security and Business Cultural Factors
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better results with a centralized, prescriptive leadership approach, while organizations 
in a country with a low power distance may align better with a decentralized or matrixed 
organization’s consensus- and collaboration-based processes.
In addition to national cultures, distinct occupational subcultures for executives/
managers, office/administrative staff, developers, and other groups exist in almost 
all but the smallest organizations. Technology and IT services companies have many 
“white-collar” knowledge workers and developers. Health care has doctors and 
nurses; educational institutions have professors and teachers. Organizations in retail, 
manufacturing, utilities, and transportation have large numbers of “blue-collar” 
workers staffing factories, facilities, stores, or field operations. Government, financial 
services, and business services industry organizations have their own unique mixes 
of blue-collar and white-collar functions. The desired security cultural traits and the 
awareness methods to instill them may vary between these occupational subcultures, 
and the differences should be considered in deciding where a more prescriptive and 
where a more flexible and collaborative security culture strategy, governance, and 
communications approach would be optimal.
Some businesses – such as Chevron, Google, and Southwest Airlines10 – have a 
business culture that is clearly defined and intentionally cultivated in a consistent 
manner, some do not. One can look at an organization’s vision statement, or mission, to 
see if it calls out or implies a business culture style. If not, security leaders should look for 
other clues as to which of the cultural styles the organization seeks to follow.
Multinational businesses sometimes attempt to superimpose a global business 
culture vision over operating units in different countries; this scenario may dovetail with 
matrixed business, IT, and security governance (see Chapter 3). Or, local subsidiaries 
may be encouraged to operate with distinct national or local organizational cultures.
Other considerations: Organizational culture research doesn’t identify a perfect 
culture, since the efficacy of culture is relative to the goals of the organization. However, 
much is written about the (numerous) dysfunctional organizational cultures including 
one short piece from the Hofstede Insights.11 Business leaders often identify and discuss 
culture issues on their own and may be in the middle of a culture change project.
10 “10 Examples of Companies With Fantastic Cultures,” Sujan Patel, Entrepreneur, August 2015, 
accessed at www.entrepreneur.com/article/249174
11 “Ask an Expert: 6 Signs That Your Organisational Culture Is Not Working?,” Hofstede Insights, 
 accessed at https://news.hofstede-insights.com/news/2018/06/15/ask-an-expert-when- 
an-organisational-culture-is-not-working
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4- 1
Security leaders should align their definition of security, the security 
program, and security awareness messages with the business 
culture. When multinational cultures are in play, the security 
organization must be flexible and creative on how it aligns to them.
4.3  Make Enhancing Communication a Top Security 
Team Priority
Security culture and awareness campaign outcomes are shaped by the whole message 
that businesspeople get from the security organization. Security leaders can address 
the challenge described in the section “Ineffective Security Communication Styles” 
by understanding how businesspeople perceive both the security organization’s 
occupational subculture and the messages they’re receiving and by improving 
communications in the following ways:
• Cultivate a collaborative and supportive communication climate with 
business leaders, managers, and staff to encourage open interaction. 
Communicate with the expectation that stakeholders will be the 
supportive colleagues you need them to be.
• Be mindful of the audience and tailor messages appropriately. Don’t 
use highly technical language that might lose businesspeople. Use 
examples businesspeople can understand. Keep presentations as 
brief and actionable as possible while providing supporting material.
• Couch negative messages as an opportunity for improvement rather 
than criticizing or casting blame.
• Discover positive points and include them in the message; there will 
almost always be something stakeholders are already doing well, 
some area where they have improved, or positive intentions they 
have expressed. Give stakeholders public credit for any help they 
provide, even in small things.
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• Also accentuate the positive by communicating with a sense 
of efficacy, as advised in Chapter 2’s section “Earn Trust and 
Cooperation from Users.” Stakeholders will respond well if offered an 
easy or achievable way to improve or reduce risk.
• Be respectful of stakeholder’s time. Prepare for meetings with 
stakeholders in advance to minimize the amount of information 
gathering required during meetings. Take note of the information 
learned from stakeholders and make it available to security team 
colleagues to avoid repetitive requests.
The following generalized example proposes a good way to frame briefings of 
security issues or calls to action for stakeholders. Note the focus on teamwork done in 
advance of the briefing to show the security organization’s collaborative approach.
COMMUNICATION TIP FOR CISO EXECUTIVE BRIEFING
• Begin with a realistic take: We may have some bad incidents, audit findings, 
or negative third-party assessments. There’s a lot of red (risk) on this chart.
• Map to business impact: Here’s how our risk scenarios relate to your core 
business functions. Here’s what happened to some of our peers.
• Emphasize teamwork that’s gone into finding a solution: Here are some 
ways we can (or already have) work with business teams to come up with a 
new approach (e.g., strategy, policy, technology upgrades, budget).
• Focus on business outcomes: This is how the new approach could protect or 
recover your core business functions or performance metrics. Here’s how the 
required work would affect you.
• Set realistic expectations: Even with the new approach, there are still some 
risks we must live with. However, by working together we can greatly reduce 
our risk and have a defensible strategy. Any and all questions welcome!
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All communications involve three components: the content, the relationship 
between the parties, and the organizational structure that frames the relationship and 
content. As we discussed in Chapter 2’s section “Clarify Security-Related Business 
Roles,” having a clear definition of roles and responsibilities can help many aspects of 
the security culture. Better security governance structures and security communication 
efforts are mutually supportive.
As noted in section “Security Culture Styles,” security leaders must be mindful of 
the business culture as they seek to communicate with stakeholders. Communicating 
effectively across multinational business cultures in large organizations requires a 
sustained team effort as suggested in the following CISO stories.
COMMUNICATION TIP FOR MULTINATIONAL IT AND SECURITY TEAMS
CISO Stories of Building a Multinational Security Culture
“You have to travel and get in front of the international business units. Face to face meetings, 
continual reiteration that you are building the security program for them and with them, not 
‘just because.’ Understand and work with different culture’s communication styles. I found 
that in India they don’t want to say no, you have to get to the reasons why something would 
not make sense and work with those issues. Sometimes this means learning more about the 
customers of your customers.
Once the relationships existed, I was able to cross-fertilize know how on international weekly 
calls among security staff – e.g. Australia is having audit findings, here’s how Sao Paolo’s team 
handled that issue. If they’ve done something and been rewarded for it, they will value it.”
Michael Everall, CISO
“We realized we needed to tell people what we were doing as a team (everything from the 
network architecture on up); we made a list of 50 initiatives and prioritized 10 with champions 
assigned to develop presentations. When they travelled, they had to present one of that 10 
to the local site. I told staff that I wouldn’t sign their expense reports unless they made a 
presentation, and I would personally add an extra ½ day to my trips for the presentation and 
open house Q&A. This was really appreciated, and we learned a lot.”
Paul Simmonds, CISO
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Recognition of the need for security leaders and CISOs to improve soft skills has 
been growing for some time. The average CISO in 2020 is almost certainly a better 
communicator than his or her counterpart in 2010. But it hasn’t been enough – yet – to 
improve cybersecurity-business alignment and cybersecurity outcomes against the 
rising bar of threats, regulations, and business needs. CISOs can take the following steps 
to improve the security organization’s business communications:
• Make improving security-related communications a top priority.
• Provide communication training, measure communication skills, and 
hire effective communicators within the security organization.
• Recruit security champions within the business’s sales and marketing 
teams to provide additional coaching or training on communication 
skills for key security managers and staff.
• Obtain commercial communications training, coaching, and tools. 
Offer these enablers both to members of the security organization 
and to members of security-related functions such as compliance.
• Use the communication tips provided here for executive briefings 
and international teams. Collect a library of such tips for other 
situations.
4.4  Use Awareness Programs to Improve Behaviors 
and Security Culture
Awareness programs can be targeted to improve specific security-related behaviors 
for defined audiences. They can also be used in a strategic effort to improve security 
culture. Figure 4-3 diagrams three dimensions of an optimal user awareness and training 
program.
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NOTE I could have written a whole book on user awareness and training 
programs. Instead, I’ve limited discussion to the programs’ goals and strategies 
that support security culture and business alignment. Fortunately, there’s another 
book that’s highly complementary to the notion of driving a healthy security culture 
through the awareness program. Perry Carpenter’s “Transformational Security 
Awareness”12 gets much deeper into tactics and I’ll refer to it herein.
4.4.1  Promote More Secure Behavior
Today’s users work online in a minefield of malware, ransomware, social engineering, 
and insecure devices, applications, and networks. Some primary purposes for awareness 
programs are to improve users’ understanding of cyber threats to themselves and the 
business as well as teach them to practice basic security hygiene against those threats. 
Role-based awareness and training can also be deployed to IT, development, and other 
business areas to reduce human or technical vulnerabilities and/or promote regulatory 
compliance.
12 ”Transformational Security Awareness: What Neuroscientists, Storytellers, and Marketers Can 
Teach Us About Driving Secure Behaviors,” Perry Carpenter, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2019.
Figure 4-3. Dimensions of User Awareness and Training Programs
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Some of users’ most common insecure practices are
• Failing to be vigilant enough to ignore or report potential phishing 
messages
• Falling for other social engineering tricks
• Selecting weak passwords or not changing default passwords
• Sharing accounts with colleagues, friends, and family members
• Telecommuting unsafely (using insecure Wi-Fi, leaving devices 
unlocked or unattended)
• Disabling security controls on a device
• Installing or using unauthorized applications
• Using obsolete software or unpatched software
• Revealing potentially sensitive information in personal interactions 
or on social networks
• Falling afoul of industry-specific compliance issues such as 
protecting customers’ personal information
Security leaders (with the support of the business) should use the full array of 
security program instruments to promote more secure behavior including policy, 
processes, awareness programs, and tools that either prevent insecure behavior or 
discourage it. An even better approach is to make secure behavior the path of least 
resistance; for example, multifactor authentication obviates the need to create highly 
complex passwords and change them frequently.
4.4.2  Target Awareness Campaigns and Training 
Initiatives
Awareness program leaders can identify which kinds of insecure practices are most 
prevalent or serious for the business by
• Running vulnerability scans for top areas of user-related 
vulnerabilities, such as weak passwords
• Interviewing the organization’s most knowledgeable user-facing staff 
in incident responder, help desk support, and HR roles to identify 
security topics on which users need help
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• Reviewing relevant audit findings (such as privileged administrators 
sharing passwords to service accounts in an unauthorized or ad hoc 
manner)
• Surveying users or supervisors in the target populations
For further prioritization, the types of insecure practices can be correlated and 
prioritized for different audiences. Work environment factors to consider are the users’ 
business roles, hardware and software, IT-related roles, relevant risk scenarios, and 
defensive controls already in place. Find out whether different populations of users can
• Telecommute and use BYOD solutions
• Browse the Web relatively freely and connect to personal web-based 
mail from their work device
• Have local administrative privileges on their work device
• Get access to personal or sensitive information
• Administer IT systems or applications
Awareness program leaders can then identify a small number of audience types 
and tailor awareness messaging and training. For example, at a retail company, one 
might target all employees and full-time contractors for phishing training and phishing 
simulation testing. However, only office workers with devices would be trained on device 
security hygiene. Only administrative staff and store managers would be trained on 
consumer privacy regulatory compliance during an initial awareness campaign.
Having selected the target behaviors and populations, identify specific awareness/
training objectives, audiences, messages, and medium(s). Note that IT staff and 
developers might merit awareness and training on some of the same issues as end users, 
but the messages and training content could vary. For example, both end users and 
IT staff could be cautioned against sharing accounts. IT staff could also be advised of 
acceptable organization-standard account sharing workarounds such as password vaults 
for break glass access13 but cautioned to adhere to policies against granting excessive 
privileges to colleagues or end users.
13 “How to Design a PAM Break Glass Process,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, January 2020,  
accessed at https://security-architect.com/how-to-balance-assurance-and- 
availability-in-pam-systems/
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Larger organizations under medium or high security pressure should have a group 
dedicated to awareness training and a communications organization providing content 
preparation and delivery. In smaller organizations, or organizations lacking staff 
dedicated to awareness and communication, the security leader responsible for the 
program should consult with internal marketing staff and/or supervisors to learn which 
mediums (e.g., videos, email newsletters, lunch and learn sessions, posters, etc.) would 
be most effective for each audience.
“We try to follow the good practice of sending a positive message in awareness 
programs. Our awareness program leader believes that if you teach people how 
to be secure in their personal lives, that translates to business benefit because 
the basic literacy applies to everybody. Also, teaching awareness this way raises 
attendance at events.” 
David Sherry, CISO Princeton University
In “Transformational Security Awareness,” Carpenter repeatedly emphasizes the 
need to work with human nature, not against it. People tend to resist doing things that 
are difficult, awkward, or require change. We tend to quickly forget about 90% of our 
training unless it is reinforced through use. Carpenter writes that instilling knowledge 
and awareness is like “an exercise in cutting through the noise and slipping past the 
brain’s defenses” to motivate users, give them the ability, and continually prompt them 
do the right thing. Facing this challenge, it is generally best to automate the desired task 
or behavior whenever possible.
Awareness professionals must adjust content and tactics to the following user 
behavior groupings: Those motivated and able to perform a duty, those motivated but 
not able, those able but not motivated, and those with neither motivation or ability. 
That’s how deep security user awareness and training can get into behavioral science, 
multimedia content development, and attention management. Carpenter notes: 
“Being a security expert doesn’t naturally transfer to communicating security-related 
information to people outside the field.” Therefore, in my experience, successful 
awareness programs rely heavily on non-technical people with a background in 
marketing, education, or communications to work with technical experts.
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4.4.2.1  Special Considerations for Work at Home, or Bring Your 
Own Device (BYOD) Programs
In 2020, COVID-19 forced many organizations to greatly expand teleworking and BYOD 
programs. As part of expanded remote access, employees in many cases require more 
latitude to browse the web free of restrictions or protections from proxies or firewalls. 
Hackers have moved to exploit newly vulnerable users and their organizations leading to 
increases in fraud and abuse.
Although its generally preferable to limit users’ vulnerability through automated 
technical controls, such as blocking ports on a device, it isn’t always possible to do 
that in a BYOD environment where controls require more user discretion, or user 
cooperation, to operate.
As organizations seek to stabilize home office security and (in many cases) to 
continue supporting remote work over the long haul – users’ security awareness 
becomes even more strategic to business success. Security leaders can take the 
opportunity to partner with business and IT functions concerned with improving staff’s 
digital literacy and proficiency, which are also a cybersecurity concern.
4.4.3  Coordinate Awareness Messaging with Managers 
and Key Influencers in Target Audiences
Business people are more likely to be influenced by awareness and training if their 
managers and executives support the program.
4- 2
To maximize the chance of success, security leaders need to gain 
buy-in for awareness, training, or security culture improvement 
programs, in advance from the managers or executives of the target 
groups.
Security leaders responsible for the awareness program should establish 
relationships with business or LOB executives, gain their trust, and seek their buy-in and 
support for the strategic use of awareness programs.
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“The attitude, behavior and messaging related to security from the CEO (and other 
executives) is critical. Just having the CEO wear a badge whenever appearing on 
an all-employee video sends a message.”
Christopher Carlson, Information Security Writer and Adviser
Once management is supportive, role- or audience-specific awareness and training 
doesn’t necessarily require an over-sized budget. The awareness program can reach 
out to influencers in the organization as well as security team members and IT staff to 
get some assistance. Consider using customizable curricula with a “train the trainer” 
approach. Engage experienced staff to introduce, explain, or add context to generic or 
third-party training content for their colleagues.
4-3
Coordinate security communications to the business with IT 
computer support and applicable corporate administration 
functions (HR, legal) or LOBs. Align instructions on how to perform 
basic or role-specific security duties with corresponding security 
processes.
Involving IT or business-level staff in customizing role-specific training or awareness 
content not only builds the library of training materials but is also more engaging and 
memorable to the staff themselves. Role-specific training can be tied to corresponding 
security processes, such as how should
• An executive sign off on a risk acceptance memorandum
• A data steward evaluate a Sales Department request for releasing 
customer information to a partner
• A system administrator request access for a third-party vendor to 
troubleshoot a critical system
See Chapter 6’s Table 6-3 to identify which control domains engage which business 
functions. Consider training needs for managers and staff in the roles needed to 
implement each control domain according to the organization’s security or business 
processes. As the awareness program builds a network of key influencers throughout the 
organization, its ability to create a healthy security culture grows.
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4.5  Commit to Improving Security Culture
Business and security leaders in organizations with a healthy security culture tend to 
accept and approve of requirements for awareness programs and security governance. 
They seek to move the organization from being one that performs tactical awareness 
and training projects to one that intentionally defines and measures security culture 
targets as a way to achieve its security vision, drive its security strategy, and meet its 
security objectives.
A long-term commitment to improve security culture could operate on a few 
different points of the continuum between purely tactical compliance–driven awareness 
programs and strategic, full-on security culture transformation programs. Note that 
strategic commitment could take the following forms:
• Establish formal security culture teams, projects, and process 
methodologies. ENISA’s “Cyber Security Culture in Organizations” 
report14 proposes a “do it yourself” model for such a program.
• Engage a management consultant specializing in driving business 
change and who has experience working with IT and security 
programs.
I’m guessing that the majority of those reading this, however, don’t have the 
mandate for a full-on transformation program or funding for the additional project team 
that would be required. The good news is that what I propose in the sections “Make 
Enhancing Communication a Top Security Team Priority” and “Use Awareness Programs 
to Improve Behaviors and Security Culture” are about midway along the continuum 
between a tactical and strategic approach. Although they require and deserve some 
additional funding and management priority, they shouldn’t require additional teams of 
resources in the typical organization.
Awareness and training efforts to strategically improve security culture can 
be built in an iterative manner and therefore be accessible to almost any security 
organization in almost any business. The main prerequisite is to enrich the 
awareness and training program to be a bit more strategic, enhance security-related 
communications, and measure aspects of the security culture along with the results 
14 “Cyber Security Culture in Organisations,” European Union Agency for Network and Information  
Security (ENISA), November 2017, accessed at www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cyber- 
security-culture-in-organisations
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of these efforts. As described in section “Measure and Improve,” the awareness and 
communications programs can periodically measure and assess the as-is culture 
and security posture, select departments or audiences for awareness projects, and 
perform them. Then measure the results and adjust or sustain those activities, 
practices, or communications that are successful. At a later stage as awareness and 
communications programs mature, the business could choose to begin a full-on 
security culture improvement initiative.
4.6  Measure and Improve
Because security culture is multifaceted and full of subtleties, businesses can benefit 
by developing, choosing, and monitoring culture metrics. Due to staff turnover and 
continual changes in security policies, technologies, regulations, and the business, 
security culture and user awareness program effectiveness should be measured at 
least once every two years. Security leaders can pursue any (or all) of three suggested 
approaches to measure security culture–related information over time:
• Measure security-related communications effectiveness.
• Measure security awareness program effectiveness.
• Measure culture comprehensively to determine whether a security 
culture program is effective.
4.6.1  Measure Your Ability to Improve Security-Related 
Communications
What if some of security culture’s woes are self-inflicted (see the “Ineffective Security 
Communication Styles” section)? Why then it would be useful to measure the progress 
and effect of efforts to apply the guidance in the “Make Enhancing Communication a 
Top Security Team Priority” section. CISOs can
• Make a list of recent security communications to stakeholders via 
briefings, meetings, email announcements, newsletters, posts, and 
important informal contacts. Have an objective party or audience 
member rate each on a scale of 1–5 for clarity, fitness for audience 
(i.e., business or IT), positivity, efficacy, and other desirable 
attributes. Track these ratings over time.
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• Self-assess and ask key team members to self-assess communication skills.
• Get feedback from stakeholders after briefings.
Set targets for improvement based on the data and measure again after a period  
of time.
4.6.2  Measure the Effectiveness of Security  
Awareness Programs
We can often measure the effectiveness of programs to promote more secure behavior 
by analyzing IT artifacts before and after awareness or training campaigns. Examples 
include events in logs, device or account security configuration settings or passwords, 
and test results such as the output from phishing simulations. In some cases, one must 
get creative about identifying IT artifacts that are outcomes of the behavior, such as the 
number of files flagged for containing sensitive data outside authorized repositories. Still 
other behaviors don’t produce IT artifacts but must be measured by human observation.
For other attributes of the security culture (see Figure 4-1) we can measure norms 
and attitudes through user surveys, and cognition or compliance through testing and 
observation.
4.6.3  Measure Security Culture Comprehensively
Some of the industry insights provided in this chapter might not have been realized were 
it not for The Security Culture Report 2018.15 The results from the report demonstrate 
the value of being able to measure security culture. Repeating measurements at the 
organization level enables businesses to understand how their security culture improves 
or worsens over time and fine-tune awareness, training, and other programs to correct 
course as needed. Improvements in culture can also be cited in audit or compliance 
reports as evidence that “people and process” controls are operating effectively.
The CLTRe toolkit16 measures the attributes of security culture listed in Figure 4-1: 
attitudes, cognition, communication, compliance, norms, and behavior.
15 “Security Culture 2018: Measure to Improve,” CLTRe AS, Kai Roer, 2018, accessed at  
https://get.clt.re/report
16 CLTRe website, CLTRe (a KnowBe4 subsidiary), accessed at https://get.clt.re/
the-cltre-toolkit/
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4.7  Call to Action
The core recommendation for security leaders from this chapter is to improve 
security culture through awareness and communications programs as follows:
• Seek executive support for making security culture improvement a 
strategic objective.
• Devise ways to promote, prioritize, and target awareness programs to 
improve security culture as well as problematic security behaviors.
• Coordinate awareness messaging and other communications with 
the executives or managers of the target audiences.
• Focus on role-specific training as well as basic user-related awareness 
issues such as the vulnerability to phishing messages.
• Target security communications as needed to applicable audiences 
or groups.
• Obtain support from influencers in target audience, especially for 
role-specific programs.
• Evaluate how the security organization communicates with 
businesspeople, and measure how well the communication is received.
• Measure the success of awareness programs and other efforts to 
improve security culture.
• Measure improvements in security-related communications.
Action – Make a quick assessment of the state of the organization’s security 
culture, communications, and awareness programs.
Ask yourself the following short set of questions and score the answers in the Success 
Plan Worksheet’s17 Section 3, Table 3. Base your score on whether you would answer 
most of the questions with a strong “no” (1), a strong “yes” (5), or something in between.
 1. Do business executives prioritize and support cybersecurity  
(i.e., consider it strategic)?
17 “Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, May 2020, 
accessed at https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet.
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 2. Do business, IT, and development managers provide resources to 
security projects and help enforce security policies?
 3. Do security team members have positive relationships and 
communications with business stakeholders?
 4. Does the security organization treat communicating with IT and 
business leaders as being a top priority?
 5. Are security leaders incentivized to
 a. Maintain regular communication with IT and business leaders in their 
functional area?
 b. Improve their communication skills and those of their team members?
 6. Does the security organization have a user awareness function 
sized to the business?
 7. Does the user awareness and training function
 a. Communicate in an efficacious manner (“we can do this,” “here’s how 
others have been [safe, successful]”)?
 b. Target awareness programs to specific audiences?
 c. Coordinate programs with the audiences’ leadership?
 d. Provide role-specific training?
 e. Recruit champions among the target audiences and “train the trainers”?
 f. Provide information or free tools that will help staff and their families 
improve cybersecurity at home?
 g. Coordinate with the marketing organization’s internal communications 
program?
 h. Use innovative and entertaining communications mediums, products, or 
services?
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 8. Does the security leadership or awareness program itself measure 
whether awareness and training programs are improving
 a. Security-related behavior?
 b. Attitudes and perceptions about the security program?
 c. Understanding of policies, tools, and procedures (cognition and 
compliance)?
 d. Compliance audit results?
Action – Define 1–3 improvement objectives for security culture
Note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 5b, of the worksheet.
The following are examples of security culture–related improvement objectives:
• Continuously maintain the stakeholder engagement table as 
part of an ongoing personal or team project (especially in larger 
organizations).
• Assess your communication style or habits and improve at least one 
practice.
• Get the security team to assess group communication styles or habits 
and improve at least one practice.
• Create and manage at least one practice for user awareness and 
training improvement (e.g., task key team members to collect 
feedback from 1–3 business or IT stakeholders on security-related 
communications).
• Prepare an informal briefing on security culture (using this chapter as 
a resource) and present or discuss it with at least one of your business 
or IT executive sponsors.
Don’t limit yourself to these examples. Look for improvement objectives that fit the 
gaps and priorities you’ve identified for your business.
CHAPTER 4 STRENGTHEN SECURITY CULTURE THROUGH COMMUNICATIONS AND AWARENESS PROGRAMS
122
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
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CHAPTER 5
Manage Risk in the  
Language of Business
For too long, information risk management has been lost in translation. Technical risk 
analyses were unintelligible to the business and even security practitioners lacked 
common terms, definitions, or analysis models. Without a working risk management 
framework, security and business leadership have found it hard to agree on priorities, 
policies, or budgets. Even security teams struggle prioritizing which controls to 
implement.
But this need no longer be the case. In this Chapter, we’ll learn how businesses can 
use the standard ISO 31000 Risk Management framework, and Open Factor Analysis 
of Information Risk (FAIR) models as the basis for a comprehensive set of well-aligned 
processes. Using quantitative criteria such as the monetary value of loss events and the 
probable frequency of occurrence makes it easier to roll information risks up into the 
enterprise risk map and report them in the language of business, i.e., dollars, pounds, 
euros, rupees, etc. We will also discuss ways to assess risk efficiently across a broad class 
of issues and assets throughout the organization.
Using these recommendations, businesses can
• Understand and employ risk management framework standards
• Establish the context for the risk program (and gain stakeholder buy- in)
• Implement a tiered risk assessment process (and weave it into IT and 
the business)
• Perform enterprise risk assessments to identify top risk scenarios
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• Treat risks holistically
• Monitor issues and risks continuously
• Communicate risks to stakeholders effectively
5.1  Address Common Challenges
Despite the availability of standards, the industry still struggles with risk management. 
And yet risk is the reason we have cybersecurity programs. Challenges include
• Lack of consistent information risk terminology and alignment with 
other enterprise risk domains
• Unrealistic expectations and ineffective risk analysis methods
• Myopic focus on control assessment while ignoring other risk 
treatment options
• Analysis paralysis and uncertainty about where to start
5.1.1  Lack of Consistent Information Risk Terminology 
and Alignment with Other Enterprise Risk Domains
Definitions for key risk terminology – particularly “risk,” “threat,” “vulnerability,” and 
“impacts” – are found in various security standards, guidelines, and other writings. 
However, these definitions vary widely. Without consistent terminology, business and 
security teams cannot be certain they are even communicating about risks – let alone 
develop effective risk treatment programs.
Worse, in some organizations, security staff seem to be running around with the 
proverbial “hair on fire” syndrome. They treat every single risk-related issue (e.g., 
vulnerability, threat or pen test report, compliance gap, etc.) as if it were a clear and 
present danger before even analyzing the business risk scenarios.
Information risk encompasses both true cybersecurity risks from cyberattackers 
acting on vulnerabilities and IT operational risks from operator error or IT component 
breakage. Due to its complexity, businesses need security and risk professionals 
to perform the analyses. However, as discussed in Chapter 1’s section “Taking 
Accountability for Risk,” business leaders need to understand information risk in 
Chapter 5  Manage risk in the Language of Business 
125
business terms. Information risk must also be quantified, like financial risk, to roll up 
from the security organization to the business level.
Fortunately as we’ll discuss in section “Understand and Employ Risk Management 
Framework Standards,” the industry has solutions that businesses can adopt for a 
consistent risk management vocabulary.
5.1.2  Unrealistic Expectations and Ineffective Analysis 
Methods
Many people who don’t understand cybersecurity believe businesses should try to avoid 
or prevent all information risks. Such thinking is valid for life-or-death safety objectives, 
but many other security objectives should be balanced against the costs or other business 
impacts of the required effort. It’s critical to have an objective framework for such analysis.
Businesses often employ ineffective qualitative methods for risk analysis, and it 
is still somewhat unusual to find a business using a quantified risk appetite agreed 
between stakeholders to identify what types and levels of risk are acceptable. Qualitative 
risk analyses assign ratings such as “low,” “medium,” and “high” or numerical risk scores. 
The analyses may rely entirely on subjective criteria, and even expert analysts may have 
cognitive biases. When business and security leaders can’t agree on a transparent and 
objective method for evaluating risk, communication is difficult.
When expectations are unrealistic and risk analysis processes poorly defined or 
lacking objectivity, it should be no surprise that the results can be difficult to defend. 
Business executives will often ask security leaders to present on risk and then challenge 
the output: “What’s in that yellow dot on the heat map anyway?”
As Jack Jones, Chairman of the FAIR Institute, likes to say, “For most companies, 
security spend is like the advertising budget. You know you’re wasting half of it; you just 
don’t know which half.”
5.1.3  Myopic Focus on Control Assessment While 
Ignoring Other Risk Treatment Options
Often cyber-risk teams focus on risk mitigation using controls for reducing risk to the 
exclusion of other risk treatment options such as avoiding, accepting, disaggregating, 
or transferring risks. Risk assessment becomes little more than control assessment in 
which the lack of a control, such as data-at-rest encryption, is automatically assumed 
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to be a risk. Although that isn’t always untrue, it can cause businesses to misjudge both 
the amount of resources required for cybersecurity and how to allocate those resources. 
Fortunately, the risk program can incorporate tiered risk assessment methods to triage 
out unimportant issues, and a holistic risk treatment program can consider all the 
options to help the business conserve and prioritize resources.
5.1.4  Analysis Paralysis and Uncertainty About Where 
to Start
In a FAIR Institute risk management maturity survey,1 only 17% of respondents report 
having strong risk analysis or assessment practices. Reviewing this survey, the criteria 
required to be “strong” are somewhat daunting to all but the best-funded and most 
effective security organizations. For example:
• Putting senior business executives’ performance incentives to 
manage information risk on a par with product, schedule, and 
financial incentives or other key performance indicators
• Hiring specialists in quantitative risk analysis and threat intelligence 
and applying a formal quantitative risk analysis model (which may 
require premium tools and data sources)
• Performing rigorous root cause analysis of all noncompliant 
conditions
• Conducting regular independent review of risk-based decision- 
making processes
For a security leader struggling to get business buy-in (another challenge with risk 
management just like all else security), those tough criteria may seem out of reach. 
Fortunately for the typical business, a risk program only needs to be “strong enough” in 
the right areas. The security team would not need to score 100% on the FAIR Institute 
maturity survey to become effective, and even getting to 60 or 70% could move the 
needle significantly toward improved cybersecurity program outcomes.
1 “The Road to Cyber Risk Maturity 2018 Risk Management Maturity Benchmark Survey,” FAIR 
Institute, January 2019
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For example, section “Implement Tiered Risk Assessment” explains how some risk 
analysis processes can be implemented quickly from the bottom up by a small team and 
distributed to other groups in the organization.
5.2  Understand and Employ Risk Management 
Framework Standards
If the business has taken steps to establish control baselines, simplify and rationalize IT, 
and promote the right security culture and governance model, risk management can fit 
right in as the keystone to these efforts. Businesses just need an organizing framework 
for it. So, if we could get our organization to implement a risk management framework 
that was objective and crossed silos, what would it look like? Although multiple 
framework standards exist (including one from NIST), I recommend these two: ISO 
31000:20182 for the overall framework and Open FAIR for the quantitative risk analysis 
model.3
5.2.1  ISO 31000 Risk Management
In the ISO model, security and business leadership first set the context for risk. Staff perform 
risk assessments and risk treatments and monitor risks for changes. Business leadership 
communicates risk appetite, preferences, and decisions to security leaders. Security 
leadership communicates new risks, status of known risks, and programs for remediation 
to all stakeholders. Risk practitioners from IT teams, the CISO, and the Chief Risk Officer 
(CRO) monitor IT operational risks, cybersecurity risks, and enterprise risks, respectively.
5.2.2  Open Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR)
We recommend using the Open FAIR definition for any kind of risk. FAIR defines risks 
as “The probable frequency and the probable magnitude of future loss,” and, in fact, 
one can substitute the words “loss exposure” for risk at any time per this definition. Loss 
exposure, or risk, in FAIR concerns itself with assets that have value which can be lost, 
2 ISO 31000 Risk Management, International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 2018
3 “Open Group Standard: Risk Analysis (O-RA) (C13G),” The Open Group, 2013. Accessed at 
https://publications.opengroup.org/c13g (free registration and login required)
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stolen, or affected in negative ways. FAIR also describes an ontology of risk component 
definitions, starting with frequency and magnitude of loss. Once trained on these 
definitions, business and security people can talk about risk in the language of business.
Many in the industry are aligning on the Open FAIR risk model (shown in Figure 5- 1).  
It provides a comprehensive set of risk terminology definitions and a quantitative 
method for estimating loss expectancy (i.e., a range of annualized loss).
Figure 5-1. Open FAIR Model
“RISK” AND OTHER RELEVANT DEFINITIONS
Risk (per FAIR): the probable frequency and magnitude of future loss
Information risk scenario: a threat acting on a vulnerability against an it or business 
information asset to produce a loss event
Risk-related issue: any reported event, circumstance, or concern that could affect one of the 
fair model components (boxes)
FAIR offers a consistent way of describing information risk and performing 
quantitative risk assessments. FAIR also provides ways to quantify the level of risk 
assessors’ confidence and addresses the multivariate nature of information risk using 
Monte Carlo simulations. The assessors must have a clear understanding and shared 
assumptions about the scenario under analysis. Using FAIR-based tools efficiently 
across a broad range of scenarios requires risk assessors to have considerable real- 
world experience with the tools and a good storehouse of risk data that is specific to 
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the business. Performing large numbers of full quantitative analyses requires a level of 
maturity and some risk analysis tools from the business.
5.2.3  Tiered Risk Assessment Process
I recommend that security teams adopt the FAIR methodology for risk analysis and train 
security risk professionals and the core security team in FAIR concepts so that they can 
speak about risk consistently. However, FAIR does not yet include a lightweight method 
of triaging risk scenarios that can be rolled out to business and IT staff without requiring 
many hours of training. I’ll address this challenge in section “Use a Lightweight Method 
to Triage Risk Scenarios.”
Businesses can come up to speed on FAIR in the spirit of “crawl, walk, run.” Initially, 
train the core security and risk management teams on the model. Develop the capability 
to use it for in-depth risk assessments. Lightly train business risk owners and IT or 
security operations leaders to understand FAIR analyses using examples of risk scenarios 
pertinent to the business. Deepen FAIR adoption over time until it becomes possible, if 
desired, to replace qualitative shortcuts used for lightweight risk assessments or other 
needs.
Figure 5-2 illustrates a conceptual risk management framework combining the ISO 
31000 and Open FAIR standards. The remaining sections of this chapter cover each 
major process in the framework.
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5.3  Establish the Context for the Risk Program
Businesses should define the scope of information risk programs based on the types of 
assets, regional or organizational boundaries, risk scenarios, or compliance issues to 
be covered. The following key to cybersecurity-business alignment summarizes a work 
program to establish the risk context. It also outlines the contents of this section.
5- 1
Prepare analysis of business risk scenarios and propose an 
information risk framework. Socialize the proposed risk framework 
to obtain broad stakeholder buy-in. Seek top-level sponsorship for 
the risk management program and formalize risk management 
accountabilities.
Figure 5-2. Conceptual Diagram for the Major ISO 31000 Risk Management 
Framework
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5.3.1  Prepare Analysis of Business Risk Context
Ideally, security leaders have top-level sponsorship up front for investments of time and 
resources in the risk program. Since that’s not always the case, confident security leaders 
can prepare a business case for the program that includes an analysis of the business 
risk context and an outline of a proposed risk framework. Consider this required 
“homework” to gain top-level support and build the actual risk program later.
Consider using PESTLE analysis4 to understand and document the risk program’s 
business context for risk leaders:
• Political: Who are the business and security stakeholders and what is 
the governance framework?
• Economic: How does the business make money? What are the core 
processes (i.e., sales, marketing, research, value delivery, value 
development, finance) that could be at risk?
• Social: Who are the users, managers, and executives that will be 
impacted by the risk program, what training will be required, and 
how to get buy-in?
• Technological: In which existing management processes and tools 
(e.g., IT governance, risk, and compliance (GRC), asset management, 
IT service management (ITSM), vulnerability management, third- 
party management, etc.) will risk management capabilities be 
embedded? What new tools may be required?
• Legal/regulatory: What regulatory requirements influence risk 
management for the business? Do they specify how risk management 
must be done?
• Environmental: Who are the secondary stakeholders (i.e., 
customers, investors, regulators, society as a whole) that would be 
impacted by IT outages, data breaches, or other losses?
4 “What is PESTLE Analysis? A Tool for Business Analysis,” accessed at https://pestleanalysis.
com/what-is-pestle-analysis/
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5.3.2  Outline a Proposed Risk Framework
As described earlier, I recommend using the ISO 31000 risk management framework and 
Open FAIR for risk analysis. In this chapter, I’ll provide additional information on risk 
assessment, risk monitoring, risk treatment, and risk communication processes for the 
framework.
Business and IT leaders generally require some education on information risk 
terminology and a briefing on how the program would work. Develop a briefing 
describing how ISO 31000 and Open FAIR concepts can be used in a risk management 
program for the business. Prepare a briefing on the need for a consistent language to 
identify, describe, and assess threats, vulnerabilities, impacts, and risks as well as an 
outline of the risk processes required.
5.3.3  Obtain Top-Level Sponsorship
Top-level sponsorship from a CEO, CFO, President, General, Provost, and other top 
business leaders is fundamental to a risk program. If required, build a business case from 
the analysis of risk context and, in presenting it, consider the guidance in the “Board 
Communication” section of this chapter.
However, security leaders need more than the sponsor’s signature. They need a 
formal assignment by the executive of business risk accountability to business leaders 
and some mechanism for holding business leaders accountable. Businesses can do this 
in different ways.
STORIES OF BUSINESS LEADER ACCOUNTABILITY FROM THE FIELD
“At the Bank, we had the view that technology doesn’t have risk, businesses do. Our role is to 
help make them aware of the risk and advise them on the alternatives. Our risk acceptance 
process was based on a simple memorandum. The form explained the risk and if we felt it 
was egregious ended with a single line that read: ‘Moving forward with this is against the 
recommendation of the CISO.’ The number of these that a business leader filed would have 
been counted, but we never had one signed off. In the Bank’s culture, it was better for the 
business leader to remediate the issue than to explain why it was necessary to overrule the 
CISO.”
Steve Katz, CISO
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“Business and IT leaders would come before the Corporate Ethics and Compliance Oversight 
Committee at least once every 2 years to present a self-assessment of the entirety of risk to their 
business unit. I sat on that Committee along with officers for audit, HR, legal, financial, and other 
functions. Completing the assessment was a rigorous 6-month process to which each of us would 
assign a support person to help the business unit understand what was required. The assessment 
process drove accountability to the business and issues flowed up to the enterprise risk map.”
Malcolm Harkins, CISO
Businesses have different ways of holding business leaders accountable for risk,  
and multiple models can work provided that the idea of managing risk tightly has  
top-level support. The key is to get security and business leaders collaborating through 
an established risk management forum (see Chapter 3, section “Risk Management 
Forums”) and to create a risk acceptance process with enough granularity and coverage 
to take in all issues critical or important to the business.
Locate and work as closely as possible with executive stakeholders responsible for 
financial risk, operational risk, and other forms of business risk; they may be found 
chairing or preparing reports for Audit Committees, corporate social responsibility 
committees, or other compliance-related functions.
5.3.4  Socialize Risk Framework for Broad Stakeholder 
Buy-in
Stakeholder buy-in for the risk program is required to successfully operationalize 
it. Security leaders must convince stakeholders of the “why” of, or reason for, the 
information risk program by explaining the business risk context, outlining the 
framework, and telling stakeholders how they would be impacted. Often, it is helpful 
to work through one of the business’s top risk scenarios using FAIR analysis with the 
stakeholders and present the results to top executives as a way of showcasing the 
proposed methodology.
As noted earlier, a risk management framework could start with information risk 
(requiring only CISO and/or CIO sponsorship), or it could be integrated into an ERM 
program with CXO sponsorship. Present the briefing with a proposed risk taxonomy, 
framework, and processes to the appropriate business, IT, developers, and other 
stakeholder audiences. The presentation can be tweaked for different audiences and 
adjusted based on audience feedback.
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5.3.5  Define Accountabilities, Risk Appetites, and Risk 
Processes
After completing the work discussed previously as well as gaining the necessary 
sponsorship and stakeholder buy-in, security leaders can continue to define and 
operationalize the risk program as follows:
• Identify accountability: Senior business, IT, or security leaders of 
the company should be identified as strategic risk owners via policy 
documents or formal memos from the top-level sponsor. Formally 
define and announce the accountability mechanisms such as signoff 
memos, self-assessments or performance evaluations, incentive 
structures, and other measures.
• Determine risk appetites: The thresholds for acceptable, 
unacceptable, and catastrophic impact from information risk often 
aren’t well defined. It can take some analysis and deliberation to 
tease risk appetites out of the “executive subconscious” into explicit 
definition. Security leaders can ask questions like: How long could 
the electronic order taking system be down before the company takes 
a material loss? Then extrapolate the risk appetites for downtime or 
financial loss based on the answers to such questions. Often, the risk 
appetite information emerges dynamically whenever staff present 
risk analyses to executives.
• Weave risk management into cybersecurity governance: 
Governance must encompass core cybersecurity accountabilities 
and cross-functional coordination functions for risks, operations, 
and other program functions (see section “Institute Cross-Functional 
Coordination Mechanisms” in Chapter 3).
• Plan risk management processes: Organization-wide processes 
for developing IT asset risk profiles, performing risk analysis and 
risk treatment, monitoring, and communication can be formally 
developed at this point and become part of the risk management 
context.
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5.4  Implement Tiered Risk Assessment
Risk assessment – which in the ISO model includes risk identification, risk analysis, and 
risk evaluation – is the core of risk management. It exists in a feedback loop with risk 
treatment and risk monitoring. However, as we discussed in section “Analysis Paralysis 
and Uncertainty About Where to Start,” most businesses haven’t yet begun to assess 
information risks comprehensively in a consistent and objective manner.
The good news is that security organizations can work with IT and the business 
to triage issues from the bottom up and sort out risk scenarios for quick treatment or 
further, detailed analysis.
5.4.1  Use a Tiered Risk Assessment Process
Figure 5-3 depicts a tiered risk assessment model that I recommend for clients.
Figure 5-3. Tiered Risk Assessment Model in the Risk Management Framework
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The tiered risk assessment process is designed to
• Eliminate > 90% of the issues that can be resolved through standard 
operating procedure (SOP) before they become a significant IT 
operational risk or a cyber-risk
• Engage business and IT staff in the issue triage and early risk 
identification processes
• Remediate or gain routine exceptions for > 90% of IT operational and 
cyber-risks at the business or IT team level
• Focus the resources of the information risk team professionals 
primarily on the top risks that represent the highest loss exposure to 
the business
Security Architects Partners, a consulting company I work with, has developed a 
form of tiered risk assessment called the Agile Risk Management (ARM) Framework5 and 
implemented it for several clients. Some examples in the sections that follow come from 
this framework, and readers can get more detail at the link.
The idea with tiered risk assessment is that staff should first identify which issues 
in an IT environment are in fact risks and which can and should be resolved through 
business-as-usual processes. Most issues aren’t risks until they exceed defined 
thresholds derived from business or information risk appetites. Therefore, issue triage 
should be done as the first step in a tiered assessment process.
5.4.2  Implement Asset Risk Profiling
Often the importance of an issue (such as a vulnerability) is relative to the asset(s) it 
affects. A tiered risk assessment process needs an easy asset risk profiling method that 
can be done on the fly whenever potential risk to the asset is identified. The method can 
also be added to asset inventory processes. An asset risk profile should contain asset risk 
metadata and an overall asset risk score that represents a quick summary of how the 
asset could contribute to risk. During triage, staff need only evaluate the asset risk score, 
but during risk assessment, trained risk advisors should consider more detailed risk 
metadata collected during the profiling process.
5 “Agile Risk Management Framework,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, January 2020, accessed 
at https://security-architect.com/RiskManagementResources
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IT, development, and LOB staff can easily be trained to use a tool to generate asset 
risk profiles. It’s possible to create asset risk profiles for a single asset, such as a server, or 
an application or system that aggregates many atomic assets.
5- 2
Engage business or IT teams responsible for asset management 
on creating a flexible asset risk profiling mechanism that can 
be activated just in time, integrated with ITSM or configuration 
management database (CMDB) tools, and updated through the 
change management processes.
The ARM methodology provides a taxonomy for asset risk metadata, a way to capture 
it on the fly, and the ability to calculate risk scores for first time use on an asset. On- 
the- fly asset risk profiling can be accomplished in minutes by the asset owner and can 
populate an existing asset inventory for future reference. Readers can learn more about 
ARM5 or devise a similar method.
5.4.3  Identify Issues That Could Bubble Up to Risk 
Scenarios
Risk-related issues can come from any circumstance or report that factors into one of 
the risk model components from Figure 5-1. Risk issues include vulnerabilities, software 
defects, third-party deficiencies, threat or penetration test reports, compliance gaps, 
audit findings, new business models, and more. But unless an issue can combine with 
other risk model components (e.g., a threat finds a vulnerability and causes a loss event), 
there’s no risk scenario. Many risk scenarios are highly unlikely to occur. Others can be 
easily treated.
To triage issues with the ARM framework, staff members can use the severity 
rating of the issue and the risk metadata of the asset to look up an issue remediation 
time window. The easiest way to explain this is to consider a simplified vulnerability 
prioritization example from a procedure we worked up for a client:
 1. Describe the vulnerability issue, such as a new OpenSSL 
vulnerability affecting 60 web servers. Look up or quickly calculate 
the assets’ risk metadata and match it against the vulnerability 
severity using the critical, high, medium, or low (CHML) scale 
provided by most vulnerability management vendors.
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 2. Look up a remediation time window from a table that matches the 
affected asset’s risk score and the issue severity.
 3. Estimate how long would be required following standard 
operating procedures to close vulnerability issues.
 4. Escalate vulnerability issues that cannot be remediated within the 
remediation time window.
 5. Record all issues, issue-to-risk triage outcomes, and issue 
remediation outcomes in an issue management system, such as Jira.
 6. Monitor the issue until it is resolved, and repeat issue-to-risk 
triage anytime there is a material change to the issue’s severity, 
assets affected, or remediation schedule.
Organizations can use this procedure to triage any type of issue that relates to a 
specific asset (such as an application). Some issues, such as penetration test reports and 
audit findings, aren’t necessarily specific to a single asset but can affect entire systems, 
applications, or aggregated assets. No matter. Organizations can tweak remediation time 
windows, severity values, and other parameters within the procedure.
For issue identification and triage, staff need not be knowledgeable about how 
vulnerabilities or other issues could affect the assets. They only need to know how to use 
the triage methodology and to specify how long it takes to resolve the issue. Thus, asset 
risk profiles and severity scores provide all the context required. Generally, the more 
important the asset, the shorter the remediation time window.
5.4.4  Use a Lightweight Method to Triage Risk Scenarios
When an issue can’t be resolved in time or according to standard operating procedures, 
it should be escalated for a quick or lightweight risk assessment. Because digital 
businesses tend to generate many information risk scenarios, risk assessors (in an ideal 
world) should be able to quickly identify risk scenarios that
• Have already been analyzed and should be treated the same way as a 
previous scenario
• Exceed risk appetite for the affected information assets and must be 
escalated for in-depth analysis and reviewed by senior security or 
business leaders
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• Do not exceed risk appetite and can be treated immediately 
according to the recommendations of the asset owner or risk advisor
This model of lightweight risk assessment could be accomplished by a centralized 
risk team whose members are trained in the FAIR model, have access to an organized 
database of previously assessed risk scenarios, and have identified risk appetites (i.e., 
tolerable amounts of loss exposure) for many types of information assets and business 
risk owners.
In my experience, even if they like the idea of FAIR, most organizations have 
only a few resources dedicated to risk assessments. This is true for all but the largest 
organizations that are most committed to risk management. Yet the typical digital 
business is either identifying or (often) ignoring many more risk scenarios than a few 
full-time or fractional resources can deal with. 
The need for a lightweight method that nonexperts can use is even more important 
for businesses committed to a decentralized or agile management approach and a lean 
centralized security organization.
LARGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY’S AGILE RISK MANAGEMENT STORY
Early on in working with agile risk management (ARM), a very large client threw us an 
interesting curve ball: This company is all agile. Not only software development projects, 
but all projects, use the agile methodology complete with standup meetings, nine-person 
“squads,” and so on. To fit the company culture, our client wanted risk advisors to be part of 
the agile squad or at least the surrounding “tribe.”
My first reaction was: Are you crazy? You can’t train that many risk advisors! Over time, 
however, the idea of engaging large numbers of IT and development staff in the early tiers of 
risk assessments grew on me. Isn’t this what the meme “security is everybody’s business” is 
all about? We developed an online form consisting of questions staff should know the answer 
to plus some artifacts for lightweight risk assessment customized to the client’s needs.
How could a business scale risk management to cover many issues across large 
populations of users and assets? ARM proposes a Lightweight Risk Assessment (LRA) 
process based on FAIR that can be used by lightly trained nonexpert staff to prioritize 
risks by estimating the probable frequency as well as the probable financial, operational, 
liability, or strategic loss magnitude of a risk scenario. Parameters for estimation are 
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provided in a lookup table for the staff to use as they go through the LRA by answering a 
short set of about five questions. Based on these answers, the ARM tool calculates a risk 
score. If the score is below a certain number, the assessor can select the risk treatment 
and sign off on the scenario. If the score is too high, the risk scenario must be escalated 
for in-depth analysis or a higher level of signoff. Either way, the results of the analysis 
go into an operational risk database for review by the business risk owners and the risk 
management team.
The Binary Risk Assessment6 provides another lightweight method. It includes an 
open source application that asks staff ten questions covering threats, vulnerabilities, 
protection strength, assets, and impacts. It outputs a low, medium, or high risk rating 
after staff answer the ten questions. As with ARM, nonexpert asset owners or risk 
advisors could be trained to answer the questions based on consistent parameters; they 
could decide on risk treatment for low and medium risks, but more senior leaders or risk 
management professionals would decide on high risks. The results of all risks that aren’t 
escalated for a higher level of signoff should be documented and periodically reviewed 
by risk management professionals.
5- 3
Use tiered risk assessment processes to engage business, 
IT, development, and other staff in risk management. Provide 
automated tools that make it easy for asset owners or risk 
assessors to triage risks by asking staff role-appropriate questions 
they should already know the answer to.
5.4.5  Develop Risk Scenario Evaluation Processes
The final phase in risk assessment is the in-depth risk scenario evaluation (or just 
risk evaluation, per ISO). Detailed risk scenario evaluations should provide a more 
detailed analysis of how a risk would materialize and a method for ranking potential risk 
treatments or controls. Such evaluations can include full quantitative FAIR analyses of 
loss exposure before treatment (aka inherent risk) and after treatment (residual risk). 
As the core information risk team performs in-depth risk assessments and reviews the 
6 “Binary Risk Analysis,” Ben Shapiro, 2011, Whitepaper, accessed at https://binary.protect.io/
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results of lightweight assessments and issue triage, it can feed higher risks up into an 
enterprise risk assessment process.
A tiered risk assessment method could triage 90% of the issues before they became 
risks and handle 90% of the lower risks in a routine manner. The information risk team 
for a retail firm with 5000 employees might identify 100 higher risks in a year. Some of the 
most serious ones could materialize from multiple scenarios and merit more than one 
assessment. On the other hand, risks dealing with similar issues – such as vulnerabilities, 
software deficiencies, or audit findings on weak internal controls – might be grouped 
into a handful of assessments. Having a well-defined process to organize and analyze 
risk scenarios is important.
Focused risk assessments can be done for any of the following reasons:
• Scenario-based analysis of a specific risk(s)
• Business case development
• Security program planning and control prioritization
• Reporting to regulators, stakeholders, or investors
Scenario-based analysis: Focuses on a single risk scenario or groups multiple 
related scenarios into one. For example, financially motivated cybercriminals might 
be able to compromise a web-based ecommerce application at a retail company via 
any one of multiple vulnerabilities and implant ransomware of different types to cause 
multiple loss events. Once analysts have developed calibrated estimates for the threat, 
controls, and impact factors in the scenario, they can perform a quantitative analysis 
using the Open FAIR risk tool7 or a commercial system such as the RiskLens product. By 
following an objective quantitative discipline, the leadership can perform data-driven 
analysis informed by multiple stakeholder experts (e.g., legal on liability, marketing on 
reputational, sales on competitive, and IT on remediation cost impacts).
Overall risk input for a business case: The security or risk organization can perform 
one-off risk assessments for a business case, for example, to get approval for funding 
mitigation of application vulnerabilities. Risk analysts could calculate the estimated 
costs to fix the vulnerabilities or to apply other controls for the ransomware scenario and 
recalculate the Open FAIR analysis with the controls in place. The before and after results 
7 “Introducing the Open Group Open Fair Risk Analysis Tool,” The Open Group, March 2018,  
accessed at https://blog.opengroup.org/2018/03/29/introducing-the-open-group-open- 
fair-risk-analysis-tool/
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yield a return on security investment. For example, one might determine that by using 
an offsite backup system, incident response upgrades, and multifactor authentication 
at a total cost of $750,000, the retail company could reduce the ransomware risk (as an 
annualized loss expectancy) by $5 million.
Report risks to stakeholders, regulators, or investors: In some countries, 
companies are required to report risks to investors and/or regulatory authorities. In the 
case of the USA, public companies listed on the stock exchanges must disclose material 
risks to investors. Recent guidelines by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
establish an expectation that corporations quantify risks being reported.
5.4.6  Perform Enterprise Risk Assessments to Identify  
Top Risk Scenarios
Sometimes, security leaders are tasked to quantify the aggregate information risk to the 
business, and CROs may need to do the same for all enterprise risks. More often, security 
leaders must simply identify the top information risks (aka strategic risks). Data for the 
enterprise risk assessment can be collected in the following ways:
• Bottom up: Collect information from any documented risk 
assessments. Estimate costs of documented incidents or breaches to 
the business or similar organizations during recent years. Identify any 
gaps in the range of issues covered by the assessments; unless there’s 
a healthy mix of assessments from vulnerability- or software defect–
related issues, red team and threat- focused issues, and audit findings, 
consider expanding the set.
• Business impact assessment (BIA) information: Obtain any 
available lists of critical assets identified by the business continuity 
and disaster recovery (BC/DR) team. Cross-reference known risk 
scenarios against the assets. Use and improve the BC/DR team’s 
interdependency analysis for critical assets to find the most critical 
areas of IT and security infrastructure for systemic risk analysis.
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• Enterprise risk map: Consult the ERM risk map or any list of 
(noncyber) risks created for the Board or a Board Committee such as 
the Audit Committee. Attempt to identify information risks that could 
directly or indirectly factor into the top enterprise risk scenarios that 
business leaders are most concerned with.
• Systemic risk analysis: You may have read about systemic 
cybersecurity risk to the economy, or financial systems, but what 
about the risk to your own business? Looking for the top information 
risk scenarios to “Tier 1” assets from the BIA or the top enterprise 
risks is a great start, but what might you have missed? Answer: 
You need to do a BIA for any parts of the security infrastructure, or 
security program, that the BIA didn’t cover. What if your directory, 
authentication, or key management services go down? What if two or 
three senior security engineers or responders become unavailable?
• Infrequent but high impact scenario analysis: As I wrote in 
“Waking Up to Cybersecurity’s New COVID-19 Reality,”8 many 
security professionals treated the early 2020 pandemic outbreak as 
a theoretical concern and probably missed early opportunities to 
prepare for a surge in remote access, supply chain risk, and business 
continuity needs. In hindsight, security leaders should maintain 
access to data on what the impacts of an infrequent but devastating 
(outlier) risk scenario like a pandemic could be. Also through risk 
management processes, prompt risk teams to watch for early warnings 
of outliers materializing. Although it isn’t normally reasonable to 
overprepare for them, significant outliers should be addressed as a 
cyber-resilience issue (see Chapter 9’s section “Develop Contingency 
Plans and Cybersecurity Strategy for Resilience”).
After all major risk concerns have been collected, normalize them using the FAIR 
model. Group closely related risk scenarios together. Rank using a rapid or exhaustive 
quantitative estimation methodology. Determine a risk appetite or maximum tolerable 
8 “Waking up to Cybersecurity’s New COVID-19 Reality,” Dan Blum, March 2020, accessed at:  
https://security-architect.com/waking-up-to-the-new-covid-19-cybersecurity-reality/
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loss. Present the risks on the list that exceed the risk appetite as the “top risks.” Maintain 
the list of top risk scenarios as events warrant between major refreshes of the enterprise 
risk assessment.
GLOBAL HIGH TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURER CISO’S ERM STORY
“Prior to being the head of security at the company, I’d worked in various business units, 
including the controller’s department. At our Corporate Ethics and Compliance Oversight 
Committee, I found the enterprise risk map. I brainstormed with the executives whose teams 
had analyzed these risks to learn how cybersecurity issues might contribute to them.
As of the early 2000s, the risk map had 9 items including sole source factory failure, 
competitive core products, and antitrust actions. I was able to weave direct or indirect cyber-
risk causal scenarios into 2 of the top enterprise risks. During a similar exercise in 2015, I 
found an enterprise risk map with 25 items and wove 18 cyber-risks into them. I believe this 
shift has occurred for almost every company. Today, for example, ransomware could be a 
major risk driver to sole source factory controllers and logistics systems.”
Malcolm Harkins, CISO
5- 4
Work with the executive responsible for preparing the enterprise 
risk map for the Board. Weave direct and indirect information 
risks into the risk map. This exercise will increase the relevance of 
cybersecurity and educate security leaders on senior executives’ 
perception of business drivers, business risks, and risk appetites.
5.5  Treat Risks Holistically
Risk treatment can take four forms: accept, avoid, transfer, or mitigate the risk. And yet, 
many security leaders put practically their entire focus on mitigation through applying 
controls such as those in the control baseline from Chapter 6.
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“to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. to 
subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
5.5.1  Formalize Risk Acceptance and Risk Exception 
Processes
When a risk owner decides not to treat a risk, the risk should be formally accepted. 
Otherwise, the business is open to accusations of not having a competent risk 
management program or, worse, of covering up risks that it could reasonably be 
expected to recognize. Once accepted, risks should be periodically reviewed.
A risk exception process is subtly different from risk acceptance. Risk acceptance 
is explicitly acknowledging a potential loss exposure and allowing it to continue. A risk 
exception, on the other hand, is a temporary acknowledgment of noncompliance with 
policies, laws, or regulations that is also creating exposure to loss, but that the business 
intends to remedy.
The exception process should include signoffs, require compensating controls 
in some cases, and make exceptions temporary in nature. Also, as changes to the IT 
environment or the threat environment unfold, the information risk team should 
monitor accepted risks in the registry for material changes to their probability of 
materializing or impact worsening.
5.5.2  Educate the Business on Risks to Avoid
In some cases, business leaders choose to avoid risk. For example, a retail business 
might decide not to engage an out-of-country credit card processing service provider 
due to concerns about transferring customers’ personal data across borders in violation 
of national privacy regulations in some jurisdictions. The time spent educating business 
leaders, IT leaders, developers, and staff on risk pays dividends later. Security-related 
processes can also proactively provide IT and business leaders with other options. For 
example, Chapter 7’s section “Manage Cloud Risk Through the Third-Party Management 
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Program” describes a financial institution’s third-party risk management case study. If 
an LOB proposes to use a vendor with a high risk score, the security team can explain 
the issues with the vendor and propose alternatives to stakeholders during a 30-minute 
meeting.
5.5.3  Share Responsibility, Outsource, or Obtain 
Insurance to Transfer Risk
Transferring risk to a third party isn’t always possible, and often only some of the risks 
can be transferred. The adage “You can transfer responsibility but not liability” is usually 
true. Because risk transfer isn’t a perfect solution and requires much nontechnical input 
into the how-to, security professionals often tend to overlook or neglect it. However, 
businesses should take advantage of the following risk transfer opportunities:
• Implement a framework for determining third-party shared 
responsibilities, service-level agreements (SLAs), and contracts: 
Contracts with third parties can often induce them to reduce risk 
more efficiently than the business could through its own efforts. SLAs 
provide a way to measure third-party efforts and assess any third- 
party deficiencies. (For more information, see Chapter 6’s section 
“Apply a Shared Responsibility Model to the Control Baseline.”)
• Consider whether cyber-insurance is right for the business: 
 Cyber- insurance is a type of general insurance that covers information 
risks. First-party cyber-insurance covers direct losses to the business 
from breaches, outages, or other incidents. Third-party coverage 
addresses secondary losses from claims and legal actions against the 
business as a result of information risks. Cyber- insurance can make a 
lot of sense as part of the cyber-resilience strategy, especially when a 
business knows it cannot afford to cover high impact losses but does 
not see a good return on security investment from trying to mitigate 
them because they occur too infrequently. Also, cyber-insurance may 
be required for credit agreements or other contracts. In such cases, 
cyber-insurance could keep a small company out of bankruptcy and 
preserve even a larger, financially strong organization from credit 
downgrades or steep stakeholder losses. Also, carrier-provided 
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breach response and other services can be helpful. See Chapter 9’s 
section “Develop Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plans” 
for more information.
5- 5
Think outside the box of risk mitigation controls to develop a robust 
set of risk transfer practices. Consult the legal team on contracts 
and cyber-insurance, the finance team on cyber-insurance, and the 
vendor management team on contracts and shared responsibility 
frameworks.
5.5.4  Evaluate Business Changes and Controls for Risk 
Mitigation
Security leaders often focus almost all their attention on creating new controls or 
bringing an existing control to bear on a new risk because that is, well, what they can 
control. However, risks can also be mitigated by business changes to process, partners, 
facilities, or activities as well as controls. Perhaps being able to help business or IT 
leaders and staff find more secure options for getting their work done without having 
to implement additional controls is the “acme of skill” from the Sun Tzu quote at the 
beginning of this section. For example, an LOB could consider modifying privacy-related 
business practices (such as collecting or reselling personal information without consent) 
that might violate regulations.
All this being said, at least some of Sun Tzu’s “one hundred victories” must come 
from “battles” or the use of actual security controls. In Chapter 6’s section “Develop 
Architectural Models and Plans for Control Implementation,” we recommend 
developing an initial control baseline and security architecture road map for building 
the controls. For the ARM project, we developed a Control Library that helps clients track 
which of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework controls and/or customer-defined controls 
are required, how they are implemented, and in which IT environments. Similar artifacts 
are available in some IT governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) systems.
During focused risk assessments, analysts can determine “what if” risk treatment 
options, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of potential controls and other 
mitigation or transfer options. Using metadata about the controls (such as strength or 
type), they can select the right ones to apply to each risk scenario.
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After selecting one or more controls for treating a risk scenario, analysts can update 
the IT GRC system or Control Library with the control information. In this way, the 
security team keeps the control baseline continuously risk informed.
5.6  Monitor Issues and Risks Continuously
The risk management framework must monitor known, new, and changing risks. It must 
track them in issue management systems and operational risk registries. Not all risks can 
be treated up front, and risks change over time. Monitoring risks is often as important as 
analyzing them in the first place.
Figure 5-4. Monitoring Risks and the Risk Management Program
As shown in Figure 5-4, risks should be monitored on an event-driven basis as well 
as through scheduled or periodic review.
• Issues: Risk scenarios can develop from the types of issues shown 
in Figure 5-4. Some – such as threat intelligence that cyberattacks 
exploiting a known third-party deficiency are increasing against an 
LOB – may recur over and over. They may need to be reanalyzed 
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from time to time and may prove to have higher or lower ratings than 
before. If so, security business leaders should reevaluate existing 
treatments or exceptions for these risks.
• Risk treatment projects: Review risk assessments whenever a risk 
treatment project or activity completes; for example, a new technical 
control mitigating access risk is ready to move into production, or a 
cyber-insurance policy expires and is offered again at similar terms. 
For the top risks in the business, reviews may also be required when 
treatment milestones are missed and/or at arbitrary time intervals. If 
residual risk remains and is higher than required thresholds, escalate 
the risk for new exception signoffs and/or new risk assessments.
• Exception lists: Review the risk assessment for a risk whenever an 
exception expires. If the risk is still higher than the risk appetite, 
escalate the risk for new exception signoffs and/or risk assessments.
5.7  Communicate Risk to Stakeholders Effectively
Risk should be the common language for communication between security and the 
business. The risk framework provides the feedback loop to collect information for risk 
analysis and treatment and to communicate risks to stakeholders. In alignment with the 
CRO and the ERM program, CISOs can communicate effectively at multiple levels with
• Business staff and associates
• Business risk owners
• Board of Directors and Executives
5.7.1  Business Staff and Associates
Employees of the business, long-term contractors, and even third parties are – to a 
greater or lesser extent – part of the risk program. For one of our clients using ARM, 
multiple business and IT staff will take on risk advisor roles. Still more staff in that 
company and others like it will perform the issue-to-risk triage process. The risk program 
can make staff more conscious of the risk dimension to their day-to-day duties and well 
versed in the use of issue and risk management tools and processes.
Chapter 5  Manage risk in the Language of Business 
150
To engage the business staff and associates, organizations of all sizes should
• Provide information on basic security issues all organizations face 
and generic risk scenarios through security awareness programs
Larger organizations, especially ones under high security pressure should
• Create awareness, training, and communications channels for risk- 
related roles such as business risk owners, risk advisors, asset owners, 
and data stewards.
• Identify potential risk management champions among the staff being 
trained or prepped for risk management roles. Assign individuals on 
the information risk team to recruit or mentor champions, and work 
with them to provide informal meetings and other communications 
to the business and IT.
• Work with HR and/or LOB managers to ensure appropriate 
performance goals and incentives for those in the champion roles.
5.7.2  Explaining Risk to Business Risk Owners
Business risk owners include CXOs and – in larger organizations – also LOB, IT, or 
development leaders. They are accountable for effective risk management and vested 
with the authority to accept known risks and/or allocate resources to treat the risks. As 
we discussed in the section “Establish the Context for the Risk Program,” businesses 
should make such accountability explicit and tangible through a visible business 
process. Security and risk leaders can provide role- specific training and communication 
channels for the business risk owner role.
Security and risk leaders should
• Advocate for explicit accountability to business owners for working 
with the risk management program to define risk appetites, risk 
treatment, and formal risk acceptance
• Seek and maintain informal relationships with business risk owners 
and any business information security officers (BISOs) outside of the 
enterprise security department in a large organization
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• Bring training and awareness efforts to life by helping business leaders 
recognize risk scenarios that can materialize from information risk
• Advocate for business leader participation in security steering 
committees or forums
5.7.3  Board Communication
The Board of Directors is accountable for oversight to ensure the business accomplishes 
its mission, such as delivering investment returns to owners, providing services, or 
meeting other key objectives. Most Boards for larger organizations maintain committees, 
such as an Audit Committee. Risk management often lies within the Audit Committee 
purview, but some financial services and other highly regulated companies maintain 
a separate Risk Committee or another compliance-related forum. Some Boards in 
the defense industry or critical infrastructure industries maintain a Cybersecurity 
Committee due to the strategic upside as well as downside importance of safely aligning 
operational technology (OT) with information technology (IT).
WHAT’S THE STORY ON BOARD-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT?
in general, many Boards still struggle to address information risk oversight. engagement 
remains low in critical areas; for example, a recent shared assessments group survey9 found 
only 32% of respondents stating that their Boards have a “high engagement and level of 
understanding” on the important topic of “cybersecurity risks relating to vendors.”
According to knowledgeable sources I interviewed such as Professor James 
Tompkins (Kennesaw State University) who researches corporate governance and 
Board-level risk oversight, there currently is no standard format for the risk documents 
or presentations (i.e., risk registers or risk maps) that Boards receive. However, Boards 
always want to know what the top risks to the company are and to understand or 
9 “Vendor Risk Management Benchmark Study: Running Hard to Stay In Place,” Shared Assessments  
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quantify them in business terms such as lost revenue, delayed product delivery, breach 
recovery costs, opportunity costs, competitive impairment, and so on.
To ensure they can oversee information risk effectively, security leaders can advocate 
that as an industry best practice, Boards should
• Include at least one member who is knowledgeable about 
cybersecurity. Though technically literate, this individual(s) need 
not be highly technical; it is more important that they have a deep 
background of business experience with cybersecurity from  
previous roles.
• Maintain a committee structure well suited to the oversight of risk 
management.
• Have direct contact with the security leadership and ensure their 
alignment with the business and their support from the business 
and that they obtain the resources required to run a cybersecurity 
program.
In leading companies, the CISO presents to the Board Audit (or other) Committee 
meetings regularly. For many businesses, there is a cybersecurity, or risk, agenda item 
for the CISO to present to full Board meetings at least once a year. The CISO may also 
present on significant security incidents (such as the breach of the business or one of its 
competitors) on request.
5-6
Advocate for more Board engagement on information risk, but 
don’t assume Board members have time to acquire much technical 
knowledge. Always communicate risks in terms of business 
impacts. Keep presentations concise and actionable.
Security leaders should
• Advocate for effective Board information risk oversight through 
personal contacts with existing Board members and top executives, 
providing copies of National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD) information risk–related guidance and offering to invite 
Board-level security experts from other organizations to visit or speak.
Chapter 5  Manage risk in the Language of Business 
153
• Advocate for the CISO’s ability to regularly brief the Board and Board 
Committees on information risk programs. Regardless of where the 
CISO reports in the organizational hierarchy, this engagement will 
help the CISO understand the top-level business requirements better 
and be more effective in the role.
• Maintain informal relationships with individual Board members, 
especially those chairing key committees covering risk and/or 
technology-savvy Board members.
• Coordinate information risk reporting with the CRO or whichever 
function in the organization handles ERM.
When presenting to the Board (or making executive presentations in general), keep 
the content simple, short, and to the point with backup information available at need. 
Avoid getting into technical detail but do focus on the organization’s cybersecurity 
situation, on the top risks, the program for managing those risks, and any executive 
actions or support requested. For more tips, see Chapter 4’s section “Make Enhancing 
Communication a Top Security Team Priority.”
Content typically presented in board presentations is generally unsatisfactory 
according to Catherine Allen, CEO of Santa Fe Consulting and a Corporate Board 
member. “The worst of it is PowerPoint presentations, death by PowerPoint. Pictures 
are good but don’t contain enough detail. Bulleted lists are better but either tend toward 
verbosity or leave out details.” Allen provides a piece of advice to CISOs presenting to 
Boards: “The best option for me has been to see infographics.”
Even if the Board holds the CISO in high regard, it may demand independent third- 
party assessments of the security program itself. The security leadership should support 
such assessments. Additionally, CISOs should help the Board get benchmark data when 
requested on what other organizations in their industry are doing for cybersecurity. 
This information is available from trade press articles, Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs), and the CISO’s own network as well as independent research companies.
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5.8  Call to Action
The core recommendation for security leaders from this chapter is to manage risk in 
the language of business as follows:
• Establish the context by adopting a consistent framework – I 
recommend the combination of ISO 31000, Open FAIR, and a tiered 
risk assessment process.
• Obtain top-level sponsorship and establish clear business risk owner 
accountability.
• Work with the IT and business teams responsible for asset 
management on creating a lightweight asset risk profiling 
mechanism.
• Create a tiered risk assessment process.
• Develop a focused risk assessment or risk evaluation method to 
select controls and other risk treatment approaches, including risk 
acceptance and risk transfer processes.
• Work with the executive responsible for preparing the enterprise risk 
map for the Board and weave direct or indirect information risks into 
the list.
• Monitor issues, risks, top risks, risk treatments, risk acceptances, and 
risk exceptions.
• Create risk communications programs tailored to staff, managers and 
stakeholders, and the Board.
Action – Make a quick assessment of the state of the organization’s information 
risk management program.
Ask yourself the following short set of questions and score the answers in the Success 
Plan Worksheet’s10 Section 3, Table 3. Base your score on whether you would answer 
most of the questions with a strong “no” (1), a strong “yes” (5), or something in between.
10 “Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, May 2020, 
accessed at https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet
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 1. Are business owners held accountable for information risk?
 2. Are business, IT, and security teams using consistent terminology 
for discussing risk and consistent criteria for assessing risk?
 3. Are stakeholders coming to security for guidance or advice before 
taking important decisions that could create risk?
 4. Are risk assessments used to prioritize security projects, manage 
third parties, or make other decisions?
 5. Is a quantitative risk analysis methodology in use?
 6. Are issues, risks, exceptions/acceptances, and top risks monitored 
in an issue management system; IT governance, risk, and 
compliance (IT GRC) tool; and/or risk register?
 7. Are top information risks being regularly communicated to 
executives and the Board, and is the dialogue constructive?
Action – Define 1–3 improvement objectives for risk management
Note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 6, of the worksheet. The following 
are some guidelines and examples.
If the business doesn’t yet have a formal information risk management program, 
look for improvement objectives in the section “Establish the Context for the Risk 
Program.” For example:
• Perform a PESTLE analysis4 to understand and document the risk 
program’s business context and discuss it with at least one business 
or IT executive sponsor.
• Task security and risk team members unfamiliar with FAIR to read 
section “Open Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR)” and 
the Open Group Standard: Risk Analysis (O-RA)7 and other FAIR 
resources.11
11 “FAIR Resources,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, January 2020, accessed at  
https://security-architect.com/RiskManagementResources
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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license  
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
To improve a risk management program that’s up and running, consider the 
following sample improvement objective:
• Review the organization’s asset inventory program and identify an 
IT champion willing to work with the risk management function on 
devising a method to capture asset risk scores and risk metadata as 
described in section “Implement Asset Risk Profiling.”
To improve the identification of top information risk at the executive level, consider 
the following sample improvement objective:
• Meet with executive stakeholder(s) responsible for reporting risk to 
an Audit Committee (or other risk management forums). Identify or 
discuss
• Who are, or could be, accountable risk owners for categories of 
information risks?
• Potential overlaps between information risks and top enterprise 
risk scenarios
Don’t limit yourself to these examples. Look for improvement objectives that fit the 
gaps and priorities you’ve identified for your business.
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All security programs depend on having some basic controls, called a control baseline, 
in place. After all, one would not deem a house or an office “secure” without locks on the 
doors to control entry.
There are many technical and nontechnical controls that a business could 
implement, but few businesses have the time, money, or inclination to implement them 
all. Some guidance is needed to determine which controls are most needed, and to that 
end the industry provides various standard control frameworks.
Some control frameworks – such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) International Standard 27001 and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-53 – contain many granular 
controls. Others such as the Center for Internet Security’s Top 20 Critical Security 
Controls provide a more minimalistic list.
This chapter provides a Rational Cybersecurity take on the minimum viable control 
baseline by identifying core control domains and guidance for choosing granular 
controls based on the business’s unique needs. It also focuses on specific requirements 
for alignment with IT or business groups to implement or operate each type of control 
effectively.
Security leaders can use the information in this chapter to establish a control 
baseline by
• Selecting a list of controls scaled for a business of their type and size
• Developing an architectural model and road map for implementing 
the controls across the business or prioritized environments
• Prioritizing deployment phasing across various IT environments 
using risk management
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• Sharing responsibility for control operation with third parties, such as 
cloud service providers (CSPs)
• Aligning control operation with appropriate IT, development, 
corporate administration, and line of business (LOB) groups
6.1  Understand Control Baselines and Control 
Frameworks
Businesses require a written policy that states how they will address security. 
Organizations have a legal obligation to adhere to their own policies, and in some 
jurisdictions or industries, policies are required to address specific security objectives 
such as safety or privacy. A complete security policy encompasses multiple documents, 
including formal definitions of the controls the business will implement.
Security leaders understand controls. Still, the terms “control framework” and 
“control baseline” – which are different terms for a “list of controls” – get tossed around 
and used in different ways.
What Is a Control Framework?
A control framework is a list of control objectives, or security requirements, such as 
“Physical devices and systems within the organizations must be inventoried.” Notice this 
example says what the organization is supposed to do, but not how. Usually, subordinate 
policy or procedure documents detail control activities.
The security industry is replete with helpful standards for security control 
frameworks. Some of the most important ones are
• NIST SP 800-53 rev 41 (controls for US Federal information systems 
and organizations)
• ISO 270012 (management system and reference controls) and 270023 
(code of practice and implementation guidance)
1 “NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and Organizations,” NIST, April 16, 2018. Accessed at https://doi.
org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4, April 2013
2 International Standard ISO/IEC 27001:2013 — Information technology — Security techniques — 
Information security management systems — Requirements (second edition), ISO/IEC, 2013
3 International Standard ISO/IEC 27002:2013 — Information technology — Security 
techniques — Code of practice for information security controls, ISO/IEC, 2013
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• ISACA COBIT4 framework for enterprise IT governance and 
management
• Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Cloud Controls Matrix,5 which 
provides a useful cross-reference to many of the other frameworks
Some compliance regulations define their own control frameworks, others reference 
one or more general-purpose control framework standards. For example, US Federal 
Government regulations such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Special Publication (SP) 800-1716 reference both NIST and International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) control frameworks, but map more specifically to NIST’s own 
control frameworks. A control baseline for a contractor covered by NIST 800-171 would 
need to reference the NIST control frameworks.
6- 1
Work with the legal team(s) and lines of business to list compliance 
regulations that apply to the business. Use this list to determine which 
standard control frameworks the control baseline should reference and 
which objectives or activities it should comply with.
When compliance requires a specific control, such as data-at-rest encryption, it may 
be necessary to implement it. Beware, however, of falling for the following myth. Always 
look beyond compliance to assess the top risks to the business and the controls they 
imply.
6
Compliance to a regulation or a checklist of controls equals (or 
guarantees) security.
4 COBIT 5: A Business Framework for the Governance and Management of Enterprise IT, ISACA, 
2012. Accessed at www.isaca.org/cobit/Pages/CobitFramework.aspx
5 CSA Cloud Controls Matrix v3.0.1, March 2019. Accessed at https://cloudsecurityalliance.
org/research/cloud-controls-matrix/
6 “NIST Special Publication 800-171 Revision 1: Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in 
Nonfederal Systems and Organizations,” NIST, December 2016, accessed at https://nvlpubs.
nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-171r1.pdf
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What Is a Control Baseline?
The work of security is never done. Nonetheless, the security leadership should be 
focused on a “minimum viable product” for the outcomes it delivers. What we mean 
by a “control baseline” is the minimum set of security controls specified for a business 
IT environment and applicability guidelines to where they apply. For example, some 
controls might apply to systems with confidential data but not to systems with public 
data. Other controls might only be implemented for newer versions of applications or 
operating systems that the organization considers “strategic” and not for capabilities that 
are being phased out.
What Do We Mean by Establishing a Control Baseline?
Establishing the control baseline is the process of implementing it for actual 
IT systems. The organization must not only specify a minimum viable set, it must 
prioritize which business units, regions, or systems implement which controls. Once 
implemented, it must verify the controls are operating correctly and sustain them.
6.2  Address Common Challenges
The industry is mature in understanding what security controls could be implemented, 
but immature about prioritizing them in a risk-informed way, organizing them in a 
coherent architecture, and engaging business stakeholders in the work of implementing 
controls. The following issues continue to challenge businesses:
• Too many controls? Seeing the forest through the trees
• Difficulty risk informing controls
• Controls without a unifying architecture
• Lack of structure for sharing responsibility with third parties
• Controls out of line with business culture
6.2.1  Too Many Controls?
The standard control frameworks each contain hundreds of control objectives and many 
additional guidelines or requirements for control activities. We are inundated with an 
abundance of information, often conflicting terminology, oversight requirements, and 
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products which can be overwhelming for smaller organizations and anyone just getting 
started. Even larger organizations and experts struggle to see the forest for the trees. 
Recognizing this challenge:
• The Center for Internet Security (CIS) maintains a list of the “top 20” 
security controls7 curated through a community of IT experts. Its stated 
goal is to help practitioners see through the “fog of more” and identify a 
set of prioritized actions based on best practices for defense in depth.
• NIST publishes a Cybersecurity Framework8 as a higher-level, more 
business-accessible list of controls that also provides pointers to the 
granular NIST 800-53, ISO 27001, COBIT, and the CIS top 20 controls.
Despite the NIST and CIS efforts, I’m not convinced they have produced a minimal 
viable control baseline. Although NIST CSF provides a very useful way of looking at 
controls, there are over 100 of them. Enumerating all the subcontrols that detail the 
CIS makes its baseline much more numerous than 20. And although the CIS 20 covers 
cybersecurity technology well, it doesn’t cover the people and process behind it with the 
same rigor. The idea of an industry control baseline is something of a myth.
7
There exists one control baseline that is suitable for every business.
Readers might be wondering, if that’s the way I feel about control baselines, why this 
chapter? My answer is that although no one control baseline can fit every business or IT 
environment perfectly, businesses should still develop an overarching control baseline 
as part of the high-level security policy and use it as a yardstick in selecting controls for 
each of its IT environments.
To help that effort, I’ve identified 20 control domains (or groups of controls) later in 
this chapter and provided guidelines for selecting granular controls within them.
7 “CIS Controls V7,” Center for Internet Security, March 19, 2018. Accessed at www.cisecurity.
org/controls/
8 “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Version 1.1,” National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, April 16, 2018. Accessed at www.nist.gov/cyberframework
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6.2.2  Difficulty Risk Informing Controls
Many think risk management is something you do after the security program becomes 
sufficiently mature rather than a vital component that helps get the program off the 
ground and guide the program while it matures. Another challenge is the industry’s 
relatively low level of risk management maturity. Practitioners still struggle because
• Selecting controls based on risk scenarios is currently more of an art 
than a science.
• Operationalizing risk management throughout the enterprise also 
requires mature, risk-informed asset and vulnerability management, 
third-party management, and other processes.
• It is sometimes difficult to determine which controls are reducing risk 
less than others and should be decommissioned during a budget cut 
or reallocation process
6.2.3  Controls Without a Unifying Architecture
Today’s digital businesses must implement controls in a hybrid multicloud environment 
and address a burgeoning crop of regulatory requirements across the international 
market landscape. Larger enterprises face additional complexity from multiple 
generations of IT infrastructure and applications.
One can make all the right moves by identifying the greatest risks and the controls 
to treat them, but without architectural alignment, controls may not be effective. Many 
organizations have acquired a lot of security tools needed to implement controls. 
But because they haven’t planned how to integrate those tools with other tools and 
processes, they get little value.
How should businesses develop the control architecture? Like the NIST CSF, I 
recommend starting with a basic cybersecurity and risk assessment. In the section 
“Develop an Architectural Model and Plans for Control Implementation,” we cover this 
critical step to align the control baseline with the operational security environment.
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6.2.4  Lack of Structure for Sharing Responsibility 
with Third Parties
When a business relies on a third party to operate its systems, some of the controls may 
be operated by the third party and some by the business, and they must coordinate their 
efforts. To be effective, the business control baseline must be aligned with the third- party 
controls through shared responsibility models.
Shared responsibility has proven difficult for the industry to address through existing 
control frameworks. To solve shared responsibility, we need to focus on what the 
business is doing with a system provided with the aid of a third party (the “use case”), 
what controls it can operate for itself, and what controls the third party operates. The 
section “Apply a Shared Responsibility Model to the Control Baseline” provides guidance 
on how to analyze and define shared responsibilities.
6.2.5  Controls Out of Line with Business Culture
Risk and regulatory considerations incline security departments toward implementing 
restrictive controls on users, but one must be careful not to get in the way of business 
growth and agility. Digital business requires exploiting technology in innovative ways. 
It’s all too easy for security teams and business staff to work at cross-purposes, as in
• Security policy writers create control standards and requirements 
without engaging the business to learn whether the requirements are 
practical or provide guidance on how the business can best meet the 
requirements.
• IT or LOB executives turn a blind eye to some security policies and 
don’t tell security teams in advance about all their digital innovation 
or procurement plans.
• Developers use “port agility” to get traffic through the firewall even as 
the network security team tries to block it.
• IT administrators kill the security team’s privileged access 
management (PAM) initiative with passive-aggressive or 
uncooperative behavior.
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Control objectives, or principles, such as least privilege (i.e., designing systems 
and processes to minimize privilege grants to users or administrators) are well enough 
in theory but often difficult in practice. Overly restrictive controls at the user level can 
create negative staff perceptions about security, potentially leading staff to withhold 
cooperation and make the controls less effective. Impeding business efforts to innovate 
in pursuit of business objectives can reduce business leader buy-in for the security 
program and tends to prove futile as the business wins many – if not most – arguments 
with security.
Security leaders should discover and confirm how controls can align with the 
business as a check on the initial control baseline and for implementation guidance. See 
section “Align Control Deployment and Business Functions” further on in this chapter.
6.3  Select a Control Baseline from the Essential 
Control Domains
Creating a control baseline is a useful exercise for security professionals regardless 
of whether you’re starting with a blank slate in a new position or trying to validate 
an existing control baseline. Take the control domains in Table 6-1 coupled with the 
guidance in this section as a starting point for creating a control baseline that fits your 
business.
(continued)
Table 6-1. Rational Cybersecurity Control Domains
Control Domain Summary Description
security governance Govern security roles, responsibilities, decisions, and strategy.
risk management Create a taxonomy framework and processes to identify, assess, treat, 
monitor, and communicate risks.
security policies and 
awareness
Document security requirements for people and systems. publicize them and 
motivate or empower users to follow them through user awareness training.
asset inventory Discover it assets, profile their risk, and identify all critical assets as well as 
asset owners.
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Control Domain Summary Description
third-party 
management
Discover third parties, profile their risks, and manage shared responsibilities 
for security.
network security and 
zoning
protect network security, arrange it assets in physical network segments or 





Manage employee, contractor, and other users’ accounts; authenticate 
access to those accounts.
access management 
and authorization
enable asset owners to ensure that authenticated users can only access 




Configure it systems and applications in a secure manner and control 
changes to policies, configurations, documents, and code.
Data protection Classify and discover sensitive information. apply encryption, tokenization, or 




Follow secure software development lifecycle (sDlC) and/or Devsecops 
standards and practices in development projects.
Vulnerability 
management
scan it systems and applications for software, hardware, or configuration 
vulnerabilities; prioritize and remediate vulnerabilities.
physical security Monitor and protect the business’s physical facilities to safeguard the users 
and assets within the facilities as well as the facilities themselves.
secure hr practices perform background checks and ensure that people-related security 
practices (e.g., background checks) comply with laws and good practices.
real-time threat 
detection
Detect hacking, malware, and abuse against it systems and devices; 
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Table 6-1. (continued)
Control Domain Summary Description
logging and log 
review
Generate and collect event logs of security-relevant information in keeping 




Monitor both standard user accounts and privileged user accounts for 
unauthorized, unusual, or suspicious activity.
incident response identify and investigate all types of incidents, contain threats, eradicate 
malware or damaged configuration, recover, and learn from incidents.
backup and data 
recovery
back up data, configuration, and code of it assets in a secure manner and 
test the ability to perform data recovery.
business continuity identify critical assets, create procedures and facilities to recover their 
functionality within a specified time in the event of outage, and test recovery.
The remainder of this section aligns the Rational Cybersecurity control domains with 
the NIST CSF and provides guidance for readers to use in selecting at least a minimal set 
of controls from most or all domains to form their business’s control baseline. For each 
control domain, the text identifies
• Definition: Brief definition of the control domain.
• Description: Describes requirements for the control domain broadly 
aimed at attaining the Level 3, or “Defined” maturity level. Recall 
from Chapter 1’s section “Maturity,” Figure 1-6, that attaining the 
Defined maturity level requires that security roles, responsibilities, 
and policies be defined and established in at least some areas, but 
only requires manual means of verification.
• Business dependencies: Identify the business functions that tend 
to be involved with the control domain deployment, for example, IT 
and development managers for security configuration and change 
management and HR for secure HR practices. Table 6-3 in section 
“Align Control Deployment and Business Functions” summarizes a 
master table of control domains and business interdependencies.
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6.3.1  Serve Up a Balanced Diet of Controls
As shown in Figure 6-1, the NIST CSF structures controls into the five primary defensive 
security categories.
Figure 6-1. Control Domains in Terms of NIST CSF
I’ve noted where each Rational Cybersecurity control domain falls around the NIST 
CSF “wheel.” It’s not an exact mapping; some control domains like network security 
zones and physical security have both “protect” and “detect” properties. But it should 
give readers an idea of how the control domains complement each other to complete the 
security posture.
Although NIST CSF isn’t the only way we could categorize controls, it provides value 
in understanding and promoting a holistic security posture:
• Identify (ID): Know what you have and what you need to protect.
• Protect (PR): Endeavor to prevent harm to your IT assets or security 
objectives.
• Detect (DE): When protection fails – and it will eventually – at least 
detect the problem.
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• Respond (RS): Upon detecting an attack, incident, or serious 
vulnerability, act to stop or contain it.
• Recover (RC): Once the breach has been closed, fix the damage.
All five types of controls are required for a balanced security posture in today’s 
target-rich digital environment. Even if an organization does a great job in the Identify 
and Protect areas, threats will sometimes prevail. Attacks or incidents must be detected 
and mitigated quickly, and the damage repaired, if only to report a near miss to the 
regulators, save the business from fines, and preserve its good reputation.
Although some control domains may be more important than others depending on 
the type of business, basic security hygiene usually requires at least some effort into each 
of them. Later sections on how to risk-inform and how to scale the control baseline provide 
guidance on when Level 3 “Defined” maturity would be too much or not enough.
Select the NIST CSF controls cited by the references in the following tables that are 
applicable for your IT environment and risk profile. Each table contains my description 
of the control domain and its Level 3 maturity criteria, business functions or roles it 
depends on for deployment, and the NIST CSF controls related to the control domain. 
Readers can also use the NIST CSF’s mappings from CSF’s own relatively high-level 
controls to the more granular NIST 800-53, COBIT, and ISO 27001 controls when more 
specific direction is required.
6.3.2  Identify All Aspects of Situational Awareness
More than one of security leaders I interviewed for the book described asset discovery 
and inventory as the most critical control that’s often overlooked. But “identify” should 
be seen in a much broader context; we need to identify accountabilities, strategic risks, 
and more.
“if you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the result of a 
hundred battles.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
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Security Governance Control Domain
Definition: Governs security roles, responsibilities, decisions, and strategies through a set of 
processes and capabilities operated jointly by business and security leaders
Description: puts a Ciso or other top security leaders in place. Defines the lines of authority, 
accountability, and responsibility for cybersecurity. aligns cybersecurity risk, security policy, and 
resource allocation with business strategies. reports security and risk status and progress to 
executives and stakeholders in business terms.
Business dependencies: executive stakeholders, lob, and it management.
References: Chapters 2, 3
nist CsF references:
iD.GV: all four controls
Risk Management Control Domain
Definition: Creates a taxonomy and process to identify, assess, treat, monitor, and communicate risk.
Description: Discovers and communicates business leaders’ risk appetite and desired risk 
treatment strategies, that is, accept, avoid, mitigate, or transfer different kinds of risks. puts a 
standard control framework in place and determines control selection and prioritization. Maintains 
and communicates risk register to management. aligns with regulatory requirements, compliance, 
and audit functions.
Business dependencies: enterprise risk management, executive stakeholders, lob executives, and 
compliance teams for basic program. potentially any other business stakeholders depending upon 






iD.sC: supply chain risk
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Security Policies and Awareness Control Domain
Definition: Documents security requirements for people and systems in the business and publicizes 
them through user awareness training.
Description: establishes a lifecycle management process for high-level policy and subordinate 
standard, guideline, and procedure document hierarchies. seeks to promote secure behavior and 
a healthy security culture. Covers security governance, risk management, acceptable use of it 
and information assets, data classification, access management, incident response, and other 
policies. puts an awareness and training program in place. refer to Chapter 3 for guidance on policy 
management and Chapter 4 for advancing awareness and the supporting security culture.
Business dependencies: executive stakeholders, lob, it, development leadership, and project 
management office (pMo) as well as awareness team and/or internal marketing team.
References: Chapters 3, 4
nist CsF references:
iD.GV-1: organizational policy
pr.at: all five controls
Asset Inventory Control Domain
Definition: Discovers it assets, profiles their risks, and identifies all critical assets as well as asset 
owners.
Description: Maintains asset inventory databases, directory services, and other registries with 
information on the assets. Using asset risk profiles, identifies the organization’s most valuable, 
critical, or high-risk assets (aka “crown jewels”). refer to Chapter 7 for consideration of “knowing 
what you have” as part of rationalizing it and to Chapter 5 for more information on asset risk 
profiling.
Business dependencies: asset inventory functions are generally led by it, development, and lob 
managers.
References: Chapters 5, 7
nist CsF:
iD.aM: all six controls
iD.ra-1: identify asset vulnerabilities
pr.Ds-3: assets managed
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A STORY OF UNIDENTIFIED ASSET RISK
“When I was the CISO of a global corporation, we had a comprehensive global outsourcing 
contract. Worryingly, when asked, they couldn’t tell us how many devices we had on the 
network. I need visibility! The outsourcer eventually estimated we had 88,000 devices, but 
I knew that was too low because my rule of thumb was 1.5 devices per person. When we 
implemented Qualys [asset discovery and vulnerability scanning] it found 138,000 devices. That 
in turn gave us the visibility to understand which devices the outsourcer should manage and hold 
their feet to the fire requiring: ‘Fix all critical vulnerabilities on a device in a timely manner.’”
Paul Simmonds, CISO
Third-Party Management Control Domain
Definition: Manages vendors, suppliers, and other third parties, profiles their risks, and manages 
shared responsibilities for security.
Description: provides security input on business decisions to use new third parties or make major 
changes to existing use cases. sets standards for security controls or conduct by third parties. 
Conducts audits of third parties in the highest risk tiers.
Business dependencies: third-party management generally led by procurement or vendor 




iD.sC: supply chain risk
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6.3.3  Protect Information Systems and Assets
Businesses should apply a defense-in-depth strategy using network boundaries, 
hardening and securely configuring systems, managing digital identity and logical access 
control, encrypting or obfuscating data in transit or storage to prevent unauthorized 
access, and providing physical security and personnel controls. Some of these controls 
can be implemented using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products, cloud-based 
or cloud-native security services, or even open source tools. When the organization 
develops its own applications, it also needs to ensure the software is written securely.
Network Security and Zoning Control Domain
Definition: arranges it assets in logical compartments or physical network segments (i.e., “zones”) 
and provides perimeter protections to the zones. Uses network firewalls, microsegmentation in data 
centers, virtual lans (Vlans), and other solutions to enforce communications policies. Controls remote 
access to protected or restricted via virtual private networks (Vpns), jump hosts, or reverse proxies.
Description: protects network routing and control devices. separates assets of different levels 
of criticality, or with different compliance or communications needs, using zones. provides zone 
perimeter enforcement using network firewalls, host-based firewalls, virtual machine firewalls, or 
identity-based access controls to form physical or logical boundaries.
Business dependencies: ea, it, and development leaders and architects as well as compliance and 






pr-pt-4: protect control networks
Security zoning has been a consistently difficult topic since at least the 1990s when 
private business networks began connecting to the Internet. Hackers began to ply 
their trade, security teams put up firewalls, and end users and developers found ways 
to get traffic around or through the firewalls. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
concept of a “virtual enterprise” doing business with customers, suppliers, partners, 
and telecommuting employees was in vogue, and security architects began to speak 
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of deperimeterization. In the early 2020s, COVID-19 dramatically increased the need 
for telecommuting, remote access, and zero trust architectures9 that require strong 
authentication or other security measures for all access, regardless of originating 
location.
Businesses continue struggling with how much security zoning is necessary and 
how to implement it. Too little, and the business’s IT resources may be overly exposed to 
cyberattackers. Too much, and the IT architecture may become inflexible and impede 
business agility.
Authentication and User Account Management Control Domain
Definition: Manages employee, contractor, and other users’ accounts; authenticates access to 
those accounts.
Description: Manages user accounts in directory services and other authentication systems for 
all employees and third-party contractors or partners and authenticates access to resources by 
people, machines, or services on the network. Depending on the criticality of the accounts, supports 
passwords, biometric sign-on, or stronger authentication capabilities such as one-time password 
(otp) token generators and contextual authentication services. protects secret authentication 
credentials such as passwords from disclosure. For consumer accounts in some jurisdictions, 
includes core privacy features such as consent management. Uses special techniques, such as 
password vaulting, for privileged user accounts.
Business dependencies: it and development managers. Compliance and audit.
References: Chapter 8
nist CsF references:
pr.aC-1: Manage iDs, credentials
pr.aC-6: identity proofing
pr.aC-7: User authentication
9 “Zero Trust Networks,” Doug Barth, Evan Gilman, O’Reilly Media, Inc., July 2017, accessed at 
www.oreilly.com/library/view/zero-trust-networks/9781491962183/
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Access Management and Authorization Control Domain
Definition: enables asset owners to ensure that authenticated users can only access resources as 
prescribed by business policies.
Description: enforces access control at multiple layers, such as network perimeters, access 
proxies, systems, databases or repositories, and applications. Controls fine-grained access 
permissions at the application level using security groups, roles, or attributes. provides access 
management processes and workflows to request or review access. provides access provisioning 
(and deprovisioning).
Business dependencies: ea, it managers, development managers, and any other stakeholder 









Security Configuration and Change Management Control Domain
Definition: Configures it systems, network devices, and applications in a secure manner and 
controls changes to policies, configurations, documents, and code.
Description: securely configures systems to reduce attack surface by applying least privilege and 
least functionality principles. applies vendor or service provider secure configuration baselines. 
supports change management to minimize “drift” from the baselines and uses automated tools 
to check operating system instances, workloads, and deployed application configuration settings 
against baselines for managed assets.
Business dependencies: it managers, development managers, and any other stakeholder 
controlling a system affected by shared security configuration and change control policies. 
Compliance and audit.
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Security Configuration and Change Management Control Domain
References:
nist CsF
pr.ip-1: secure baseline configuration
pr.ip-3: Change control
Data Protection
Definition: Classifies and discovers sensitive information and applies core data security and privacy 
controls such as encryption or data leakage protection (Dlp) on data in motion, at rest, and in use.
Description: encrypts data on the wire using transport layer security (tls) and similar protocols 
and encrypts data at rest on mobile devices. Databases and other critical repositories where large 
amounts of structured or unstructured sensitive data are stored may leverage secure configuration, 
access control, restrictive security zoning, and database audit and protection tools rather than 
encryption to avoid degrading functionality. Defines data classification policies and data owners and 
discovers or keeps an inventory of sensitive data in the it environment. Chapter 8 discusses data 
governance which affects data protection as well as access control.
Business dependencies: ea, it managers, development managers, and any other stakeholder 






pr.Ds-2: Data in transit protected
pr.Ds-4: adequate capacity
pr.Ds-5: Data leak protection
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Secure Software Development and Application Security Control Domain
Definition: Follows secure software development lifecycle (sDlC) and/or Devsecops standards and 
practices in development projects.
Description: sets standards, training, practices, and tools enabling developers to create more 
secure systems and applications. performs threat modeling and security reviews during the design 
phase or at intervals during agile development processes. provides tools for static and dynamic 
software testing as well as vulnerability assessment to add assurance during the quality control 
process, at least for critical applications. provides basic web application firewall (WaF) functionality.
Business dependencies: Chief technology officer (Cto) and development leaders
References: Chapter 7 (Devsecops)
nist CsF references:
pr.aC-4: access control (for applications)
pr.at-1, 2: User awareness, training
pr.Ds-7: separate development from production
pr.ip-2: implement secure sDlC
pr.ip-12: Vulnerability management plan
Vulnerability Management Control Domain
Definition: scans it systems and applications for software, hardware, or configuration 
vulnerabilities; prioritizes and remediates vulnerabilities.
Description: provides processes and tools for periodic automated vulnerability scanning and 
vulnerability remediation through patching or applying compensating controls. patching processes 
take software updates from multiple vendors and/or a third-party vulnerability management tool. 
prioritizes vulnerability remediation. For critical assets, tests patches before applying them to reduce 
chance of impact on users or disruption to production systems.
Business dependencies: it and development leaders, compliance and audit
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Vulnerability Management Control Domain
References: Chapter 5 (triage, prioritization)
nist CsF references:
pr.ip-12: Vulnerability management plan







Definition: Monitors and protects the business’s physical facilities to safeguard the users and 
assets within the facilities as well as the facilities themselves.
Description: protects business facilities, such as office buildings, data centers, and servers. 
provides physical access control systems, such as locks, alarms, and physical identity badge 
readers. Uses cameras and motion sensors to monitor facilities. protects against natural threats 
such as earthquakes, fires, and floods.




pr.aC-2: physical access control
pr.ip-5: physical security policy compliance
De.CM-2: Monitoring systems (a detect control)
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Secure HR Practice Control Domain
Definition: performs background checks and ensures that people-related security practices (e.g., 
awareness training, policy enforcement) comply with laws and good practices.
Description: Maintains and follows hr and/or security policies and procedures for background checks, 
hiring, contracting, awareness programs, terminations, incident investigations, and disciplinary actions 
as they relate to security. provides input on any policy or procedure, such as monitoring staff emails 
and communications for leakage, or controls on personally owned mobile devices.
Business dependencies: hr, security operations and monitoring, iaM, and international legal teams.
References:
nist CsF:
pr.ip-11: Cybersecurity included in hr practices
6.3.4  Win the Race to Detect
In recent years, this saying emerged: “There are only two kinds of organizations: Those 
that have discovered a breach, and those that have been breached and don’t know it.” 
Cyberattackers can penetrate a business quickly; the 2019 Crowdstrike Global Threat 
Report10 found the progression from initial compromise to acting on the cyberattacker’s 
target often unfolds in minutes or hours. Against that, as we’ll describe in Chapter 9, the 
average time businesses take to detect intrusion may be measured in months.
One slip, and the business could experience a ransomware infestation during which 
attackers encrypt their data and throw away the key. Or, compromised end user devices 
and credentials could be used to steal sensitive data. Rapid detection of threats in the IT 
environment is critical.
10 “2019 Crowdstrike Global Threat Report: Adversary Tradecraft and the Importance 
of Speed,” Crowdstrike, March 2019, accessed at www.crowdstrike.com/resources/
crowdcasts/2019-global-threat-report-crowdcast/
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Real-Time Threat Detection Control Domain
Definition: Detects hacking, malware, and abuse against it systems, generates alerts to security 
monitoring systems, and triages alerts to enable effective response.
Description: provides multiple layers of defense to detect and prevent hacking and malware threats 
to the it environment. Deploys intrusion detection systems as well as endpoint and server-level 
malware scanning and removal. Combines technical, procedural, and educational controls against 
phishing, which is the most common malware delivery method for targeted cyberattacks. interfaces 
to incident response capabilities to quarantine, contain, or block any malware found on endpoints. 
provides enough skilled staff to configure and tune the products, perform investigations, and 
orchestrate responses, such as cleaning infected systems or temporarily quarantining compromised 
network segments. operates security information and event management (sieM) capabilities, or 
makes use of cloud-enabled ones, to correlate security events and apply machine learning (Ml) to 
detect anomalies.
Business dependencies: it teams, legal.
References: Chapter 9
nist CsF references:
De.CM-1, 4, 5, 7: Detect malware, unauthorized mobile code, suspicious network activity
De.ae-4,5: Understand, process alerts
De.Dp: Detection processes (all controls)
De.CM-6: Monitor external services
Logging and Log Review Control Domain
Definition: Generates and collects event logs of security-relevant information in keeping with 
security standards; reviews logs to detect threats or compromises of it systems.
Description: operates on endpoints, servers, applications, infrastructure systems, network devices, 
and security services themselves. Creates processes and acquires tools to monitor and review the 
log information. provides skilled technical security staff to analyze logs using basic log management 
and collection tools to identify indicators of compromise from the mass of normal activity. May begin 
to operate a sieM or other advanced tools to supplement real-time threat detection with log-based 
detection as well as to produce security reports for audit or trend analysis.
Business dependencies: it and development teams, hr, legal, compliance.
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Logging and Log Review Control Domain
References: Chapter 9
nist CsF
pr.pt-1: logging and log review
De.ae-1, 2: analyze logs to baseline normal activity and attacks
De.ae-3: Collect and correlate log data from multiple sources
User Account Monitoring Control Domain
Definition: Monitors both standard user accounts and privileged user accounts for unauthorized, 
unusual, or suspicious activity.
Description: Monitors for common types of unusual user activity, such as multiple failed 
authentication attempts followed by access from an unexpected location. Complies with legal 
protections or work rules while performing the necessary monitoring, especially for privileged 
accounts, by combining technical, procedural, and educational controls.
Business dependencies: iaM, hr, legal, audit, compliance teams.
References: Chapters 7, 8
nist CsF:
pr.aC 1, 4, 6, 7: Capture user and access management events
pr.pt-1: audit logs collected per policy
De.ae-1: baseline normal account activity
De.ae-3: Collect and correlate log data
De.CM-1, 3, 7: Monitor networks, devices, personnel activity
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6.3.5  Respond Effectively and Appropriately
Businesses must have the ability to take corrective action in response to detected attacks, 
vulnerabilities, and incidents. Effective response capabilities are the other side of the 
“detect” coin; they can often mitigate most of the damage from cyberattacks.
Incident Response Control Domain
Definition: identifies and investigates all types of incidents, contains threats, eradicates malware or 
damaged configuration, recovers, and learns from the incidents.
Description: provides a program to respond to incidents before breaches or other emergencies 
materialize. enacts a set of response policies, plans, and processes that define what constitutes 
an incident, how each type of incident will be handled, and who is responsible for which activities. 
provides technical capabilities and procedures to contain, investigate, and escalate incidents to 
executives and report them to external stakeholders such as customers, partners, regulators, law 
enforcement, and the general public.
Business dependencies: executive stakeholders, it, development and lob leaders, hr, legal, 





rs.Co (communication): all controls
rs.an (analysis): all controls
rs.Mi (mitigation): all controls
rs.iM (improvement): all controls
6.3.6  Recover from Outages or Breaches
Businesses must be able to recover from outages to IT systems caused by operational 
errors, physical failures, or cyberattacks. In addition, serious data breaches or 
ransomware incidents require long-term recovery efforts to restore reputation, market 
position, or operational capabilities even after a hacking or malware threat has been 
contained and eradicated.
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Backup and Data Recovery Control Domain
Definition: backs up data, configuration, and code of it assets in a secure manner and tests the 
ability to perform data recovery.
Description: prepares for the loss of it systems or data by taking data backups, designating warm 
or cold standby systems for use in the event of an outage. tests recovery of user data, configuration, 
and entire systems. May arrange relationships with outsourced providers of redundant compute, 
storage, and network resources.
Business dependencies: business continuity team, it, development and lob leaders, vendor 




rC.rp-1: recovery plan executed
Business Continuity Control Domain
Definition: identifies critical assets, creates procedures and facilities to recover their functionality 
within a specified time in the event of outage, and tests recovery.
Description: provides basic business continuity processes to recover critical assets identified 
during a business impact assessment (bia). prepares for the loss of it systems or data by taking 
data backups, designating warm or cold standby systems for use in the event of an outage. Creates 
contingency plans and performs failover tests or other tests. Manages recovery from regulatory, 
legal, and reputational damage in the event of a breach of sensitive data. May arrange cyber-
insurance and relationships with outsourced providers of redundant compute, storage, and network 
resources.
Business dependencies: business continuity team, it, development and lob leaders, legal, vendor 
management, compliance teams, and any other stakeholders affected by outages or breaches.
References: Chapter 9
nist CsF:
rC.rp-1: recovery plan executed
rC.Mi-1, 2: recovery plan improvement
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6.4  Develop Architectural Models and Plans 
for Control Implementation
For most organizations, the control baseline is a work in progress. Security leaders rarely 
have the luxury of starting over. Nor is the work ever done: New types of systems and 
applications constantly join and leave the IT environment, and many controls must be 
continuously improved or changed over time.
Establishing the control baseline across all control domains requires people and 
process as well as technology. Businesses must put governance structures in place 
to ensure that the controls get implemented correctly and to verify they’re operating 
correctly. They must also address shared responsibility models for controls operated 
across their own and third-party (e.g., cloud provider) environments.
6.4.1  Maintain Assessments, Target Architectures, 
and Implementation Road Maps
Businesses must create a road map for implementation and prioritize controls based on 
risk. Road maps, or implementation plans and schedules, should be guided by a target 
architecture.
If you don’t know where you’re going, any road will get you there.
Target architecture(s) can be developed for the entire control baseline, for individual 
control domains, or for crosscuts of the control domains. The architecture specifies the 
technical components and interfaces that implement control objectives. It must also 
identify people’s roles (such as users and administrators) in providing controls and the 
need for any processes or procedures covering the control activities (such as log review).
To produce a target architecture, security leaders should have a current security 
assessment. The security assessment should provide a control gap assessment aligned 
to a list of top information risks. Use the risk assessment and applicable regulatory 
requirements to identify control gaps. Use the control gap assessment to prioritize and 
inform the target architecture and more detailed design or requirements documents.
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Using risk-informed target architecture recommendations, develop a road map for 
implementation. Periodically update risk and control gap assessments and maintain 
target architectures and road maps as living documents.
6.4.2  Use a Two or Three Lines of Defense Model 
for Control Assurance
To ensure controls are effective, security organizations must concern themselves not 
only with the strength of the controls but also the quality of implementation and rigor 
of operation. To provide assurance, most financial services and many businesses in 
other industries use a “three lines of defense” metamodel (combining architecture and 
governance) to verify and confirm controls as follows:
• First line (implementation and operations): IT and development 
business process or system owners perform most day-to-day 
implementation and operations work. For example, business staff 
use on-premise SAP systems or cloud-based Salesforce services with 
support from IT operations and development.
• Second line (security administration, monitoring, and 
assurance): Security staff can back up IT operations staff to 
provide assurance by defining, validating, or checking IT’s security 
procedures. Security staff also often operate security tools such 
as cloud access security brokers (CASBs) and key management 
services that exist solely for assurance. Security staff perform security 
monitoring, security design reviews, and penetration testing from the 
second line as well.
• Third line (audit): Audit can provide an independent check on the 
implementation, operations, and assurance processes in the first and 
second lines. Often a combination of internal auditors and external 
auditors operates according to an annual or semiannual schedule. 
Internal audit should report outside of IT, often directly to a Board 
of Directors’ Audit Committee. External audit reports (such as an 
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Service 
Organization Control 2 (SOC 2)11 report or a Payment Card Industry 
Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)12 report) are also reported to 
compliance stakeholders.
6- 2
Internal audit or compliance functions should sample security 
assurance (second line) as well as IT operations (first line) functions 
for deficiencies in meeting the business security policies. The security 
organization should assist internal audit in maximizing insight and 
efficiency in its process and partner with internal audit on executive 
reporting to help make audit findings actionable for stakeholders.
6.4.3  Apply a Shared Responsibility Model to the Control 
Baseline
As security leaders or architects select baseline controls, they must eventually bring the 
discussion down from the abstract control framework level to the individual services 
provided for different IT environments or use cases. When IT or security environments 
are operated by third parties, it’s helpful to have a shared responsibility framework that 
defines security requirements and evaluation criteria for different types of third parties, 
or third-party use cases, to improve control assurance.
Businesses increasingly depend on cloud service providers (CSPs) and other third 
parties to deliver IT capabilities. For example, if a customer hosts credit card processing 
on servers in the cloud and requires PCI DSS certification for them, the CSP must also be 
certified.
In general, there’s a common misconception that service providers will take care of 
customers’ security needs by default. After all, CSPs do offer user account management, 
logging, and other controls. Unfortunately for the customer, however, it can only 
11 “SOC 2 Reporting on an Examination of Controls at a Service Organization Relevant to Security, 
Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, or Privacy,” AICPA, March 2018, accessed 
at www.aicpastore.com/SOC/reporting-on-controls-at-a-service-organization-re/
PRDOVR~PC-0128210/PC-0128210.jsp
12 “Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard version 3.2.1,” PCI Standards Security 
Council, May 2018, accessed at www.pcisecuritystandards.org/document_library
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outsource some of the responsibility for security to a CSP and little if any of the liability or 
accountability for breaches.
Security leaders and staff broadly recognize the need for a shared responsibility 
model (e.g., the Workday SaaS tool provides logging, but the customer must configure 
the logs, collect them, and review them). But to develop such a model, we can’t rely on 
control frameworks alone. We need to focus on what the business is doing with a third-
party provided system (the “use case”) and then ask the following questions covering 
four perspectives on shared responsibility:
 1. What controls must the customer operate to secure the use case?
 2. What controls (or capabilities) should the third-party provide to 
the customer?
 3. How should the customer evaluate the general security posture of 
the third party to know whether to trust it?
 4. What controls that the third party is solely responsible for should 
customers most rigorously evaluate?
The shared responsibility arrangements are different depending on the type of third 
party. Table 6-2 identifies six types of third party use cases, customer dependencies for 
each one, and critical criteria to evaluate.
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Table 6-2. Types of Third Parties
Type of Third Party Inter-dependencies and Evaluation Criteria
Generic vendor, 
partner, or third 
party
the following third party evaluation criteria flow down the table, applying 
to all vendors or third parties. all vendors or third parties should be viable 
businesses, offer or agree to acceptable contractual terms, and provide a 
security program with their own controls that are commensurate to the risks of 
the use case. in general, every third party should provide secure hr services, 
security policy and awareness, incident response, and other controls for itself.
Commercial off-the- 
shelf (Cots) product 
vendor
businesses deploy software or hardware products and rely on the vendor for 
secure software (or system) development, vulnerability management support, 
and training for the product.
Full-time contractor 
staffing providers
some onshore or offshore professional services companies provide contractors 
for staff augmentation, and some engagements last months or years. these 
staff may be treated similarly to the customers’ own employees. as the staffing 
provider’s customer, the organization will be depending on the provider’s secure 
hr practices and user account management to validate staff are employees 
in good standing at the contractor organization. however, the customer 
organization must also provide user account management and authentication 




saas Csps provide turnkey applications on demand, such as salesforce or 
Workday. Customers need the vendor to provide security for the full it stack, 
but enable customer control of user account management for the customer’s 




paas Csps provide an application development and application platform 
environment on which customers can build, host, and run Cots or custom 
applications. Customer paas requirements are similar to the saas ones; 
however, the customer needs more control over application and data security 




iaas Csps provide a compute virtualization and cloud storage environment 
on which customers can build, host, and run compute infrastructure and 
applications. Customers are responsible for all host-level security features in 
the guest os.
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Requirements and evaluation criteria for third parties also vary with the use cases 
and characteristics of partners or suppliers. For example, many products or services 
require vendors to connect into the customer network and troubleshoot problems 
or perform maintenance. Customers depend on the vendor to provide secure device 
configuration for vendor’s devices and identity and access management for the users. 
However, customers must provide remote access controls and perform their own real- 
time threat detection for the access.
Risk should also inform third-party management and the shared responsibility 
model. For example, a product or service designed to update real-time market prices 
and margin requirements for a financial services company needs more monitoring and 
control than a supplier of network cables and printers. Some organizations perform a 
quick risk assessment of the technology or service use case for a supplier and place it in a 
higher or lower tier with more or less controls and assurance requirements for it.
Shared responsibility means that some security controls must be operated solely by 
the third party and are out of the customer’s hands. Where risk warrants, customers need 
a way to verify that the third party has the controls. In some cases, customers send staff 
or consultants into third-party facilities to do a complete audit of their security posture 
against NIST, ISO, or other control frameworks. However, many suppliers (such as 
CSPs) tend to be unwilling to submit to site visits or any security oversight. Fortunately, 
standard audits such as SOC 2 exist for service providers that can make it unnecessary 
for customers to audit CSPs themselves. Instead, customers can obtain evidence of the 
CSP’s SOC 2 certification.
Although SOC 2 provides a defensible and pragmatic way to confirm a third 
party’s basic security hygiene, customers should look deeper under the covers when 
sharing responsibility with a third party for protecting critical business systems. If 
customers can’t perform third-party audits themselves, they should request and sign a 
nondisclosure agreement (NDA) for the detailed copy of the third party’s independent 
audit report. It may validate some of the third party’s security claims and/or provide 
findings where improvement or compensating controls are required.
For more information on managing third party CSP security, see the Chapter 7 
Section “Manage Cloud Risk Through the Third-Party Management Program.” Readers 
can also obtain detailed CSP control frameworks, questionnaires, and other information 
from the Cloud Security Alliance’s Security Trust Assurance and Risk (STAR) program.13
13 “Cloud Security Alliance Security Trust Assurance and Risk (STAR),” Cloud Security Alliance, 
Accessed At: https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star/
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6.4.4  Tune Controls to Security and Business Needs
The following guidance from Malcolm Harkins’ Managing Risk and Information 
Security14 is helpful in evaluating and implementing controls: “For a few years…I thought 
of information risk and security as a balancing act…But as my responsibilities grew…I 
realized that a balancing act was the wrong analogy. We could not start from a position 
of making trade-offs between risks and enablement, or between security and privacy. 
So I began using a different model…of optimizing what is really a multivariate equation 
of risk dynamic and business objectives in order to create solutions that are ‘tuned to 
target.’” The variables in Harkins’ control tuning model are
• Risk and compliance
• Cost and maintenance
• Productivity and user experience
• Market objectives
• Customer needs
Security leaders can tune controls using the variables in this model. Given a risk 
scenario, security leaders may have a choice of mitigation strategies and controls to deal 
with it. Once controls are selected, they can be tuned to the desired deployment style 
by planning who, what, and how to implement and operate them while considering the 
variables in the control tuning model.
6-3
Engage business and IT stakeholders who have a security-related role 
maintaining controls, are the business owners for assets protected 
by the controls, or whose operations or business objectives could 
be impacted by the controls. Tune control deployment style to their 
business needs and risks.
Finally, many controls must be changed or improved over time because neither 
the use case requirements nor the threats are static. For example, the growth in 
telecommuting and cloud computing over the years (and in 2020, with COVID-19) 
14 Managing Risk and Information Security: Protect to Enable, 2nd Edition, Malcolm Harkins, 
Apress Open, 2016
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necessitated increased use of remote access. Also, more stringent privacy requirements 
and potential for abuse of facial recognition and other machine learning (ML)–enabled 
technologies have created the need for new privacy-enhancing controls and changed 
requirements for deploying existing controls.
In general, the massive volume of security events and the speed with which threats 
can compromise an IT environment put a premium on fully automated exploit blocking 
or ML-enabled detection controls that can keep up with the pace of threats at scale in 
many environments. Over time, security teams must evolve from “manual detect” to 
“automated protect” styles of control deployment. This will be required to keep up with 
adversaries while also minimizing “control friction” vis-à-vis the legitimate users of the 
protected technology and the controls themselves.
6.5  Scale and Align the Control Baseline
Different types of businesses need different controls scaled to the business culture and 
deployed at appropriate maturity levels. For any business, control implementation must 
be aligned to the business functions supporting security for the control.
6.5.1  Scale to Business Size, Type, and Industry
For a small business, the implementation of many controls will be less complex than for a large 
enterprise. There will be fewer business units, groups, roles, duplications of functions, required 
integrations, more simplified processes, and (in some jurisdictions) reduced regulatory 
requirements. However, the small business security team has fewer resources to deploy security 
controls and tends to require easier-to-use or deploy solutions than a larger business.
For example, small and medium-sized organizations under low security pressure 
could modify the control domains’ maturity requirements as follows:
• Governance: Combine the security steering committee function with 
an IT steering committee or even a single executive staff meeting for 
all administrative decisions.
• Security policies and awareness: A single security policy document 
might suffice. However, detailed technical procedures should still be 
in separate documents.
• Access management: Smaller organizations may not require formal 
access request, access review, and access revocation processes.
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• Only use two lines of defense (omit internal audit)
• Prefer simplified cloud-based solutions for
• Real-time threat detection
• Logging and log review
• User account monitoring
• Backup and data recovery
• And other controls
On the other hand, a large decentralized business such as a multinational 
corporation with multiple subsidiaries requires added maturity in many areas and may 
even need more than one control baseline due to major divergences between multiple 
lines of business and regions. See Chapter 3’s section “Matrix Models.”
Also, medium or large organizations under high or very high security pressure should 
generally meet the maturity criteria in most or all control domains and in some cases exceed 
them. As mentioned in the “Address Common Challenges” section, high maturity procedural 
controls and/or privileged access management tools are a common requirement.
Small, medium, and large organizations with a relatively low level of complexity 
may be able to deploy controls universally to cover all assets. Organizations with high 
complexity and low maturity may need to compromise, applying many controls only to 
critical business assets at first.
Organizations with high levels of complexity and security pressure should prioritize 
efforts to reduce complexity. However, if the organization cannot further reduce 
complexity, deploying advanced automated assessment and detection solutions may be 
useful. Emphasize automated configuration and compliance assessment tools, third- 
party management services, security analytics and machine learning for real-time threat 
detection, and so on. Have processes that support, motivate, or require LOBs and IT 
teams to remedy deficiencies detected against the control baseline in their areas.
Other special vertical industry considerations apply. Application program interface 
(API) security is everything to high technology companies or CSPs with many exposed 
services. Software vendors and SaaS companies must put a higher emphasis on secure 
software development practices. Online retail companies with no brick-and-mortar stores 
could deemphasize physical security. High technology manufacturing companies, 
utilities, and transportation companies must improve their ability to provide security 
controls to IT/OT (operational technology) environments.
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6.5.2  Align Control Deployment and Business Functions
Security programs, and even a minimum viable control baseline, have many points of 
alignment with the business. I went through the 20 control domains in the previous 
section and cross-referenced all the core business interdependencies to create 
Table 6-3. The table maps the business functions (other than those in the core security 
organization itself) to each control domain. Security leaders can use this information to 
identify which business functions they should engage with in the process of specifying 
control baseline requirements for each control domain.
Security leaders shouldn’t be daunted by the size of the table; they will not need to 
implement all the controls and manage all the alignments at once. What is necessary is 
knowing which business leaders hold the leading roles for which business functions, to 
get to know those leaders and to include aligning with them in control implementation 
project plans as these come up for action in the security architecture road map.
 
6-4
Identify the leaders for the various business functions as well as 
business or IT owners of critical assets. Assign informal relationship 
managers to them. For business functions with multiple control 
domain alignments, establish formal coordination forums or 
projects as the work content merits.
Chapter 6  establish a Control baseline
193
Table 6-3. Master Table for Aligning Business Functions to Control Domains
Business Function Control Domain Inter-Dependencies
executive 
stakeholders




security governance, risk management, security policy and awareness, 
asset inventory, third-party management, incident response, backup and 
data recovery, and business continuity. Many other control domains also 
tend to have inter-dependencies on lobs in organizations with decentralized 
security governance.
it leaders or teams security governance, security policy and awareness, asset inventory, security 
zoning, authentication and user account management, access management and 
authorization, sCCM, data protection, vulnerability management, logging and log 




security governance, security policy and awareness, asset inventory, security 
zoning, authentication and user account management, access management 
and authorization, sCCM, data protection, sDlC, vulnerability management, 




backup and data recovery, business continuity
Compliance and audit risk management, security zoning, authentication and user account 
management, access management, sCCM, data protection, vulnerability 
management, logging and log review, incident response, business continuity
endpoint or mobile 
device management 
team






physical security, business continuity
human resources secure hr practices, user account monitoring, incident response
(continued)
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6.6  Call to Action
The core recommendation for security leaders from this chapter is to establish the 
control baseline as follows:
• Select which control frameworks to reference based on your 
business’s industry and compliance requirements.
• Put a minimum viable control baseline in place.
• Select granular controls from the 20 major control domains and the 
NIST CSF model control categories.
• Prioritize the granular controls based on risk.
• Build two or three lines of defense into the control architecture.
• Work with the business’s third-party management organization 
to apply shared responsibility models or concepts to third-party 
relationships.
• Tune control deployment style to the business’s risk, risk appetite, 
culture, and functional requirements for the protected assets.
Business Function Control Domain Inter-Dependencies
internal marketing 
team
security policy and awareness
it asset management asset inventory
legal team secure hr practices, logging and log review, user account monitoring, 






third-party management, security zoning, access management and 
authorization, data protection, incident response, backup and data recovery
public relations incident response
Uat team security policy and awareness
Table 6-3. (continued)
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• Seek to achieve a “Defined” maturity level or better in each control 
domain.
• Align control deployment with the leaders of the business functions 
involved with the controls as well as with owners of critical assets.
• Scale control deployment to the business’s type, size, and compliance 
requirements.
Action – Make a quick assessment of the organization’s control baseline
Ask yourself the following short set of questions and score the answers in the Success 
Plan Worksheet’s15 Section 3, Table 3. Base your score on whether you would answer 
most of the questions with a strong “no” (1), a strong “yes” (5), or something in between.
 1. Does the business have a “control framework” and/or a “control 
baseline” document that lists the control objectives for IT and the 
business?
 2. Does the security organization have published guidance mapping 
the control objectives to the required control activities for different 
levels of risk or different situations (e.g., data classifications, use of 
third-party services)?
 3. Is the control baseline mapped to requirements documents and 
solution architectures for critical operational systems in IT and 
security environments?
 4. Is the control baseline updated and followed?
 5. Do IT, security, or third-party management groups have a shared 
responsibility framework to aid in evaluating third-party services?
 6. Does an architecture document specify how the controls should 
be deployed?
 7. Does the business have an assurance or an audit function to verify 
controls are operating?
15 “Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, May 
2020, accessed at https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet
Chapter 6  establish a Control baseline
196
Action – Define 1–3 improvement objectives for the control baseline
Note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 7, of the worksheet. The following 
are guidelines and examples of control baseline improvement objectives:
• Evaluate the current control baseline document(s) to see if they can 
be used as is or as a draft starting point.
If the business requires a new or rewritten control baseline:
• Create an initial detailed outline for a new control baseline using 
a spreadsheet or a governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) tool. 
Populate the draft using information from the 20 security control 
domains.
If a current and credible security assessment is not available:
• Perform a rapid enterprise risk assessment16 based on the 
methodology from Chapter 5, section “Perform Enterprise Risk 
Assessments to Identity Top Risk Scenarios,” using available data to 
identify at least a rough list of top information risks.
• Perform a control gap assessment against the control baseline 
and the list of top information risks. Depending on the size of the 
business, rapid or deep security assessments17 can be performed 
within a 30-, 60-, or 90-day period.
Don’t limit yourself to these examples. Also consider other improvement objectives 
that fit the gaps and priorities you’ve identified for your business.
16 “Rapid Enterprise Risk Assessment,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, January 2020, accessed 
at: https://security-architect.com/RiskManagementResources
17 “Security Assessments,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, January 2020, accessed at:  
https://security-architect.com/SecurityAssessmentResources
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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license  
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
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What you cannot manage, you cannot secure, and a control baseline can’t be fully or 
efficiently implemented across a chaotic IT environment. Although CISOs, or other 
security leaders, don’t own the IT strategy, they have an interest in making it as simple 
and well defined as possible.
Too many IT environments are aging and dysfunctional. Cloud computing and 
modern development practices promise transformation to the powerful, seamless 
IT systems digital businesses need, but often just disrupt, disappoint, and add to the 
complexity. Amid these challenges, the security leadership needs to be able to reference 
an up-to-date, approved IT strategy.
To support their organizations’ digital transformation initiatives (aka “digital 
initiatives”), IT organizations must consolidate, simplify, and modernize the 
infrastructure hosting core business applications. They must rationalize application 
portfolios. To catch the cloud computing wave, IT and security must change the way 
they operate from “IT-as-provider” to “IT-as-broker” by excelling at third-party risk 
management and hybrid cloud monitoring or management. Cloud- enabling processes 
such as DevOps can take on characteristics of DevSecOps, and Agile of Disciplined Agile, 
while still enabling rapid innovation.
First the IT and digital innovation, and then the cybersecurity function, must create 
a strategy that optimizes business agility, operational efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and 
risk reduction. Although security leaders can’t drive the IT or digital strategy on their 
own, they can request, encourage, and contribute to its development.
Where good practices are lacking, security leaders can advocate for them and 
implement those that they can as part of ongoing security projects or changes. Security 
leaders can showcase good practices such as tiered risk assessments, third-party risk 
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assessments, DevSecOps, and security service catalogs. In many cases, security leaders 
can leverage their inherently cross-functional role to help promote an effective IT strategy.
This chapter provides guidance on how to
• Address common challenges
• Help develop a strategy to consolidate and simplify IT
• Learn from digital initiatives
• Provide security for a governed multicloud environment
• Upgrade IT operations with DevSecOps and Disciplined Agile
7.1  Address Common Challenges
IT and security organizations often share a common challenge described in Chapter 4’s  
Section “Business Units at Odds with IT and Security.” Many organizations’ internal 
IT infrastructures are aging and dysfunctional, losing adoption to cloud-based 
deployments or digital innovation functions outside the IT chain of command. The 
drift in larger organizations is toward decentralization as the pace of change in IT 
accelerates and business units take advantage of cloud services. And yet all too often, 
digital transformation projects or cloud initiatives end up underdelivering and adding 
to the complexity of the overall IT environment. The security function gets caught in the 
middle, charged with protecting a mess not of its own making. Resistance seems futile 
when security lacks input to the IT or digital strategy or when no strategy is in place.
7.1.1  IT Out of Alignment with Digital Business Initiatives
Is it “IT” or is it “Digital?” Most businesses in 2020 have launched some type of digital 
transformation project, stood up Digital Innovation Lab(s) at the enterprise or line of 
business (LOB) level, or even gone so far as to appoint a Chief Digital Officer. This sort of 
development could be a good thing… or not. Done poorly, competing digital initiatives 
may cause rival fiefdoms to emerge without uplifting core IT environments.
Shadow IT is an explosion of cloud computing adoption for business use by 
employees and workgroups with no centralized IT organization involvement. Whereas 
digital innovation initiatives may be seen as strategic, shadow IT deployments tend to be 
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more tactical. Between shadow IT and digital initiatives not aligned with IT, it becomes 
hard to even talk about the IT environment, especially in large organizations. One could 
ask whether the “IT environment” means all the business’s IT capabilities regardless of 
who runs them or just the centrally managed part of IT?
I’ll use the term “overall IT environment” inclusively of all IT or digital systems 
whether they’re run by central IT, an LOB, or a CSP. In my experience, even in larger 
organizations, there’s usually one security function nominally responsible for defending 
or at least overseeing the defense of the whole IT environment. The good news is that, 
managed correctly, digital initiatives (including shadow IT) can sometimes accelerate 
the development of digital business capabilities available to all LOBs.
7.1.2  Complexity as the Enemy of Security
Too many IT environments are highly complex, riven into silos, and replete with 
duplicate capabilities and internal support organizations that become increasingly 
difficult to sustain. This can happen for the following reasons:
• We (the IT organization) inherit an IT environment that grew 
organically, not one built and maintained from an architectural 
blueprint.
• We undertook project after project from a tactical perspective. 
Projects were underfunded or under-resourced. Project contractors 
or on-staff developers and engineers failed to provide transfer of 
knowledge for long-term operations or maintenance. Documentation 
wasn’t created or maintained.
• Our technical debt – or the cost of reworking systems that we still 
need but find increasingly unfit for purpose – is out of control.
• Different business units, or workgroups, never aligned on a common 
architecture and portfolio of shared services. They went out on their 
own to build, buy, or subscribe to YETAs (yet another application(s)) 
of the same type we already had.
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“At the end of a decade or two, IT departments across the business have become 
curators of IT museums. Old, or suboptimal tools (like a custom financial loan 
management platform built on Microsoft SharePoint, or many disjointed SAP 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) modules) have been woven deeply into the 
business process. They are hard to replace. Dozens of satellite applications, such 
as customer relationship management (CRM) or business analytics, have been 
bolted haphazardly on to the tangled mess.”
Anonymous Client
Then a new IT opportunity comes along. The “revolutionary” capability or application 
has an exciting name or buzzword. The business launches a new project driven from a 
digital innovation team or even from EA. “This is going to change everything, enable the 
business, reduce costs and risks!” Only it doesn’t. Technical debt isn’t easy to repay.
Security leaders get caught in the middle, responsible for securing a tangled mess 
that is not of their making. The more complex an IT system or application is, and the 
more richly it is integrated into the fabric, the harder it is to secure it. Assurance, or being 
sure, that something is secure requires threat modeling all the ways it can be attacked 
and verifying that controls – such as error checking, malware scanning, or configuration 
hardening – are in place and operating to cover all important attack vectors. Logging 
services, software updating must be added. A limited budget for assurance and control 
can run dry amid endless permutations.
The good news is that the security leaders can influence the business toward reducing 
complexity and following good practices. But security leaders must get themselves 
positioned correctly in the organization to help drive a coherent IT and security strategy.
7.1.3  New DevOps or Agile Models Fielded Without  
Security Provisions
Digital businesses, software suppliers, and cloud service providers (CSPs) alike are 
driven by the market to do more with less and to do it faster. Agile project management 
can speed release cadences and, in some cases, make service providers more responsive 
to end customer needs. DevOps models can reduce the number of staff needed to run IT 
systems as well as streamline the release process.
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DevOps is a style of IT operations in which the same team that performs 
development also performs operations, generally through automated processes. DevOps 
has become popular due to cloud computing and agile development models in which 
new capabilities are frequently developed in 2-week sprints, and functionality is released 
to production continuously. However, DevOps can create security issues if there isn’t a 
separation of duty between development, test, and production operations roles.
“Many organizations are advancing into the DevOps culture but not addressing 
security in the process. IT and security managers must be prepared to deal with 
the cultural and technical challenges of defining DevSecOps responsibilities clearly 
and apportioning them to development and security staff. An additional challenge 
is that the security environment can be quite dynamic. How can the DevSecOps 
practices move fast when there's a lot of technical debt?”
David Cross, Senior Vice President, Chief Security Officer at Oracle SaaS Cloud
Engaging developers requires a different approach in the (modern) development 
environment, where agile development models have supplanted the waterfall 
development models that once ruled the roost. Waterfall software development 
models1 – which are heavy on documentation, reviews, and approvals – are favorable 
for assurance. However, in the digital business environment, most development teams 
have moved to agile development models2 that emphasize early delivery, continual 
adaptation or improvement, and rapid or flexible response to change.
Agile development has become a popular method for creating software, and some 
businesses even use agile principles or agile project management outside the software 
development area. However, in some cases agile process has become an excuse for no 
process at all. It is common to find development teams that don’t perform or document 
up front systems requirements analysis. It can be difficult for security teams to engage 
development when there is no process to inject security into and no documentation 
against which to perform security reviews.
1 “Waterfall Model,” Wikipedia, accessed at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waterfall_model
2 “Agile Software Development,” Wikipedia, accessed at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Agile_software_development
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Fortunately, some aspects of both agile and DevOps models can be positive for 
security, as I’ll describe in the section “Upgrade IT Operations with DevSecOps and 
Disciplined Agile.”
7.2  Help Develop a Strategy to Consolidate  
and Simplify IT
The preceding challenges paint a troubled picture of “macro-complexity” (too many 
types and instances of systems and applications) and “micro-complexity” (systems 
integrated in complex or custom ways that aren’t well managed or documented). What 
can CISOs or other security leaders who don’t control the IT strategy do? As it turns out – 
a lot! Start with the following objectives that should be part of any IT strategy:
• Understand how to reduce macro-complexity by consolidating or 
rationalizing core enterprise applications.
• Understand how to consolidate core infrastructure and security 
platforms.
• Understand how to simplify micro-complexity by adopting consistent 
management practices for the IT environment.
• Discern the IT strategy and align the security road map to it.
Take opportunities to position security as a coordinating function, at least informally. 
Implementing many of these practices is IT’s job, but the security function is heavily 
involved and will live or die based on the outcomes. It pays to understand typical IT 
strategy objectives and the good practices that can lead to accomplishing the strategy. 
While doing the security work they have to do within IT anyway, security leaders can 
align or coordinate with IT, digital, risk, or finance teams already following practices that 
will support an effective IT strategy.
7- 1
Leverage the inherently cross-functional roles security is 
naturally asked to perform – as policy establisher, access 
gatekeeper, and security service enabler – to help improve the  
IT or digital architecture and strategy.
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7.2.1  Understand How to Reduce Macro-Complexity 
by Consolidating or Rationalizing Enterprise 
Applications
The IT or enterprise architecture (EA) function leads and staffs application rationalization 
projects, not security. However, security leaders should understand the process and 
support it in the interests of enabling an IT strategy to help set security priorities, support 
security objectives, and simplify the IT security environment. So as to be able to talk 
intelligently on these topics during meetings that shape the IT strategy, let’s consider the 
following brief explanation of application consolidation and rationalization.
Every business has its core operating and administration functions, such as
• Product or service development, manufacturing, or extraction
• Logistics, communications, transportation, or delivery
• Sales and marketing
• Product or service delivery, customer support, accounting, etc.
There may be more than one core application instance, for example, a retail 
and manufacturing conglomerate has multiple “cash cow” product lines; a national 
government has multiple departments.
IT organizations can identify core functions of the business and map them to core 
applications as follows:
• For each line of business, name the core operating functions and list 
the applications that support them.
• Next, identify the administration functions – such as HR, accounting, 
facilities, legal – that support each line of business and list the 
applications that support them.
You don’t have to generate a complete list of all the applications that enhance or 
support the core applications; that comes later with the application portfolio exercise. 
Core applications are just the main applications.
Rearchitect or Rationalize Core Applications
In studying the core functions of the business, one often finds multiple core 
application vendors used for multiple lines of business, for example, both SAP and 
Oracle for general administration and Microsoft, IBM, and some open source tools 
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for product development in the same area. Ideally, there could be one and only one 
core application suite for each core function. Rationalizing applications is the process 
of phasing out applications that do the same thing or at least specifying which is the 
enterprise standard and requiring LOBs to justify using a different solution.
One may also discover an aging core application or perhaps an old version of the 
vendor’s product. Whenever possible, core applications should be based on modern 
architectures using a recent version of the product or service. IT or development 
organizations can also refactor core applications by eliminating now- unnecessary 
modules, replacing ones that are easy to replace, and wrapping others with APIs. 
Eventually the code in the wrapped modules can be pulled out into microservices or 
itself replaced. Often, application-specific security modules can also be refactored to use 
general-purpose security products (i.e., for encryption or identity management functions).
Also, per the following cybersecurity-business alignment key, some specific security- 
related controls may benefit from competent application portfolio management.
7-2
Coordinate the asset inventory control and asset risk profiling 
implementation, timing, and data models with those of IT- or 
EA-led application consolidation and rationalization efforts.
7.2.2  Understand How to Consolidate Core Infrastructure 
and Security Platforms
IT or EA should develop an IT strategy for consolidating infrastructure platforms as well 
as enterprise applications. Security controls must be implemented in the infrastructure 
using a combination of native platform capabilities and multiplatform (or hybrid cloud) 
integration patterns. Simplifying infrastructure security systems (especially identity and 
access management (IAM) and logging) yields major benefits to security team workloads 
and accuracy.
 Infrastructure Platform Background
A core infrastructure platform provides the set of hardware or software compute, storage, 
and network capabilities needed to support one or more business applications. It 
includes physical or virtual servers and containers, operating systems (OSes), network 
routers, and storage facilities.
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Examples of infrastructure platforms include public cloud infrastructure-as-a- 
service (IaaS) solutions – such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform, 
and Microsoft Azure – as well as private cloud, premise-based solutions based on 
VMware or virtual data center solutions. Vendors such as Cisco, Juniper, and EMC 
provide the network and storage capabilities for private clouds and in some cases in 
partnership with public cloud suppliers.
 Security in the IT Strategy for Infrastructure Platforms
The IT strategy should seek to minimize the number of infrastructure platforms. 
Otherwise, the more platforms and the more integration patterns are required, the more 
complex the control baseline(s) becomes along with all other aspects of IT management 
and security.
Often, strategists advocate moving infrastructure to public IaaS systems so as 
to simplify IT. However, although IaaS offloads operations tasks such as data center 
and server hardware management, it still leaves the customer to manage operating 
systems, network zoning, performance, availability, backups, and more. Any IaaS that 
isn’t required to support a core business application is fair game for consolidation. 
When rationalizing or rearchitecting core applications, businesses should consider 
the infrastructure consolidation too. One option is to source new versions of core 
applications from a software-as-a-service (SaaS) solution. SaaS completely offloads 
IaaS requirements from the customer. Most software vendors are shifting their strategic 
development priority into a cloud offering such as Microsoft Office 365, Oracle Data 
Cloud, and SAP HANA.
IaaS or private cloud solutions remain the only choice, however, when a business’s 
core applications are either developed in-house or must be heavily customized beyond 
the limits of vendors’ SaaS solution flexibility. Even then, platform-as-a-service (PaaS) 
or “serverless” deployment options on IaaS may be an option. Typically, an in-house 
private cloud infrastructure and one or at most two public cloud IaaS infrastructure 
platforms can satisfy most business infrastructure platform needs.
Each infrastructure platform requires a skilled team to operate and maintain it, 
and any security controls must be operationalized for it. For example, a compliance 
regulation or the business’s own security policy might require encryption of sensitive 
data-at-rest in all platforms. Encryption key management could then be implemented 
using platform-native capabilities (such as Amazon Key Management Services (KMS)) 
or a third-party capability (such as the Thales/SafeNet virtual key management servers 
Chapter 7  Simplify and rationalize it and SeCurity
208
running in AWS). If the business also used VMware in its private cloud, it would have to 
implement encryption key management there as well. Potentially, elements of the same 
third-party encryption key management capability can be used across the hybrid cloud 
of multiple infrastructure platforms.
7-3
Work with IT infrastructure platform teams to develop a menu 
of reusable native or hybrid cloud capable security controls. 
Communicate security recommendations to IT teams and 
application developers for using the preferred (strategic) controls 
and/or guidance and decision trees for control selection.
7.2.3  Understand How to Simplify Micro-Complexity 
by Adopting Consistent Management Practices 
for the IT Environment
Many core IT systems are highly configurable and complex to deploy – think Windows 
Active Directory domains with interforest trusts or SAP and Oracle ERP suites 
each integrated with 20, 50, or even more satellite applications for development, 
collaboration, or analytics. One such core system isn’t even the whole IT environment, 
but if you draw out all its inputs, outputs, services, and dependencies, it can sometimes 
look like the proverbial tangled mess.
Fortunately, core systems setup need not be complex and obtuse. Solution 
engineers can simplify the micro-complexity of the larger core systems through standard 
architecture patterns for identity, security, network, storage, monitoring, data models, 
and business continuity. By tackling macro-complexity through consolidation and 
micro-complexity through good deployment practices, IT can reduce or avoid  
technical debt.
Since much of the micro-complexity comes from security, the security team has 
a natural mandate and many opportunities to help reduce it. To do so requires close 
engagement and collaboration with IT.
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7.2.4  Discern the IT Strategy and Align the Security  
Road Map to It
Security leaders have a stake in simplifying and rationalizing IT. Although they can’t 
drive the IT strategy on their own, they can request, encourage, and contribute to its 
development. Without an IT architecture and strategy in a business of any complexity, 
there can be just too many moving parts to protect.
Security leaders must look through the lens of risk first. Even if highly sensitive data 
is mired in a legacy system one hopes to replace, it is still a protection priority. But the IT 
strategy should be the secondary prioritization lens to help pick investments in controls 
for strategic and thus future-proofed IT systems.
If an up-to-date, approved IT strategy is available, security leaders can align the 
security strategy, architecture, and road map cleanly and completely to it. Tying security 
control solution architectures into the known quantity of an IT strategy and road map 
does wonders to clarify security priorities from the technical control perspective.
If no strategy is published, try to determine the de facto IT strategy by 
understanding the assumptions and road maps of IT leaders and major LOBs. Work 
with IT leaders, EA, digital initiative leaders, and risk management functions to resolve 
open issues or answered questions on strategic IT or digital targets to secure. The goal 
is to determine which applications, infrastructure platforms, and integration patterns 
are core to the business and are considered strategic priorities by the leadership. Align 
security priorities for capability deployment and improvement to those. Ensure that 
any gaps in the business’s understanding of the IT strategy get reflected as gaps in the 
security road map as well.
Of course, trying to fill a gap in IT strategy isn’t always easy. Security leaders can find 
themselves in an awkward position. IT leaders may not be ready or interested.
“Most organizations are barreling along in one direction ‘driven by culture,’ and you 
won’t succeed by standing out in front and telling folks they’re going the wrong 
way. If you want to steer in a new direction you first need to find ways to influence 
the drivers by identifying shared interests and finding their pain.”
Jack Jones, Chairman of FAIR Institute
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Work collaboratively on common priorities or pain points. Security teams should 
always be able to identify opportunities to work with IT on shared priorities because 
often much of the micro-complexity of IT comes from “kludgy” security bolted on in 
a haphazard manner. Refactoring security services such as monitoring, patching, and 
access management to use loosely coupled, API-enabled components can reduce 
technical debt and set the stage for further modernization.
Collaborate with IT on developing security controls. Every control from cutting- 
edge new DevSecOps capabilities to traditional patch management affects IT, by its 
nature, and is a natural meeting ground for IT and security staff to work together. Pick 
at least two different control groups from different categories in the control baseline 
(e.g., asset inventory, secure system configuration, or logging and log review) for joint 
projects with IT. Involve IT staff in the design, follow a repeatable project methodology, 
and document the results such that the project can showcase security and IT working 
together.
7.2.5  Take Opportunities to Position Security 
as a Coordinating Function
It’s not uncommon for organizations to have a decentralized IT environment where 
business units control much of the IT budget and staff. Security can often serve as a 
coordinating function between IT, LOBs, and corporate administration groups. Working 
on an informal basis across these groups, security professionals tend to have a useful 
cross-functional view. It isn’t always realistic to formalize a coordinating role for security 
leaders, but some of them thrive on it.
ENGAGED SECURITY LEADERSHIP STORIES
“I work with a Security Business Liaison Committee run by the CISO to manage the timing 
and impact of technology and policy changes at the bank. The committee has sub-groups 
for executives, mid-level managers, and technical coordination. As a security strategist, I add 
value to IT and the business strategy by helping to solve multi-disciplinary problems that none 
of the groups could solve by themselves.”
Randall Gamby, Vice President, Manager Security Strategy at U.S. Bank
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“We have an EDGE team (‘Everyone Digs Governance Eventually’) for security, compliance, 
HR, legal, Growth, Finance, and all the business units. Through EDGE, we facilitate solutions 
to ‘sticky yucky’ business problems requiring multiple stakeholders to resolve. We’ve tackled 
everything from how to ship medical data extracts to partners in a secure and compliant 
manner, to vendor risk management, to securing merger and acquisition processes. I’ve spent 
a lot of time building up my Associate VPs to help me engage the business.”
Joey Johnson, CISO, Premise Health (ISE Southeast Executive Award Winner 2017)
7.3  Learn from Digital Initiatives
The security team can be a fast learner that adopts good practices from formal or 
informal digital initiatives and pockets of innovation in the organization or even externally 
to it. Security leaders should maintain contact wherever possible with groups outside 
IT that are responsible for digital initiatives. At a minimum, keeping an open channel 
provides the opportunity to familiarize such teams with current security service catalog 
options, decision trees, or other implementation aids used for similar efforts in the past.
Recognize that as a digital business, parts of the IT and the application environment 
may be in a state of continuous transformation and disruption. Be open to the possibility 
that the digital team(s) is uncovering new or unique use cases and requirements for which 
IT and security leaders do not yet have a fit-for-purpose solution. Be prepared to partner 
with the digital team and learn from it, potentially assisting its efforts and bringing new 
skills, knowledge, and capabilities back into the security offering and/or strategy.
7.4  Provide Security for a Governed Multicloud 
Environment
To succeed, the IT and security leadership must make capabilities available to business 
units in an easy-to-consume, agile manner. Gone are the days when business units 
would live with lengthy IT schedules for delivering new capabilities or changes; today 
they can quickly put any one of hundreds of SaaS offerings on a credit card or hire a few 
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developers to build a custom solution on an IaaS platform such as AWS or Azure. Many 
businesses have adopted a “cloud-first” IT strategy where IT or LOBs deploying premise- 
based solutions must justify why this approach is superior to cloud-based options.
With some businesses even opting for a “cloud-only” IT strategy, one might ask is 
there even a need for an IT department? I think the answer is yes because the business 
needs IT expertise to deliver on the cloud’s promise of lowered cost and increased agility 
as well as to manage security and risk. However, IT and security groups must prove this 
point to the business through action.
7.4.1  Identify the Risk of Shadow IT
Shadow IT can lead to unintended and undesirable security risks, compliance concerns, 
and hidden costs. According to the Oracle and KPMG Cloud Threat Report 2019,3 92% 
of 450 IT and security respondents were concerned about shadow IT; many of the 
respondents also found that policies against the use of unauthorized services were 
routinely flouted and had led to unauthorized use of data, introduction of malware, and 
other issues.
On the other hand, Entrust Datacard’s report, “The Upside of Shadow IT: 
Productivity Meets IT Security,”4 found that 77% of 1000 respondents believed shadow 
IT can make businesses more competitive and that efforts to eradicate it through 
cumbersome approval processes could actually drive business or IT users even farther 
into the shadows and compound the problem.
Rather than thinking of these as dueling reports, we can see them meeting in 
the middle on the need for a governed enterprise multicloud offering. Facing a clear 
and present danger, businesses will often empower security to develop a strategy for 
controlling shadow IT. When that happens, security leaders should resist the temptation 
to come down too hard on shadow IT offending LOBs with draconian policies. 
Instead they can engage the business leaders and help them understand risks and 
accountabilities.
3 “Oracle and KPMG Cloud Threat Report 2019,” Oracle and KPMG, April 2019, accessed at  
www.oracle.com/a/ocom/docs/dc/final-oracle-and-kpmg-cloud-threat-report-2019.pdf
4 “The Upside of Shadow IT: Productivity Meets IT Security,” Entrust Datacard, October 2019, 
accessed at www.entrustdatacard.com/pages/shadow-it
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7-4
Work with forward-thinking IT leaders seeking to establish IT 
as a broker in the cloud environment.
With the security team’s support and a business mandate, IT should be able 
to resolve the shadow IT conundrum, as also discussed in my article, “Shadow IT: 
Cultivating the Garden,5” and in the following section.
7.4.2  Align with the Evolution from IT-as-Provider  
to IT-as- Broker
A cloud-only or cloud-first approach is a game changer for the IT department. Now it 
must operate as a broker of cloud services as well as a provider. Businesses can mitigate 
the risks of shadow IT by having the IT and security organizations develop a service 
catalog of shared capabilities – both cloud-sourced and from in-house. IT can also help 
business units find the best cloud solutions for their needs and help the enterprise by 
curating all business unit requirements and satisfying them through the fewest possible 
number of reusable, flexible, and scalable solutions.
The first step is for IT to marshal cloud computing expertise from within its 
ranks to create one or more Cloud Architect and Cloud Security Architect positions 
with performance objectives to support LOBs and digital initiatives. Then open a 
communication flow such that
• IT Cloud Architects and Cloud Security Architects become familiar 
with cloud developments within the business and provide periodic 
internal briefings on IT projects, LOB projects, industry technology 
developments, and the state of the market.
• IT and security communicate the IT strategy, service catalogs, and 
road maps incorporating shared cloud services to the business.
5 “Shadow IT: Cultivating the Garden,” Dan Blum, November 2019, accessed at  
https://security-architect.com/shadow-cultivating-garden/
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• LOBs engage IT and security from the beginning of capability 
sourcing decision processes.
• Business, IT, and security staff establish informal working groups (aka 
centers of excellence) to share knowledge of cloud applications and 
infrastructure platforms.
The cloud access security broker (CASB) is an example of a security tool that both 
controls and enables cloud users. By providing single sign-on (SSO) to cloud services, 
the CASB improves ease of use, user authentication, and user account management 
assurance. The CASB can also support financial controls by limiting cloud access 
for sanctioned services to users with centrally authorized accounts. Licenses for 
unauthorized users could be reclaimed.
Additional cloud-enabling services provided or supported by centralized IT groups 
could include consulting, implementation, DevSecOps, monitoring, IAM enablement, 
and more. As we unpack the topic of business-enabling technology services and 
topics, security comes into increasing focus and with it opportunities to encourage and 
influence a modern IT strategy and service delivery model.
7.4.3  Manage Cloud Risk Through the Third-Party 
Management Program
In practice, there is a natural tension between consolidating forces in IT and 
decentralizing forces in the LOBs and development organizations. How the business 
manages third-party relationships (or doesn’t manage them) can end up becoming a 
battleground.
7- 5
Work with third-party management to develop a portfolio process 
for managing the risk and utility of third parties.
Developing a tiered risk assessment process (see Chapter 5, section “Implement 
Tiered Risk Assessment”) for third parties is not so difficult for smaller business with 
security staff ready to do their research. Larger business with multiple LOBs and a need 
for hundreds of third parties should consider obtaining a third-party risk management 
tool, such as BitSight, ProcessUnity, or Security Scorecard.
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A BROKERAGE’S THIRD-PARTY RISK MANAGEMENT STORY
at a recent conference, BitSight copresented a case study of a third-party management 
process with one of its financial services brokerage clients.
BitSight is a Vendor relationship management (Vrm) vendor that provides a security rating 
service for third-party vendors’ and CSps’ security postures. at the conference the brokerage 
described how it used the technology to develop a successful process.
“management liked how we required vendors with high risks to have high scores,” said the 
speaker. “We operate similarly to a mortgage lender’s loan pre-qualification service. Suppose a 
business unit brought us proposal to use a vendor with a low score. using BitSight’s database 
during a 30-minute meeting with the internal customer, we could explain the issues with the 
vendor and propose some alternatives.
“in general, we don’t focus much on the low risk use cases, but we can really help with the 
medium-risk scenarios. for those, we have made the assessment and implementation into 
parallel processes. this lets us pick our battles. in high risk scenarios (e.g., ones requiring 
the vendor host our customers’ personal data) we got the loBs to agree to follow a policy of 
no implementation until an assessment using questionnaires and site visit is complete. the 
database tool also helps us determine what areas to dive into.
Bottom line – we’ve gone from taking 17 weeks to as little as 1 day for pre-qualification and 
have even been able to reduce the high risk review process to less than 8 weeks.”
7.4.4  Collaborate with IT on Operationalizing Shared 
Security Responsibilities
Security and IT management across the industry are adapting to the “hybrid IT” model. 
As the business rationalizes core systems, some capabilities move to the cloud. These 
capabilities need to be deployed and operated using a shared responsibility model 
with the CSP as well as central IT and/or LOB-level groups. Many IT teams are not as 
experienced working in the cloud model, and shared responsibility arrangements tend 
to be addressed as one-offs in an ad hoc manner.
To simplify and rationalize the hybrid IT environment, businesses should 
systematize a shared responsibility model in technology processes for onboarding new 
CSPs or new cloud services, change management for existing services, and service 
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decommissioning. The process can engage appropriate groups from the business (i.e., 
third-party management for contracts, IT and security for risk assessments, and IT and 
the CSP for operations protocols). See Chapter 6, section “Apply a Shared Responsibility 
Model to the Control Baseline” for more information.
7.4.5  Include Security Services in the IT Service Catalog
The concept of a service catalog becomes increasingly compelling with hybrid IT and 
IT broker/provider operating models. The catalog is a documented set of IT service 
offerings that provides a unified view of IT capabilities independently of where they’re 
sourced from, how they’re operated, and who maintains them. Thus, the service catalog 
can broker both IT and CSP-provided services to internal customers. All that is required 
for a capability to be on the catalog is that it follows whatever contracts, service-level 
agreements (SLA), or cost model standards the catalog defines.
• Contracts: Usually internal agreements, but sometimes legal 
agreements, on how the service will be consumed or provided
• SLAs: IT or service provider commitments to uptime, support 
response time, or other performance metrics in operating the service
• Cost model: Chargeback or showback processes that enable the 
business to assess internal cost structures and how resources are 
allocated
Most cybersecurity capabilities and activities can be factored into IT service 
offerings – some to be exposed to the business and others measured only within internal 
IT processes. A security capability or activity can be
• Provided as a stand-alone IT service catalog item: For example, 
a business could offer both standard and enhanced email hygiene 
services to business units with different service descriptions and 
lower or higher SLAs and costs. The standard service could provide 
email anti-spam and malware scanning as well as anti-phishing 
awareness training. The enhanced service could add deep email 
anti-malware sandbox analysis and enhanced services for signed or 
encrypted email delivery.
Chapter 7  Simplify and rationalize it and SeCurity
217
• Packaged into the IT service catalog and exposed to business 
stakeholders. For example, a Standard Linux Server could be 
provided as a virtual machine (VM) on a private VMware cloud or on 
the AWS IaaS. In either case vulnerability management SLAs could 
specify how often the VM will be scanned and the patching windows.
• Embedded into the IT service catalog but not exposed: Certain 
capabilities such as user entity behavior analysis (UEBA) or security 
configuration checking could operate on critical systems without an 
exposed SLA and/or service description.
Notice how closely IT and cybersecurity services can sometimes be interwoven. 
To achieve higher maturity, the security function should be providing service catalog 
information. In doing so, it can either align with an existing IT service catalog process or 
engage with IT to develop one.
7.5  Upgrade IT Operations with DevSecOps 
and Disciplined Agile
DevOps benefits may come at the expense of losing separation of duty between staff 
roles and may even undermine the separation of IT development environments from 
IT production environments. If a fully automated continuous delivery, continuous 
deployment (CICD) model is adopted, the requirement for handover, or signoff, may 
be omitted. Fortunately, development teams (motivated to deliver more functionality 
on schedule) and operations teams (motivated to only deploy stable solutions that run 
reliably) tend to work well together for availability objectives. But what about privacy, 
confidentiality, safety, or integrity concerns?
7.5.1  Use Risk-Informed DevSecOps Practices
Although DevOps poses a challenge for cybersecurity, it’s also an opportunity. Some 
of the DevOps principles – automation, systems thinking, continuous improvement, 
transparency, and shortened feedback loops – can be positive for assurance.
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DevSecOps is the name for the practice of adding assurance into DevOps processes. 
As shown in Figure 7-1, it affects the timing, impact, and scope of security steps in the 
DevOps process.
Figure 7-1. DevSecOps Benefits
• Timing: DevSecOps “shifts left” the security assurance steps in 
DevOps release process, enabling IT to build security practices in at 
the beginning of projects rather than bolting it on at the back end.
• Impact: Automated deployment, aka “infrastructure as code,” 
eliminates one big vulnerability: the need for system administrators 
to get remote access into production server farms and applications 
to reconfigure systems or fix bugs. The “immutable infrastructure” 
is never reconfigured or patched directly in production. Instead, it 
is updated periodically from the latest stable development or QA 
version. Malware has fewer ways to infect immutable infrastructure 
and would be more easily detected.
• Scope: Not only are security steps automated, or semiautomated, 
into the development and release processes, they’re also defined in 
a simplified manner so that the developers themselves can perform 
them with appropriate security training and review. DevSecOps can 
be a force multiplier for the security team.
 
7-6
Empower developers to easily perform security-related tasks 
(DevSecOps) as part of their normal workflow and/or cross-fertilize 
security staff or expertise into the development organization.
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To start a DevSecOps initiative, security teams can engage developer communities 
using a combination of these approaches:
• Work alongside pilot projects to instrument security steps: 
Security staff can be temporarily embedded within key development 
organizations to build security instrumentation into the release 
process. The goal should be to configure development pipeline tools 
to invoke security steps in an automated manner to minimize the 
developer impact of the extra work on successive releases. Work 
with developers to capture the learnings on how to analyze reports 
from security tools (such as static and dynamic code testing) on their 
systems, simplify the process of fixing problems, and develop training 
curricula for others based on the pilot project experience.
• Designate security champions: Matrix key software architects to 
the security organization. Identify persons on the developer teams 
who are willing to take on the opportunity for an expanded role via 
a security championship program. Provide executive support and 
other incentives to encourage participation.
TECH COMPANY’S SECURITY CHAMPIONSHIP STORY6
“We were able to improve our vulnerability metrics and expand the extended security team 
from 15 to 40 participants without adding security headcount. We did this using business 
engagement, collaboratively developed metrics, and a security championship program that 
followed three principles: Inclusion, Transparency, and Governance.
We engaged security champion volunteers on every major team. With the approval of their 
VP each security champion dedicated 15% of their time for hands-on security-related work 
in their area. In return they got recognition and reimbursement for training courses through 
which they earned paid security certifications.
6 “Democratizing Security: A Story of Security Decentralization,” Harshil Parikh, March 
2019, accessed at https://published-prd.lanyonevents.com/published/rsaus19/
sessionsFiles/13748/HUM-W03-Democratizing-Security-A-Story-of-Security-
Decentralization.pdf
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We also worked with business leaders to build consensus on security metrics and ways to 
improve them. We developed tools to show the measurements to leadership frequently using 
positive messaging (not a wall of shame).”
Harshil Parikh, Security Leader, Medallia, Inc.
 Cover the Full Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Process
The scope of DevSecOps may cover anything from lightly customized commercial 
software and services integrated together in test and production environments to 
large, custom-coded applications. As we discussed in Chapter 6, software security then 
becomes a critical part of the control baseline and typically involves DevOps teams 
adhering to enterprise SDLC standards.
Figure 7-2 details a sample DevSecOps-inspired development and release process 
diagram. Security steps track each stage of the process and can be highly automated. 
Training for new staff on the SDLC and its embedded security steps can be delivered just in 
time or at the beginning of projects. As developers create and unit-test software modules, 
they perform code scans or static security tests. Once developers integrate code into larger 
modules, dynamic application security tests attempt exploits against the runtime interfaces.
Figure 7-2. Sample DevSecOps Process Diagram
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As DevOps teams prepare the product for production, they perform vulnerability 
scans and apply production security configuration. In production, continuous 
vulnerability scans and patch updates begin, the security team does periodic penetration 
tests, and security operations or internal audit monitor events or logs.
Security teams can also consider performing formal security design or code reviews 
for higher-risk projects, as well as requiring manual security release signoff before 
promoting changes to production. Note, however, that formal reviews are expensive 
and require specialized security expertise. They are typically reserved for the most 
sensitive modules (i.e., cryptographic processors, automated teller machine (ATM) user 
interfaces) in high-risk systems. Another alternative is to provide guidance or training 
to help senior developers that perform design reviews for integrated systems to look for 
specific kinds of security issues.
Finally, security and development organizations can collect continuous feedback 
from the DevSecOps process, including both automated metrics, such as the results 
of the security tests, and qualitative lessons learned or suggestions to improve the 
SDLC process. Track such feedback in an issue management system, such as Jira or 
ServiceNow.
7.5.2  Embrace the Disciplined Agile Approach
In the “Address Common Challenges” section, we noted that, sometimes, the “agile” 
methodology is used in practice as an excuse for no process at all. Agile’s silver lining, 
however, is the notion that agile development teams, or “squads,” should have end-to- 
end accountability for delivering their minimum viable product. This can and should 
be construed to include mitigating risk. If one of our goals for Rational Cybersecurity 
is to “make security everybody’s business,” what’s not to like about a methodology that 
emphasizes accountability?
Enter the Disciplined Agile Delivery (DAD) model.7 It adapts agile methodologies, 
such as Scrum and Kanban, to make them more suitable for larger projects requiring 
cross-functional coordination or higher-risk projects requiring assurance and oversight. 
7 “Disciplined Agile Delivery,” Wikipedia, accessed at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Disciplined_agile_delivery
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DAD enables agile teams to continue using their agile methodology of choice while 
extending it to support coordination and assurance at project inception, construction, 
and transition stages.
• DAD inception: Kicks off the typical series of agile work streams 
broken up into two-week “sprints” with a “Sprint 0” inception stage. 
Sprint 0 has just enough up-front planning to solidify the vision for 
the project or application as well as the scope of the effort, overall 
data model, and technical architecture. Also, the inception stage 
can identify the expected risks, testing strategy, and whether the 
application will be reused by others.
• DAD construction: Actual DAD development proceeds similarly to 
Scrum or Kanban’s; however, teams include an architecture owner 
role and have the remit to coordinate with colleagues in supporting 
roles for testing, integration, and project-specific specialties.
• DAD transition: Adds sprints as necessary for the DAD team(s) to 
transition a capability into production. The primary DAD team(s) 
coordinates with infrastructure, security, operations, and support 
during the release process.
DevOps and DevSecOps teams can adopt key concepts from DAD for projects 
that exceed agreed risk thresholds. The security organization can also use DAD for 
its own security engineering efforts and share knowledge, tools, and lessons learned 
with development organizations so as to influence DAD’s inclusion in the SDLC. DAD 
procedures and supporting roles can be coordinated with DevSecOps. For example, a 
project inception stage could specify a test plan with requirements for the manual or 
automated security steps during development and integration with security tools for 
functions such as encryption or vulnerability management.
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7.6  Call to Action
The core recommendations for security leaders from this chapter are to work with IT 
on simplifying and rationalizing the IT environment as follows:
• Identify and help solve IT and business leaders’ security-related pain 
points in IT systems.
• Leverage the cross-functional roles security is naturally asked to 
perform – as policy establisher, access gatekeeper, and security 
service enabler – to help improve the IT architecture and strategy.
• Prioritize security solutions based on an already written or de facto IT 
strategy.
• Coordinate work on controls such as asset risk profiling (as part of asset 
inventory) with application consolidation and rationalization efforts.
• Develop security architecture patterns, recommended solutions, and 
decision trees to apply controls in core infrastructure platforms.
• Support forward-thinking IT leaders seeking to establish IT-as-broker 
in the cloud environment and/or finance projects working to put 
technical debt on the balance sheet.
• Work with third-party management to develop a portfolio process for 
managing the risk and utility of third parties.
• Include security services in the IT service catalog.
• Cross-fertilize security staff or expertise into development and/or 
operations organizations to establish risk-informed DevSecOps and 
Disciplined Agile practices.
Action – Make a quick assessment of the state of the organization’s IT security 
strategy and architecture
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Ask yourself the following short set of questions and score the answers in the Success 
Plan Worksheet’s8 Section 3, Table 3. Base the scoring criteria on whether you would answer 
most of the questions with a strong “no” (1), a strong “yes” (5), or something in between.
 1. Does the business have a simplified and rationalized IT environment?
 2. Is there a published, up-to-date IT strategy?
 3. Has the security strategy aligned to the IT strategy?
 4. Is the business use of a hybrid multicloud environment  
governed well?
 5. Does IT publish a service catalog and are security services included in it?
 6. Does the security organization work closely with third-party 
management to assess risk early in the commercial evaluation 
process?
 7. Is the security organization working with DevOps teams to 
develop DevSecOps processes?
Action – Define 1–3 improvement objectives for simplifying IT and security
Note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 8, of the worksheet.
The following are examples of IT and security strategy–related improvement objectives:
• Locate document(s) labeled as an “IT Strategy” or serving that 
purpose. Provide security organization commentary on them and 
discuss with the IT stakeholders. Align them with the current security 
project portfolio or road map as appropriate.
• Help the IT organization operate in the “IT-as-broker” mode by 
collecting information on cloud-based security services options 
(e.g., vulnerability scanning, multifactor authentication, etc.) already 
provided.
8 “Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, May 2020, 
accessed at https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet
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• Analyze development tool chains in use and discuss potential 
DevSecOps solutions with development managers.
• Evaluate the opportunity to set up a Security Championship 
Program(s) in IT. Discuss the idea with senior IT managers that might 
support it and/or identify staff members in IT that might be good 
candidates in championship roles.
Don’t limit yourself to these examples. Look for improvement objectives that fit the 
gaps and priorities you’ve identified for your business.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license  
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
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Access control is required for most IT assets, and many of the access rules must be 
managed by nontechnical business users. The work of managing access controls (“access 
governance”) involves both identity and access management (IAM) and data protection 
disciplines such as information classification and data governance.
IAM and data governance are vital for reducing breach risk and complying with 
privacy-related regulations. IAM alone represents three of the control domains from 
Chapter 6’s list of 20 control domains. IAM is technically complex and highly people 
centric. It requires cross-functional engagement across many business, IT, and 
development teams. In short, the perfect storm for Rational Cybersecurity!
Most digital businesses literally can’t run without digital identity authentication, 
authorization, and access management capabilities. Paradoxically, the more dependent 
digital business becomes on digital identity, the more privacy risk it creates for persons, 
and that feeds back into regulatory and reputation risk for the business. Personal data 
has been termed “the new oil” – as much as it powers business, it’s toxic when spilled. 
And yet we rely on IAM not only to identify and authenticate users, services, and devices 
but also to enable digital relationships.
Access control may protect the business, but digital identity enables it. If a business 
were committed to being agile and flexible at all costs, it would tend to grant high levels 
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of access to all staff members and make it easy for privileged users to change the rules on 
a dime. If, on the other hand, the business was committed to security and compliance 
at all costs, it would minimize access grants and create extremely rigorous processes for 
any rule changes.
This chapter provides guidance for security leaders on how to
• Understand access control and data governance models
• Build up IAM control baseline capabilities
• Balance access control and accountability
• Modernize IAM to enable digital business
• Monitor identity-related events and context
• Build up identity, privilege, and data governance services
• Implement IAM and data governance in a cross-functional manner
8.1  Understand Access Control and Data  
Governance Models
Access control is about enforcing access policies at runtime in systems based on 
roles and rules defined through access management processes. Those processes may 
empower data owners (appointed through data governance) to approve access requests 
or make changes to rules for accessing the data that they control.
Figure 8-1. Elements of Access Control
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Access control based on predefined roles and rules can be automated. But all the 
other elements of Figure 8-1 depend on decisions by people in the organization about 
data ownership, system ownership, and role ownership.
One can describe the IAM components of access control in terms of the four core 
services in Figure 8-2.
8.2  Address Common Challenges
It’s tempting to jump right into the observation that digital identity is both cause and 
content of many, if not most, security breaches. Let’s just lock it down! But that would be 
to overlook a fundamental point captured here.
“My job as a Ciso is actually very easy. Fundamentally, just three things: provide 
authorized access to data and services, block unauthorized access to data and 
services, and prove it.”
Andrew Yeomans, CISO
Figure 8-2. Core IAM Services or Capabilities
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Access control needs to be viewed from a dual perspective of enabling and 
protecting. Whatever one does to protect using access controls must be calibrated to risks 
that could arise from access. Multifactor authentication (MFA) is a great control when 
it can be combined with single sign-on (SSO) mechanisms, but otherwise the need for 
users to repeatedly enter longer passwords and one-time codes and take other actions to 
authenticate for each different site or application introduces friction. Consider the risk 
context of what is being accessed. Rigorous authentication may make sense for airport 
security, but to identify users reading free, public content? Not so much.
Perhaps more than any other discipline, IAM must be aligned with the business 
culture as per section “Address Common Challenges” in Chapter 4. Is the culture flexible 
and trusting, or are stability and authority more important?
8.2.1  Immature Data Governance and Access 
Management Processes
Many businesses possess IAM tools such as directory services and identity administration 
systems and think the tools in themselves will provide a state-of-the-art IAM solution. 
But unless the business also has mature processes for access management, the tools can 
be ineffective and the business vulnerable to the risks of inappropriate access. To manage 
access in a logical and scalable way, identity administration systems need to route access 
approval requests to data owners or data stewards of sensitive information.
Most businesses have at least rudimentary information classification in that they’ve 
defined levels of data sensitivity and identified which types of data belong at which 
sensitivity level. For example, pricing information may be confidential (available on a 
need-to-know basis) and customer records restricted (need to know with the highest 
level of control). However, most businesses tend to suffer from information sprawl and 
cannot enumerate all the repositories or systems where each type of sensitive data does 
(or should) reside. Nor can they programmatically identify the data owners for all the 
many instances or aggregations of sensitive data.
My colleagues and I have done many IAM consulting projects and have put 
together an IAM resources page for readers.1 We typically find directories and identity 
administration systems in place that meet some of the business needs. Every business 
1 “Identity and Access Management Resources,” Security Architects LLC, January 2020, accessed at 
https://security-architect.com/IAMResources
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has password-based authentication, but many still lack stronger MFA capabilities, even 
for critical systems. Generally, the business can identify some of its critical assets and the 
names of the responsible business owners. However, unofficial copies of sensitive data 
or other critical assets tend to proliferate and lack clear ownership.
We usually find a deprovisioning capability to remove access for employees leaving the 
business, but it rarely does a good job of handling contractor or partner access removal. 
And although it may handle staff terminations, the deprovisioning process rarely cleans up 
account access rights that aren’t required after a user transfers to a new department. The 
policy data – roles, groups, and rules – that would be required for such precision in access 
management are rarely rationalized. Cleaning them up would be onerous, requiring the 
aid of specialized identity governance and administration (IGA) tools.
IGA systems without well-defined processes, access policies, and models tend to 
operate in an ad hoc manner. Users are overprivileged with too few roles and groups 
in place or with too many and no one in charge. Access once granted is rarely removed 
when users transfer assignments or positions. On IAM consulting engagements, it is not 
uncommon for us to find businesses with more groups than users in the directory.
Finally, despite being included in the SANS Critical Controls lists and in the control 
baseline recommendation for this book, user account monitoring is often absent.
8.2.2  Outdated IAM Deployments Meet Generational 
Challenges with Cloud, Privacy Rights, and Forced 
Digitalization
Most in-place IAM deployments are outdated and don’t scale to current volumes 
of people, data, and things. Poor identity data quality, silos in IT, infrastructure 
and business changes, and the proliferation of incompatible systems multiply IAM 
challenges.
Prior to the growing popularity of cloud deployments, many businesses consolidated 
their in-house directory and authentication services to the Microsoft Active Directory 
during the early 2000s. Over a decade later, cloud computing began to undo that 
consolidation, and by now many businesses are back to square one. IAM’s gyrations 
from a mature, consolidated state (on-premises) back to once again straining to support 
too many directories and user sign-ons (in the cloud) suggest that rationalizing and 
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simplifying IAM (and IT) is not a one-time fix, but a generational challenge the industry 
experiences each time new infrastructure platforms, applications, and use cases appear.
Businesses are still adapting IAM to more loosely coupled and decentralized models 
necessary to support the hybrid multicloud environment. Fortunately, most cloud 
services consume Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) assertions as well as 
other standard IAM protocols. (SAML is an identity federation (aka federated identity) 
standard that, very simply put, can signal to cloud-based applications “Hey, I’ve already 
authenticated my user, log him in!”) Federated identity reduces the need to maintain 
complex, integrated directory services as well as multiple sign-on burdens on users.
There is also a generational shift from the Baby Boomers and Generation X 
workforce to Millennials. Millennials have grown up immersed in, and more comfortable 
with, consumer technology. Consumer mobile devices are more intuitive and easier 
to use than business workstations. Millennial workers and many older ones who 
caught onto consumer technology expect to use consumer-grade devices at work, 
to be empowered with enough access to be effective, and to keep growing in their 
understanding and mastery of the technology. Recognizing this, the concept of people- 
centric security began to emerge about 5 years ago.2,3
PEOPLE-CENTRIC SECURITY
This model of security emphasizes individual accountability and trust. It deemphasizes 
restrictive, preventative controls. It favors expanding the “trust space” within which staff 
discretion to operate is encouraged. It assumes the security culture will instill awareness of 
responsibilities and peer group support for taking responsibility.
At the same time, international privacy and data residency rules are becoming more 
stringent. Few businesses are fully adapted yet to the notion that in many jurisdictions 
it is a legal requirement to obtain customers’ informed consent for using their personal 
data and to provide other privacy rights. Businesses face increased risks of consequences 
2 “Lessons in How to Implement People-Centric Security,” Heather Pemberton Levy, Gartner, Inc., 
June 2015, accessed at www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/lessons-in-how-to-implement- 
people-centric-security/
3 People-Centric Security, Lance Hayden, McGraw Hill, 2016
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from privacy breaches due to regulations such as the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). However, stricter controls on how to access identity information 
and share it between applications and partners – if implemented – create a drag on the 
business.
As if all this wasn’t enough, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 forced many businesses 
to institute sweeping work from home programs, massively increase remote access to 
premise-based applications, or move those applications to the cloud. But work from 
home breaks the trust model for many businesses that have required staff to physically 
be in a building in order to access sensitive resources. These businesses must now 
pivot to acquire, deploy, and test logical, identity-based controls such as multi-factor 
authentication (MFA).
8.2.3  The Red-Headed Stepchild IAM Team
For a critical security control domain, IAM is unusually cross-functional and business 
enabling. IAM architectures can be highly complex and subject to disruption from 
IT, regulatory, and business changes. You’d think IAM would fall under the security 
organization, but I’ve often seen IAM teams under IT, business units, or other parts 
of client organizations. It’s common to find an IAM working group promoting cross- 
functional engagement at the grassroots level. Unfortunately, these teams often don’t 
have an executive sponsor engaged with them.
“we’re working with baling wire and duct tape here.”
Talented IAM team engineer
8.3  Build Up IAM Control Baseline Capabilities
Many breaches either involve unauthorized access to personal information stored 
directly in IAM directory services or another IAM failure such as weak credentials or 
inadequate identity proofing before issuing credentials. Unfortunately, it’s common to 
find deficiencies even in the most basic IAM controls.
From Chapter 6, there are several control domains related to IAM, data protection, 
and privacy. These control domains in turn comprise multiple control activities required 
to attain a Level 3 (Defined) maturity.
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Table 8-1. Controls for Protecting Access to Data





list critical assets, such as applications, servers, or 
databases. identify their system or data owners.




Categorize data (e.g., public, proprietary, confidential, 
restricted). identify types of confidential or restricted data 
such as personal information or trade secrets. publicize 
policy and require policy acceptance.
Compliance training Make business and it staff aware of basic privacy and 





use the business’s main directories or user repositories to 
manage the users’ identity lifecycles.
authentication provide and standardize authentication services. enable 
MFa for higher-risk access.
Centralized single 
sign-on (sso)
provide sso as a control point for user access to 
disparate systems while also improving the user 
experience.
access control Manage 
administration 
critical systems
establish and verify access policies (groups or roles) are 
valid and periodically reviewed for critical systems.
Deprovisioning remove terminated user accounts to revoke access to 






Monitor privileged user and administrator account 
changes on critical systems for anomalous activities that 
may indicate account takeover.
Data protection encryption, 
tokenization, other 
controls
protect privacy of personal data and credentials in transit, 
in storage, and in use.
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Figure 8-3. Control Continuum
Chapter 6’s section “Tune Controls to Security and Business Needs” clearly applies 
to IAM and data governance; both need to be tuned to capture the right balance between 
the use of restrictive controls and accountability-based controls. They must also be 
modernized to enable ongoing technology advancement for digital business.
8.4  Balance Access Control and Accountability
Businesses need to strike a balance between risk reduction and productivity or the 
ability to get work done – between risk and drag, in other words. There is no way to 
completely eliminate risk even with highly restrictive controls. It is also imprudent 
to operate a digital business without some drag from controls. Figure 8-3 depicts the 
notion that between the two extremes of having too many restrictive controls or too few, 
businesses have a broad area of realistic operating conditions.
One might ask, couldn’t we end up still having too much risk and too much drag if 
we took a middling approach? Fortunately, additional tools are at our disposal. We have 
protect controls (i.e., restrictive) to prevent inappropriate access and detect or response 
controls for an accountability-based approach. Detect controls create less impact on the 
user experience and allow users to have more access rights. For example, some banks use 
a control called “passive authentication” to log users into online banking sessions instead 
of requiring highly complex passwords or authentication devices. The bank operates 
sophisticated monitoring tools in the background to detect any suspicious activity.
In the realm of access control, we can choose to “trust but verify” or promote high 
standards of accountability to control risk without deploying controls that restrict user 
activity. Staff could be allowed more discretion to make subtle choices, that is, Should 
a salesman send an “internal” document to a prospect? What is the classification of that 
document anyway? Is it OK to let this vendor into the building on Saturday for a meeting 
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when the receptionist is gone? Is it OK to edit a confidential company document on my 
personal tablet device while I’m on vacation? Arguably, security policy could cover any 
or all of these circumstances, but in the real world of work, there is always more context 
and circumstances where the answer may be it depends. Figure 8-4 depicts a more 
nuanced view of businesses trading off risk and drag, restrictive access control, and 
accountability.
Figure 8-4. Finding a More Comfortable Middle Ground Between Risk and Drag
Where to end up on the control continuum is a function of security culture and 
the nature of inherent risks. Some businesses have a cultural inclination toward more 
trust, others toward more control. Regulatory guidance tends to emphasize control, 
often mandating least privilege and separation of duty. But regulatory guidance usually 
includes a caveat that the approach can be “risk based,” thus allowing planners to mix 
and match “compensating controls.” There are also opportunities, such as deploying 
privacy-enhancing controls, to reduce both risk and drag at the same time.
A restrictive control approach has long been the dominant theme for cybersecurity 
professionals, and we’ve tended to default to “protect.” However, people-centric security 
(PCS) poses an alternative theory. At the intersection of IAM and PCS, we must ask how 
much discretion we can give access managers who grant other users’ access. Do we want 
the access request process to be highly discretionary (and therefore flexible) or highly 
prescriptive (mostly rules based and potentially inflexible but more difficult to abuse)?
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Observe that our second risk/drag figure (Figure 8-4) has a more nuanced notional 
continuum of controls than the previous (Figure 8-3). One business, such as a bank, 
might choose a restrictive control set to meet its regulatory requirements and to abate 
the constant risk of financial fraud. Another business, such as a technology startup, 
might choose a permissive control set. The control environment, in this example, likely 
varies due to the companies’ difference in assets; perhaps the startup only needs to 
protect documents, but the bank must protect everything from documents to bank 
accounts to ATM machines.
The bank could, however, tune or optimize its control set to reinforce accountability 
for document access through awareness training and deterrent monitoring. This would 
reduce the need for restrictions on access in some use cases and might improve the 
user experience without increasing risk very much. On the other hand, a startup should 
formalize more restrictive access controls (and rely less on trusted staff) as it expands 
and takes on higher risk customers and regulated use cases.
Access control and data governance require cross-functional business alignment. 
Security and business stakeholders should work together intentionally to seek that 
middle ground as shown in the following alignment key.
8- 1
Work with stakeholders such as the business’s Privacy Office, 
executives, enterprise architecture (EA), and digital initiative leaders 
to understand how the business culture should drive design principles 
for identity governance, data governance, access control, and 
accountability.
Unlike restrictive controls, accountability-based controls operate within the trust 
space of empowered users and managers to raise the odds they will do the right thing. 
Accountability-based controls can use a mix of carrots and sticks.
Carrots include positive messages imparted through user awareness and training – 
discussed in Chapter 4 – to create the user perception that access is a privilege and 
help them understand why and how security policies (such as not sharing restricted 
information) should be followed.
Sticks, on the other hand, can be the awareness that monitoring systems (see the 
section on “Monitor Identity-Related Events and Context”) will detect violations of 
policy and that policies will be enforced through disciplinary action. Sticks can be 
communicated through legal contracts, systems and applications’ cautionary messages, 
and user awareness programs.
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8.5  Modernize IAM to Enable Digital Business
IAM is also a key control for enabling digital business by managing digital relationships. 
To do this, IAM teams must often enhance identity interoperability standards support in 
the business applications and infrastructure. Often, security leaders aren’t the drivers for 
IAM digital business initiatives. But don’t be tempted to just stand aside and let an IAM 
team outside security or some other group handle it without your input. Remember – the 
IAM capabilities are a security priority. Even if security isn’t leading an IAM initiative, 
make sure it has a seat at the table.
8.5.1  Manage Digital Relationships
Identity is not just a set of controls, it is a key part of the way the business manages its 
relationships with users both on-premise and in the cloud. These relationships are 
increasingly – in many cases entirely – digital.
Digital relationships that staff, partners, business customers, suppliers, and 
consumers have with the business are enacted through applications with user interfaces 
(UIs) and/or via application program interface (API)–based services. All require identity 
to authenticate, authorize, and personalize the user experience (UX) and functionality or 
do the same for APIs under the covers.
Digital business can be highly innovative, ranging far ahead of any IT strategy crafted 
even just a year or two ago. IAM is often “tip of the spear” in developing customer- or 
partner-facing digital business relationships. To understand the business’s forward- 
looking requirements, security leaders should join with the IAM team to engage with 
IT and business unit planners and developers on their IAM use cases early and often. 
These use cases may introduce new capability or scaling requirements such as support 
for dynamic secrets management in a microservices environment, consumer IOT device 
authentication support, or new workflow approval processes for partner onboarding.
8- 2
Work with the IAM team to engage with business units whose 
requirements push the envelope of existing standards and 
technology. Encourage and support innovation for business benefits 
and overall capability improvement.
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The recommendations in Chapter 7’s sections “Help Develop a Strategy to 
Consolidate and Simplify IT” and “Align with the Evolution from IT-as-Provider to IT-as- 
Broker” suggest another key to business alignment.
8- 3
Work with EA and the keepers of the IT strategy to ensure that IAM 
and data protection controls operate in the strategic IT systems as well 
as over critical assets; coordinate with third-party management and 
internal development teams to get the controls implemented in new or 
changing systems on-premise or in the cloud.
8.5.2  Take a Proactive Approach on Privacy
As critical as managing digital relationships with people is for IAM, it is also an area of 
great challenge. Both traditional IAM systems and consumer IAM (CIAM) systems sold 
to businesses expressly to manage consumer identity must increasingly take account 
of privacy regulations that, in some jurisdictions, give consumers a great deal of choice 
about whether their data can be stored, how it can be used, who it can be shared with, 
and how long it can be retained.
This creates marketing technology dilemmas for businesses, which are highly 
dependent on the ability to ingest a great deal of personally identifying information (PII) 
and put it through machine learning and business intelligence systems to gather critical 
data for sales, support, and new product or service development. Businesses may also 
get a little extra revenue or tit-for-tat advantages by selling or sharing personal data to 
partners. Traditionally, consumers have received little information about or choice in 
the sharing or analytics processes. Today such PII-fueled business models are under 
regulatory pressure.
Marketing technology (martech or adtech) is beyond the scope of this book, so I 
won’t opine on the optimal marketing approaches. But it is within our scope to say that 
IAM or CIAM will need to have the right capabilities to support privacy protection and 
that such processes and controls must be aligned with business models’ assumptions 
about how personal information should be used. For example, customer consent for 
storing or using PII must be obtained through the UI or UX, which could be a shared 
IAM service or part of an application. Disclosing how customer data will be used in a 
transparent manner is good for compliance and can also be part of an engaging UI.
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8- 4
work with the organization’s privacy office as well as customer- and 
partner-facing loBs and business developers to share new and 
existing applications’ privacy requirements and business models. work 
with the iaM team and business developers to learn about privacy-
enhancing capabilities.
According to the third “Cisco Cybersecurity Series 2020 Data Privacy Benchmark 
Study,”4 increasing numbers of organizations have been achieving positive return on 
investment from privacy programs. A common path to such gains has been to obtain 
privacy certifications such as ISO 27701 (a privacy extension for ISO 27001), EU/Swiss- 
US Privacy Shield, APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules, and EU Binding Corporate Rules. 
These certifications can demonstrate compliance with European, Asian, or other privacy 
frameworks and provide legal cover for cross-border data transfers. For the average 
company in the study, the ratio of benefits to spend was 2.7, meaning that for every 
dollar of investment, the company received $2.70 worth of benefit. Companies reported 
positive results from building customer loyalty or trust, reducing sales delays, mitigating 
losses from data breaches, and other benefits.
Consider privacy-enhancing technologies such as tokenization, private pairwise 
identifiers in federated identity connections, and zero-knowledge proofs. Businesses  
can also monitor decentralized identity, or so-called self-sovereign identity models.  
A number of startups are developing decentralized identity solutions using blockchains 
as registries for users’ core decentralized identifiers (DIDs) which then link to verified 
claims5 (essentially, digitally signed attributes) or zero-knowledge proofs.
8.5.3  Enhance Identity Interoperability and Agility
Guess what, key security initiatives (such as zero trust perimeter security and API 
security) and key IT initiatives (such as container-based compute services) could all 
depend on identity interoperability.
4 “Cisco Cybersecurity Series 2020 Data Privacy Benchmark Study,” Cisco, January 2020, accessed 
at www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2020/02/2020-data-privacy-
cybersecurity-series-jan-20201.pdf
5 “Verifiable Claims Working Group documents,” W3C, 2019, accessed at www.w3.org/2017/vc/WG/
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SAML and OpenID Connect for authentication and single sign-on, OAuth 2.0 for 
authorizing API-based access to resources, and Structured Cross-Domain Identity 
Management (SCIM) for provisioning accounts or permissions are all federated identity 
interoperability standards that work across business domains. They can facilitate single 
sign-on, distributed authorization, API security, and ease of use to speed the process of 
forming secure digital relationships. Creating consistent IAM services for LOB cloud and 
Internet use cases enables the business to simultaneously move forward and reduce risk 
by avoiding ad hoc LOB solutions.
As business’s IAM environments encompass more and more externalized, cloud- 
based systems, it will become increasingly important to also move identity functions 
to the cloud by leveraging standards-compliant identity-as-a-service (IDaaS) solutions 
such as Azure Active Directory, Okta, and OneLogin. IDaaS systems extend federated 
authentication and provisioning to hundreds or thousands of SaaS solutions.
Modern users are also highly mobile, pushing businesses to develop secure 
strategies for bring your own device (BYOD) access, at least to everyday email, 
collaboration, and similar tools. Fortunately, many IDaaS solutions provide lightweight 
mobile device management (MDM), adaptive risk-aware authentication, and highly 
scalable and extensible directory services. These tools can help protect mobile/cloud 
users and businesses against brute-force attacks on user passwords, rogue apps, and 
other threats in the open cloud.
To increase IAM flexibility to operate in a distributed, yet still secure, manner, 
businesses should set identity interoperability requirements for purchased applications 
or services and reference the industry standards in third-party assessments. Encourage 
or require
• UI flexibility, that is, browser-based and mobile support
• API enablement for most IAM services
• Ease of configuration and administrative update via APIs or UIs in a 
distributed environment
• Careful API design to avoid vendor lock-in and keep the 
implementation flexible
Also, specify the standards in the business’s software development lifecycle 
(SDLC) standards for developers and provide guidance on leveraging standards 
implementations from strategic vendor or service provider platforms and related APIs.
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8- 5
Work with EA, the Chief Technology Officer (CTO), or leading 
application development teams to incorporate identity 
interoperability standards into the SDLC.
Finally, businesses must also bring modern IAM fully into their development 
environments to make both more agile without sacrificing assurance. Enable IAM in 
microservices and container environments to support DevSecOps initiatives for IaaS or 
private clouds.
8.6  Monitor Identity-Related Events and Context
Solutions enabled for enterprise use through modern IAM architecture in today’s hybrid 
cloud environment may have a downside. When cloud services are exposed to the 
Internet for business use, they’re also exposed to brute-force password retry attacks, 
denial of service, and other automated exploits.
Fortunately, MFA can fend off the brute-force attacks, but other attack vectors 
remain. Just as businesses run on empowered users, IT systems run on privilege, and 
privilege is a two-edged sword. It enables users to get the work done but can be exploited 
by rogue users or hackers in the event of account takeover. It is very difficult to protect 
your systems against attacks by authorized users.
Recall from Chapter 6 that we must use Detect and Respond controls to complement 
Protect controls. Identity monitoring, auditing, and analytics fit the bill perfectly. Some 
key capabilities now being offered by vendors include
• User account monitoring: It is critical to detect inactive accounts, 
stale group memberships, and potentially toxic combinations of 
privileges granted to users (i.e., the same user has the permission to 
pay invoices and to modify the vendor address file). A more advanced 
use of user account monitoring is to apply peer group analysis of user 
privileges, or even use machine learning tools to analyze activity and 
permissions, to help develop business rules for access management.
• Adaptive authentication: A smart feature that dynamically 
adjusts authentication requirements to the risk of the resource 
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being accessed. Also provides real-time detection of anomalous or 
suspicious behavior through machine learning at the back end.
• IAM event logging: Business IAM teams should work closely with 
security operations to develop comprehensive logging standards to 
capture IAM-related events. The logs can also capture context from 
system and application events in logs and alerts from all protected 
systems in the IAM environment.
• Change monitoring: Unexpected changes to access entitlements 
(e.g., adding a new user to the all-powerful Active Directory Domain 
Administrator Group) can be early indicators of compromise, and 
the business must be on the alert for them. That is another reason 
why rationalizing and simplifying the IT environment is critical. A 
simplified IT environment with well-defined procedural controls – 
such as change management for IT and a formalized request 
process for privileged access – is easier to monitor. Changes to 
sensitive objects – such as the Domain Administrator Group – can be 
immediately detected through automated processes. The software 
could verify that an IT service management (ITSM) service ticket 
authorizing the change exists, and if not, roll back the change.
• Privileged user analytics: Deeper analysis of what privileged users 
are doing, even down to the level of actual session monitoring is 
available from privileged account management (PAM) tools. These 
tools can issue alerts themselves and also forward the alerts to a 
security information and event management (SIEM) system which 
can correlate multiple indicators of compromise.
8.7  Build Up Identity, Privilege, and Data 
Governance Services
Identity and data governance services must provide an orderly and scalable way to 
manage access controls. They must manage the user information and access rights 
behind the scenes to ensure the right people get access to the right resources at the right 
times in the right context. Although identity governance and administration (IGA) tools 
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are powerful and comprehensive, additional controls are required to manage privileged 
user access, and these controls are typically provided by PAM tools.
IGA and PAM systems both help support enterprise IT security and regulatory 
compliance. An IGA system combined with IAM intelligence (monitoring, audit, and 
analytics) helps give the business a rich set of tools to use for both restrictive access 
controls and accountability-based controls.
The IGA and the directory services can be used to create and manage identity 
information and access rules in an orderly manner. It is this information that enables 
interoperable runtime authentication and authorization capabilities to support the 
business and the IT strategy, reduce risk, and enable digital relationships. Figure 8-5 
captures the admin time, runtime, and policy model faces of IAM.
8.7.1  Understand Identity Governance and Administration 
(IGA) Requirements
The IGA discipline is the most complicated part of IAM and requires a bit of explanation. 
IGA has its roots in “provisioning” tools that perform directory synchronization and 
automated account creation. These tools evolved into IGA suites.
Advanced provisioning tools once differentiated themselves primarily by supporting 
dozens of connectors for consolidating directory information into centralized systems 
such as Microsoft Active Directory and synchronizing identity information with other 
OS or application user account repositories. Today, literally thousands of connectors 
Figure 8-5. IAM Admin Time, Runtime, and Policy Models
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are integrated into IDaaS tools to enable single sign-on with numerous SaaS services. 
Besides provisioning, other important IGA suite capabilities include
• Identity administration: Adds, updates, or deletes users, credentials, 
groups, roles, or other attributes that grant access permissions to 
resources. Allows users to perform self-service administration of 
some attributes (e.g., password reset). Enables administrators or 
application owners to delegate administration rights over security 
groups that grant privileges to the IT environment.
• Access administration: Processes access requests centrally, such 
as “add user to the operations group” or “give the user access to 
Salesforce.” Typically received via an ITSM (e.g., ServiceNow) ticket 
or email message, these requests trigger access provisioning for 
automated fulfillment based on business workflows.
• Access certification: Also called access review, this function 
periodically prompts managers or data owners to validate access 
rights to IT resources. It is required for certain compliance regimens, 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States.
• Role models and business rules: Provide the “brains” of the IGA that 
model how access should be controlled and map access rules from 
the abstract business role representation to concrete IT permissions 
such as groups or security settings.
8.7.2  Understand Privileged Account Management (PAM) 
and Just-in-Time (JIT) PAM Requirements
Powerful administrator accounts – such as the Amazon Web Services (AWS) root user, 
the Active Directory Domain Administrator, Azure Global Administrator, and Linux 
server root accounts – are called privileged accounts. PAM tools can be used to manage 
these accounts and gain additional control over them.
Privilege in IT is required to set up and administer servers, cloud systems, and 
applications. However, the same IT administrators who create security settings or access 
controls can easily change them, as could an external cyberattacker compromising the 
administrators’ accounts.
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As shown in Figure 8-6, PAM systems manage privileged account registration, 
credential issuance, revocation, and rotation. PAM systems can also provide runtime 
capabilities such as credential check-in/checkout, session monitoring, and privileged 
user analytics. The original PAM vendors such as BeyondTrust, CA, Centrify, and 
CyberArk centered their implementations around a password, or credentials, vault.
Today, privileged accounts are scattered through the hybrid multicloud 
environment, and businesses are increasingly using Just-in-Time (JIT) PAM capabilities 
that require a runtime assignment of a role to a privileged account. Because role 
assignment is usually an IGA function, PAM and IGA tools are starting to converge with 
some vendors, such as Saviynt, specializing in IGA-enabled “cloud PAM.” Regardless 
of how it is deployed, PAM is critical to reducing the probability that a bad actor 
compromising a user account somewhere in the business will be able to move laterally, 
escalate privilege levels, and cause a breach.
8.7.3  Develop a Hybrid IGA and PAM Architecture
Modern digital businesses (and IAM vendors) have been much quicker to enable digital 
relationships with innovative use of identity interoperability protocols than they have 
been to also extend their back office IGA and PAM systems to the cloud. However, as 
balance of business activity and value shifts heavily into cloud and mobile environments, 
businesses must develop a hybrid IGA and PAM architecture to cover them as well.
The diagram in Figure 8-6 is adapted from a “to be” IAM architecture we developed 
for a large North American SaaS vendor’s hybrid cloud deployment in 2019 and is 
representative of what this client and similar companies are deploying as of 2020. Note 
the following features of the diagram:
• The blue cloud symbolizes a hybrid multicloud environment in 
which all the systems, data, and IAM services reside. Today, however, 
most IGA and PAM systems are deployed on premises.
• The primary directory, authentication, and SSO services for this 
client are in the cloud (as part of an IDaaS) solution.
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The IGA, PAM, and runtime IAM systems must often support billions of access 
control scenarios – just imagine how big a matrix showing all the combinations of 
hundreds of rules, thousands of users, and millions of resources (potentially comprising 
every field or button on every form of every web application) would need to be. The 
complete solution must therefore
• Model roles and business rules to drive IGA through policy 
abstractions that simplify the matrix
• Risk-inform access management functions to enable verification of 
correct operation at scale
Figure 8-6. Case Study of IGA, PAM, and Identity Services
• The IGA uses a role model and business rules to enact permissions 
in the directory and in other user identity repositories, such as one 
attached to the PAM system.
• The PAM system is shown as a separate vendor solution from the IGA 
system because only a few vendors yet combine IGA and PAM, and that 
is the way the systems will be deployed for the client in this case study.
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8.7.4  Model Roles and Business Rules to Drive IGA
IGA systems manage access control by defining access policies in the form of roles for 
users and business rules that refer to roles, groups, or collections of users. These access 
policies must be managed and aligned at both the business and IT levels of abstraction.
Figure 8-7 illustrates how a business can map job functions (aka business role such 
as “Accountant”) to the IT roles (such as a user account in the finance system which is a 
member of the system’s local “Accountants” group) and then to the actual IT system and 
application or database permissions required for the work.
All users, and other active entities such as machines and services, should have 
defined digital profiles in the business’s directory service(s). Changes to a profile trigger 
changes to access via the IT roles, such as security group memberships. Access managers 
or the users themselves can request access changes. Depending on business rules, the 
IGA system may perform automated provisioning, or it may orchestrate a workflow 
seeking approval for the change.
Figure 8-7. Building a Role Model for IGA
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When a new user joins the business, the business roles and user attributes in the 
profile trigger the IGA system to initiate the new accounts, group memberships, and 
permissions that comprise the “birthright” entitlements for the user. When the user’s 
business roles or attributes change, the IGA system adjusts IT roles and permissions. 
When the user’s entry is removed or suspended, the IGA system removes or  
disables access.
Finally, the IGA system continuously reviews user access rights against the business 
rules or signals from IAM monitoring systems, and it may periodically orchestrate access 
certification campaigns requesting (for example) managers to certify an employee 
should continue to have certain access rights or that a contractor is still engaged with the 
business.
8- 6
Engage HR, compliance, and appropriate IT or development 
functions on creating roles for provisioning birthright accounts, 
managing centralized IT services, and securing applications with 
compliance-mandated roles.
8.7.5  Risk-Inform Access Management Functions
Businesses and their identity operations teams need to risk-inform the IGA function. 
Otherwise, the business is likely to have high levels of inappropriate access or experience 
“drag” from excessive rigor and delays for users requesting necessary access.
Sometimes both risk and drag run rampant across an IT environment that doesn’t 
have a well-defined and well-managed role model or role-specific training for users. 
During the discovery phase of one IAM assessment, we discovered that IT administrators 
could easily reset information classified by the business as “Strictly Confidential” to a 
lower level without data owner involvement. Yet, in the same organization, business 
users who didn’t know the access rules for certain situations held back from sharing 
information with customers even when they knew it would cost them a deal.
The IGA processes and role models must be appropriate to the business’s 
security culture. Returning to our earlier discussion of people-centric security and 
accountability, it is probably neither possible nor desirable to completely automate all 
access assignments. An automated role-based access management system is beneficial 
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when many identical or similar roles can be assigned, such as to users of manufacturing 
resource management systems in a large factory environment. In other cases, at least 
some role assignments or access grants must be orchestrated through workflows. 
Workflows give managers or resource owners constrained discretion over access 
decisions. Sometimes it’s expedient to allow delegated administration of IT roles;  
that is, appoint an application owner or a business partner to be the owner of a group 
that controls who can access to an externally facing application.
Excessive access privileges are often granted when managers rubber-stamp access 
requests or reviews because they’re working under deadlines and perhaps don’t 
understand the applications’ access model or the full extent of access granted by a 
privilege when multiple systems are integrated together. Often the unwelcome chore 
of access certification (aka access review) gets handed off to compliance; we heard of 
one case where a compliance officer was tasked to certify 20,000 accounts in just two 
weeks! But, with the right tools, the compliance officer’s mission could be accomplished 
without gross errors. Here’s how: Advanced IGA tools can run analytics or respond to 
clever queries such as “Which users have been granted access to critical systems in the 
recent review period? What are all the changes to critical systems’ access? Which users 
are outliers with more access than anyone else on their team?” The compliance officer 
can then investigate or ask for manager approvals on just those cases.
 Implement Advanced Data Governance and IGA When Required
Businesses should fully advance IGA and data governance in cases where their legal and 
compliance functions already require data governance and/or the business has many 
types of sensitive data and complex requirements such as avoiding conflict of interest or 
maintaining information barriers.
Otherwise, using the basic IGA process with simplified data stewardship for the most 
critical information only should suffice. One common scenario is to implement formal data 
stewardship for PII in response to GDPR requirements for a Data Protection Officer function. 
Information classification is another area where most organizations need to improve even 
just on the basic issues. Data classification levels should reflect the role the data plays in the 
business rather than a textbook. For example, many organizations still use a category called 
“Internal Use Only,” and that can confuse employees when a business process needs such 
data to work with “external” partners such as contractors or suppliers. In addition, data 
handling guidelines must be clearly specified, including for collaboration use cases.
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More advanced IGA requirements are most common in financial services, law firms, 
and specialized niches of other vertical industries. Figure 8-8 depicts IGA processes 
informed by data governance. Data governance includes formal data classification, 
data stewardship, and automated sensitive data discovery and reporting. The sensitive 
data discovery and asset risk profiling processes could identify data stewards for certain 
assets as the approvers for access request or access provisioning workflows.
Figure 8-8 also shows integration points between IGA and supporting processes. 
For example, “map permissions to role/group” may be controlled by IT operations. The 
IAM team and IT operations must coordinate their knowledge of how access policy 
or entitlements map in the applications. For applications developed in-house, the 
business’s software development lifecycle (SDLC) standards should specify role model 
guidelines (e.g., for consistent use of custom applications’ administration or approval 
roles) based on the IAM program’s models. EA should be consulted on the architectural 
principles behind identity services, access policy models, and integration.
Figure 8-8. A Risk-Informed IGA Process Map
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8.8  Implement IAM and Data Governance 
in a Cross- Functional Manner
Because data pervades the business and everyone needs access, IAM and data 
governance (DG) must be aligned at the technical and business level through 
appropriate forums.
8- 7
Consider creating an IAM working group under the sponsorship 
of the information security steering committee to enable the IAM 
team, developers, and other IT or security groups to exchange 
knowledge and work on processes, role models, or technical 
standards.
Because IAM is cross-functional and critical to security and the business, I’ve 
included a sample Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed (RACI) matrix in 
Table 8-2. As the IAM and data governance programs mature, the business should 
formalize more and more of the roles and responsibilities shown.
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Table 8-2 adapts the RACI from Chapter 2’s Table 2-2 and suggests role assignments 
for the following identity, privacy, and data governance management practices:
• Maximize IAM business value: The CIO is accountable, the IAM 
team lead responsible, and the CISO consulted in this matrix. This 
division of labor varies with different organizations.
• Manage identity operations: This practice is devoted to managing 
all the moving parts of the IAM and IGA infrastructures (see 
Figures 8-6, 8-7, and 8-8). The CIO is typically accountable for 
identity operations, as for everything in IT. The IAM team manager 
has responsibility for operations and monitoring, but IT operations 
and security incident response may share the responsibility for 
monitoring.
• Manage privacy and identity risk: Accountability for these risks goes up 
to the top but is shared with the Chief Privacy Officer (or Data Protection 
Officer position). The CIO has the responsibility. Generic compliance and 
audit functions also have responsibility and perhaps even accountability 
for identity-related risks not handed off to a Chief Privacy Officer.
• Manage advanced access governance: Where implemented, the 
Chief Privacy Officer (or another compliance function) should have 
accountability. Responsibility lies with the CIO and the IAM team 
management.
8.9  Call to Action
The core recommendation for security leaders from this chapter is to control access 
as follows.
Security or IAM teams should
• Ensure that IAM and data protection control baseline activities 
operate in the strategic IT systems as well as critical assets; 
coordinate with third-party management and internal development 
teams to get the controls implemented in new or changing systems
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• Work with stakeholders on design principles for identity governance, 
identity interoperability, data governance, access control, and 
accountability
• Engage with customer- and partner-facing LOBs to learn from their 
work on identity interoperability or privacy-enhancing technologies 
and business models to enable digital relationships
• Work with business developers to share new and existing 
applications’ privacy requirements and business models
Large businesses and small or mid-sized businesses with complex environments or 
high security pressure should also
• Deploy IGA systems to manage role-based access to critical processes 
and PAM systems to protect critical assets
• Engage HR, compliance, and appropriate IT or development 
functions on creating roles for provisioning birthright accounts, 
managing centralized IT services, and securing applications with 
compliance-mandated roles
• Establish an IAM working group enabling the IAM team, developers, 
and other IT or security groups to exchange knowledge and work on 
processes, role models, or technical standards
Action – Make a quick assessment of the organization’s access control and data 
governance capabilities
Ask yourself the following short set of questions and score the answers in the Success 
Plan Worksheet’s6 Section 3, Table 3. Base your score on whether you would answer most 
of the questions with a strong “no” (1), a strong “yes” (5), or something in between.
 1. Does the business have a cross-functional identity and access 
management (IAM) team?
 2. Does the IAM team report to or coordinate with security?
6 “Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, May 2020, 
accessed at https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet
Chapter 8  Control aCCess with MiniMal Drag on the Business
256
 3. Does the business have coherent access policy models (roles, 
rules, and groups) in key IT environments?
 4. Can IAM systems quickly enable new digital relationships for new 
applications or business partners?
 5. Does the business have someone working on data governance?
 6. Does the business have a Chief Privacy Officer or a Data 
Protection Officer?
 7. Are data stewards, or data owners, assigned for sensitive or 
business-critical information?
 8. Does the security department know where all the sensitive data is 
stored?
 9. Are privileged access rights (i.e., root account or domain 
administrator) restricted to small groups of users?
 10. Is privileged access controlled or monitored?
Action – Define 1–3 improvement objectives for the access control and data 
governance.
Note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 9, of the worksheet. The following 
are some sample improvement objectives:
• Conduct a rapid security assessment focused on IAM and data 
governance7; together they constitute a large and critical piece of the 
security program.
• Identify quick-hitting IAM improvement projects. Use the business 
impact assessment (BIA) and the enterprise risk map to find critical 
assets and risk owners; map the IAM and data governance control 
baseline (Table 8-1) against the assets and connect with one to three 
stakeholders to learn their IAM and data governance pain points.
7 “IAM Assessments,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, January 2020, accessed at  
https://security-architect.com/IAMresources
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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license  
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
If you are the CISO (or “Head of Security”) but the IAM team reports to another 
organization and isn’t closely aligned to security:
• Strengthen the dotted-line reporting relationship of the IAM team 
to security. To do this, work with the CIO or other higher executive 
functions over IAM.
Don’t limit yourself to these examples. Look for improvement objectives that fit the 
gaps and priorities you’ve identified for your business.
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Cyber-resilience provides the ability to withstand and mitigate the impacts of 
information risks. Businesses can start to become more resilient by identifying their 
critical assets, top risk scenarios, and basic contingency plans. Then, by aligning 
technical security capabilities with IT operations and other business functions, security 
leaders can enable the business to detect suspicious or anomalous events earlier, and 
respond and recover faster from incidents such as breaches or system outages.
Incident response (IR) is closely linked to security monitoring and detection. It 
should be managed by a dedicated group (or person) that coordinates closely with 
security operations, legal, HR, and other functions. Businesses should develop response 
plans for common types of incidents and for potential incidents from top risk scenarios. 
Enact response in a structured manner wherein each business function has a script for its 
part; for example, after a data breach, IT restores affected systems to normal operation, 
public relations communicates with the media, and the legal team notifies customers or 
partners of lost personal information.
Businesses can lay the groundwork to enable recovery from serious incidents by 
performing business impact assessments that identify critical assets and developing 
business continuity plans to restore or recover the assets. Recovery plans may overlap 
response plans in the case of cyber-incidents, requiring that business continuity teams 
and IR teams coordinate. Strictly operational incidents such as hardware failures fall 
purely in the purview of the business continuity function.
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This chapter provides guidance for security leaders on how to
• Understand cyber-resilience requirements
• Address common resilience challenges
• Identify critical business assets, risk scenarios, and contingency plans
• Detect cybersecurity events consistently and promptly
• Respond to incidents
• Recover from incidents caused by cyberattacks and operational 
outages
9.1  Understand Cyber-Resilience Requirements
Businesses can achieve cyber-resilience by implementing smart risk management, 
robust security monitoring, and well-planned incidence response as well as business 
continuity/disaster recovery (BC/DR) programs that reduce cybersecurity breach 
impacts and/or operational impacts from IT outages.
Figure 9-1 illustrates cyber-resilience in terms of the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework. “Identify” controls pinpoint critical assets, interdependencies, risks to 
the assets, and grant authority to defend them. All other cyber-resilience controls 
depend on this. “Protect” controls reduce probability of successful attacks. However, 
the probability of any attack getting through can rarely be reduced to zero. “Detect” 
and “Respond” controls can mean the difference between a cyberattack penetrating 
the IT environment but ultimately falling short of success and that same cyberattack 
materializing into a major breach. Incident response also sets the stage for recovery 
and business continuity.
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The following sections detail ways that Identify, Detect, Respond, and Recover 
controls can reduce the impact of cyberattacks and operational failures. They also 
describe good practices for aligning the technical work on controls with business 
stakeholders.
9.2  Address Common Resilience Challenges
Although Figure 9-1 charts a clear path to resilience, numerous challenges must be 
overcome. These include
• Business unpreparedness for response
• Lengthy cyberattacker dwell time
• Lack of visibility or access to all IT systems
• Difficulty hiring and retaining skilled incident handlers
Figure 9-1. A CSF-Inspired Cyber-Resilience Framework
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9.2.1  Business Unpreparedness for Incident Response 
and Recovery
Most businesses have immature and/or underfunded incident response and recovery 
strategies and capabilities. They have not planned for, may not have experienced, 
and may not have retained staff who are knowledgeable about breaches of personal 
information, loss of trade secrets, outages, ransomware, or all the other types of incidents 
that can befall a digital business.
Above-average risk management, business continuity, and response processes 
are requisites for cyber-resilience. Without them, critical systems and their 
interdependencies may not be identified, detection is uncertain, recovery time 
objectives don’t reflect business needs, and response or recovery could be 
ineffective. And yet according to surveys such as the FAIR Institute’s “Road to Risk 
Management Maturity,”1 the average overall level of risk management maturity was 
low at 33% in 2018.
Businesses in the 2020s will continue to face an elevated threat environment, with 
growing levels of automated malware attacks as well as, in some industries, nation-state 
attacks. Yet due to immature risk management and business continuity processes, they 
may not have their defensive priorities clearly focused on critical systems.
To monitor complex environments and investigate incidents, larger businesses may 
require both a security operations center (SOC) team operating 24x7 and a Computer 
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT). Maintaining these capabilities at this level 
requires more than a dozen highly trained staff. Faced with these resource requirements, 
some try to get by as if they were much smaller organizations with just one person to 
perform the CSIRT role and SOC services during daylight hours only. What do you think 
happens when cyberattackers come in the night?
You guessed it – a breach (or its beginnings). Once the breach is discovered, the 
business lands in a maelstrom of trouble with technical, budgetary, customer, public 
relations, and human resources concerns colliding. Just when the need for cross- 
functional collaboration is at its highest, the organization is not prepared. No plans 
covered this type of incident, not even to specify who to notify or what to do. At best, 
1 “The Road to Cyber Risk Maturity 2018 Risk Management Maturity Benchmark Survey,” FAIR 
Institute, January 2019
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the incident becomes a huge distraction. Opportunity costs as well as response costs 
mount rapidly as executives call meeting after meeting to thrash through the issues and 
take hurried reactive actions. Inevitably they make some mistakes. If management also 
succumbs to internal infighting during the response process, the situation gets even 
worse.
9.2.2  Lengthy Cyberattacker Dwell Time
According to sources such as the “Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report,”2 the 
average “dwell time” during which a cyberattacker can maintain a covert presence in 
an organization’s digital systems before detection and eradication typically lasts for 
months. This can be disastrous because skilled attackers can progress from their initial 
beachhead to the target objective within minutes or hours,3 and even lower echelon 
attackers have ample time to plan and attempt exploits.
Long dwell times offer attackers ample windows to exploit the victim organization’s 
trade secrets, customer information, funds, or other targets. They enable observation 
and recording of individual or organizational activities to identify additional targets. 
Attackers have time to implant malware, backdoors, or logic bombs that assure their 
future access and ability to cause damage. And because criminals and spies can 
collaborate or share information on targets, other attackers may come in to “join the 
party” at the victim business’s expense.
An organization could end up suffering multiple breaches, find some systems being 
used for botnet activity, others to mine cryptocurrency, and still more held for ransom. 
As soon as it fixes one breach, it confronts another. Without drastic measures to burn 
down and rebuild IT systems, the business could find itself in a state of continuous 
compromise.
Fortunately, businesses can take action to institute cyber-resilience along with our 
other priority programs and be leagues ahead of many of their peers and better prepared 
for many risk scenarios.
2 “2019 Data Breach Investigations Report,” Verizon, May 2019, accessed at https://enterprise.
verizon.com/resources/reports/2019/2019-data-breach-investigations-report.pdf
3 “2019 Global Threat Report: Adversary Tradecraft and the Importance of Speed,” 
Crowdstrike, March 2019, accessed at www.crowdstrike.com/resources/
reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/
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9.2.3  Lack of Visibility or Access to All IT Systems
As we described in Chapter 7, many businesses have a fragmented IT environment 
spread across multiple operating units or international subsidiaries. These environments 
sometimes span complex hybrid cloud topologies over which they have poor visibility. 
The more fragmented the environment, the more difficult it is to establish centralized 
or coordinated security monitoring capabilities, log or event collection, and detection, 
response, or recovery services. Such difficulties arise due to both noninteroperable 
systems across silos of IT functionality and internal politics.
The larger and the more decentralized the business, the more political challenges 
complicate or kill security monitoring projects. Although a technical monitoring solution 
may exist, some units aren’t forthcoming with data from workstations, network systems, 
or security tools such as secure web gateways or secure email gateways.
Technical immaturity in any of the following areas can compound political or IT 
interoperability issues:
• Incomplete monitoring infrastructure (i.e., lack of log collection or 
security information and event management systems (SIEM))
• Immature detection processes and alert triage
• Legacy antivirus (AV) solutions not well suited to investigative or 
forensic work
To remedy this problem, develop the capability to detect cybersecurity events 
consistently and promptly in critical systems and eventually to all systems in the IT 
environment.
9.2.4  Difficulty Hiring and Retaining Skilled Staff
According to surveys such as one from the Enterprise Strategy Group and the 
Information Systems Security Association International (ISSA),4 over half of North 
America’s organizations report “a problematic shortage of cybersecurity skills.” 
4 “The Life and Times of Cybersecurity Professionals 2018,” Enterprise Strategy Group and  
the Information Systems Security Association International (ISSA), April 2019, accessed at  
www.esg-global.com/esg-issa-research-report-2018
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Anecdotal evidence from Rational Cybersecurity project interviews indicates that 
a shortage of skilled IR staff is a major gap; CIO James Rutt observed, “It’s nearly 
impossible to source qualified IR professionals and retain them for long in the New York 
City area.”
Even businesses that have staffed up find it difficult to satisfy and retain staff in 
security monitoring or IR roles over the long term. High skill requirements, a demanding 
work schedule, stressful incidents, and (in some cases) soul-destroying regulatory 
investigations make managing and retaining workers a constant struggle. Anton 
Chuvakin, a former Gartner Research VP and Distinguished Analyst who used to field 
multiple IR program inquiries from clients weekly, commented: “SOC managers tend to 
be chronically short-staffed and under pressure to fill entry-level positions with people 
who may be smart and dedicated, but are not yet trained.”
Under these circumstances and in a hot cybersecurity job market, it isn’t easy to 
keep one’s best analysts happy and retain them in their critical SOC or IR positions. But 
failing to keep those functions staffed with trained people is a leading factor in security 
breaches.
9.3  Identify Critical Business Assets, Risk 
Scenarios, and Contingency Plans
The core processes for detection, response, and recovery depend heavily on identifying 
the critical assets of the business, their interdependencies, and the risks to those assets. 
IT and security leaders should conduct rolling business impact assessments (BIA), 
enterprise risk assessments, and cybersecurity maturity assessments at least every two 
years to provide a list of top information risks, a current state baseline, and a gap analysis 
of cyber-resilience capabilities. Contingency plans should be developed for how to 
perform response and recovery for probable types of incidents and outages.
9.3.1  Perform Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
A BIA is the first step in the business continuity planning process. Use BIAs to
• Identify a prioritized list of critical enterprise resources or services 
(“critical assets”)
• Map critical assets to business processes
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• Stipulate any legal and regulatory requirements for the assets
• Itemize interdependencies between the assets and other  
business systems
• Set goals for critical assets’ recovery time objectives (RTOs)
The BIA focuses on identifying the impact to the business if a critical asset becomes 
unavailable. It specifies maximum acceptable downtime, or loss levels, and sets recovery 
objectives accordingly.
BIAs should normally be performed at least every two years. Meetings (typically 
2–4 hours long) should be conducted by a business continuity (BC) professional5 
or someone trained in that discipline. The BIA lead should facilitate meetings with 
experts on each asset. The IT and security leadership must ensure that senior business 
stakeholders support the BIA as an objective, fact-finding exercise and that senior team 
members who work “hands on” with the services are in the room during meetings.
9.3.2  Analyze Top Risk Scenarios
Whereas the BIA identifies and prioritizes those assets or services most critical to the 
business, information risk analysis describes the top scenarios wherein threats exploit 
vulnerabilities to create adverse impacts of different kinds on the tangible IT assets 
identified in the BIA or on intangible assets such as brand reputation. As we wrote in 
Chapter 5, risk analysis is an ongoing process within information risk and enterprise risk 
management (ERM) programs.
A CISO’s risk team should perform an enterprise risk assessment at least once every 
two years. As described in Chapter 5, section “Perform Enterprise Risk Assessments to 
Identify Top Risk Scenarios,” the risk assessments should be aligned with the BIA but 
also look for top risks in other areas.
5 BC professionals may be trained in the ISO 22301 standard and/or in industry-specific standards 
such as the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Information Technology (IT) 
Examination Handbook in the United States
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9.3.3  Develop Contingency Plans and Cybersecurity 
Strategy for Resilience
Using the BIA and the risk assessment inputs, the IT and security organizations should 
prepare contingency plans for coping with outages, breaches, and other material 
incidents. The contingency planning process should draw information from the 
following work streams:
• Cybersecurity maturity assessment: Determine the organization’s 
level of maturity at risk management, security monitoring or 
detection, IR, and BC/DR. What level of maturity and capability does 
the organization have currently, and what level should it target one or 
two years from now? Where are the gaps?
• Incident response planning: These plans (described in the 
“Respond to Incidents” section) will drive IR procedures for different 
types of incidents and must be created through an iterative capability 
building and learning process.
• Business continuity planning: These plans (summarized in the 
“Recover from Incidents Caused by Cyberattacks and Operational 
Outages” section) will prepare the ability to recover systems that have 
been damaged in breaches or outages.
• Cyber-insurance coverage acquisition: Chapter 5, section “Treat 
Risks Holistically,” suggests cyber-insurance as a means of risk 
transfer under certain conditions. Based on the business’s top 
risks, business leaders from the finance, legal, IT BC/DR, and 
security functions can work closely together to obtain the right 
kind of cyber-insurance policy and conduct operations to preserve 
the organization’s eligibility for coverage. Because some  cyber- 
insurance policies require the business’s IR function to coordinate 
with the insurance company’s breach responder, any constraints 
and opportunities from the actual cyber-insurance policy must be 
factored into IR contingency plans.
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Contingency plans for cyber-resilience should be part of a business’s IT and security 
strategies. IT and security leaders can recommend ways for business risk owners to deal 
with IT failures or incidents arising from strategic risks. The actual plans can summarize 
and reference existing and more detailed risk registers, IR plans, and BC/DR plans. If 
none are yet developed, the contingency plans can develop preliminary assumptions 
and starting points for them.
Once the business has a maturity assessment covering the cyber-resilience 
functions, IT and security leaders should work with business executives to set direction 
on three key cyber-resilience decisions considering the business’s maturity level and 
future needs:
• Roles and responsibilities: Who is responsible for security 
monitoring? Incident response? Recovery of various types of 
systems? Accountabilities must be identified among executives, 
business process owners, CIOs, and CISOs and responsibilities or 
consultations to the CSIRT, SOC, business continuity team, service 
managers, and others.
• Security monitoring – organization and staffing: Does the business 
need a SOC with 24x7 coverage? A 24x7 SOC requires 8 to 12 highly 
skilled (and expensive) staff. Alternatively, the organization could 
stand up a “SOC lite” with fewer persons but reduced hours. It could 
use managed security services providers (MSSPs) and managed 
detection and response services (MDRs) that provide round-the- 
clock services to augment small (even one person) in-house security 
monitoring teams. However, outsourcing security monitoring 
requires careful management, and it may reduce the business’s 
ability to cover all locations and to tailor detection to its unique 
applications, configurations, people, and processes.
• Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT): Where does 
the CSIRT function reside in the organization? In larger businesses, 
different groups should provide security monitoring and CSIRT 
functions. However, technical staff and duties overlap. The CSIRT 
also requires support from nonsecurity stakeholders, such as legal, 
human resources (HR), marketing, PR, and others.
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9- 1
Because cyber-resilience requires considering business drivers, top 
risks, risk appetites, and IT security governance questions get as much 
input on the strategy as possible from executive management.
“everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face.”
Mike Tyson
9.3.3.1  Plan for Unexpected Incidents
Many incidents fall into known types. Even if some of the details of threats, impacts, and 
response or recovery strategies have to be discovered or developed on the fly, existing 
playbooks for the incident type provide a place to start.
Completely new types of incidents could throw the CSIRT, the CISO, and the whole 
company into a state of chaos or panic. Businesses in some industry sectors, such as 
the retail clothing, might reasonably expect to never encounter a nation-state attacker 
(aka advanced persistent threat (APT)). Suppose, now, one of those businesses 
receives forensic evidence from their national intelligence agency that indicates it has 
just experienced its first APT attack. What should the business do now, and how could 
it have prepared?
I hate to say this: Preparing for unexpected incidents requires having a “plan for a 
plan.” This needs to be one of the CSIRT’s playbooks and a subject for training exercises. 
Part of stakeholders’ orientation to their role in the CSIRT should state that “If you get 
a meeting request with a subject line such as ‘Urgent: Critical New Incident Planning 
Meeting,’ you attend that meeting.” Such meetings could have a simple objective to 
create a playbook on the spot, at a minimum identifying
• An incident commander and accountable executive(s)
• An incident team
• Internal or external resources to draw on (in our example) to come 
up to speed on APTs very fast
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• Any existing playbooks (from other incident types or provided by 
vendors or security information groups) to use as template or  
starting point
• Next steps
9.3.4  Develop Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery 
Plans
Preparing a business continuity plan helps the business recover quickly if an incident 
does happen. Although it isn’t possible to predict every kind of incident that could 
threaten the business, one can develop plans that cover a range of incidents (e.g., 
natural disasters, computer problems, staffing issues, pandemics). A business continuity 
plan helps to identify and prevent risks where possible, prepare for risks that can’t 
be controlled, and respond and recover if an incident or crisis occurs. The size and 
complexity of BC/DR plans depend on the size and type of business, but IT and security 
leaders and service managers should ensure that they include
• Information required to recover from catastrophic failures, to get the 
business running again
• Procedures for restoring critical systems or applications within 
defined recovery time objectives
• Periodic testing of recovery processes
• A schedule for updating the plan itself to account for any changes to 
the business, the industry, or the operating locations
9-2
Ensure that senior business stakeholders support the business 
continuity program and that the key IT team members who work “hands 
on” with mission-critical services are in the room during BIA and BC/DR 
planning meetings.
Some companies routinely purchase extra capacity (e.g., 25% above current 
demand) to all IT procurements as cyber-resilience requirement. Occasionally such 
procurement policies pay off. For example, over-provisioning spare notebook computers 
and remote access solution capacity would have made businesses more resilient 
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to the COVID-19 pandemic. In general, BCP/DR plans should also be informed by 
requirements to provide cyber-resilience in the event of infrequent but high impact 
events such as hurricanes, prolonged power outages, and pandemics. BC/DR team 
members should be informed of these scenarios by the risk management team and 
(since they are infrequent) devise ways of increasing resilience – whether by design, 
procedural contingency plans, or incremental capability – that don’t add much to cost 
but do leave the business better prepared. Rather than overstocking licenses and VPN 
gateway appliances, for example, a pandemic prepper could arrange and test cloud-
based remote access capacity for use during crisis or peak demand periods.
9.4  Detect Cybersecurity Events Consistently 
and Promptly
Per the NIST CSF, “Detect” controls must backstop “Protect” controls. Businesses must 
collect logs, generate and receive real-time notifications, and investigate events which 
could be indicative of security problems. Detecting advanced (or stealthy) threats 
requires more sophisticated monitoring tools and processes, skilled staff, and enough 
event context to distinguish normal from malicious activity. Monitoring capabilities 
must be deployed in all IT domains (i.e., on-premise data centers, end user networks, 
cloud infrastructure, and applications). Outside the enterprise IT systems’ domains, 
businesses should also monitor user feedback to the company as well as security-related 
notifications from external parties.
Security monitoring systems process information and analyze it to find indicators of 
compromise, precursors to attacks, or vulnerabilities. A good monitoring infrastructure 
will detect many issues, most of which are unimportant, repetitive, or false alarms. 
Security monitoring can be like looking for needles in the haystack, such as
• Threats, human or automated, attacking or already inside the systems
• Security controls not operating in compliance with policy
• Information assets that are missing or failing to pass security tests or 
health checks
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9.4.1  Monitor Event Logs, Alerts, and Reports
First, we must capture the data! Basic event logging gives visibility of IT and security- 
related activity, establishes baselines for normal activity, and provides data for an audit 
trail. Monitoring and logging processes and tools must cover log creation, collection, and 
management as well as real-time notifications to security consoles, operators, or tools.
Security teams can employ log management and SIEM tools to collect logs and 
events. The tools can understand and normalize many kinds of log data from different 
systems (such as security systems like firewalls, endpoint protection systems, and 
directory services) as well as server, application, and endpoint resources. However, 
standards are required for custom applications’ logging and alerting function and for 
configuring off-the-shelf systems.
After collecting log data, alerts, and notifications, businesses can run this 
information through automated analysis, perform human log review on selected issues, 
and retain certain log records. If we could capture all the events in the enterprise that are 
meaningful to IT and security objectives, it would be as if these events were pouring into 
a giant funnel for filtering, refinement, and processing.
Figure 9-2. Log and Event Data Generation, Collection, and Processing
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9.4.1.1  Collect Data for Investigations, Retain It for Compliance 
and Evidentiary Purposes
Many logs collect IT and security data. Even for a small business with less than 100 
employees, the security department should be monitoring the firewall, endpoint anti- 
malware, directory services, email server, and production web/commerce site logs. 
Use log collection tools to collect some or all the logs’ information to a central server. 
Tool options range from open source Logstash and Elasticsearch to perform basic log 
collection at the low end all the way to enterprise class SIEMs from vendors such as 
Splunk, IBM, RSA Security, and others.
A good log collection tool should have some default settings for which events to 
collect and which to drop. Businesses should generally take advantage of the tools’ 
capabilities to normalize, summarize, or compress events to increase capacity. However, 
in some cases, business, security, and legal departments should also retain raw logs for 
evidentiary and forensics use against attackers.
Log data can accumulate fast, even with summarization. To avoid storing too 
much or too little, work with the legal and compliance functions to set data retention 
requirements where they apply for critical systems or regulated systems. Even where 
no regulatory retention requirements exists, note that the longer the retention 
period, the longer the lookback period available for investigations. For example, 
suppose we find a hacker penetrated the organization’s systems at least two months 
ago; full network packet capture systems can prove invaluable in tracking down 
which systems were compromised and which external command and control sites 
were used in the attack.
9.4.1.2  Use Context to Enrich Events
To avoid generating too many alerts, or false positive alerts (e.g., on every instance 
of multiple login failures to a user account or every attempted hack against a server), 
SIEMs and other tools can automatically correlate events from multiple log and 
notification sources to gain additional confidence that something is wrong or to 
prioritize among the many potential issues. For example, a SIEM could prioritize an 
alert about a system logging port scans (indicative of hacking interest) if the SIEM also 
learns that said system is
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• An executive’s laptop (context source: Active Directory)
• A server with unpatched vulnerabilities (context source: vulnerability 
scanner)
• A server in the scope of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) audits (context source: 
asset management system
In short directory services, vulnerability management systems, asset management 
systems, and many other IT security capabilities can provide context to the SIEM or 
other monitoring tools. Monitoring tools can also use enterprise context information 
to enrich events and reports with additional information. Keeping context information 
accurate, up to date, and accessible is a critical success factor for effective security 
monitoring. Security engineering resources can be dedicated to integrating monitoring 
tools with context sources.
9- 3
Identify IT or security administrators responsible for context sources and 
engage them in efforts to improve security monitoring capabilities.
9.4.1.3  Automate Monitoring Tools, Processes, and Use Cases
Collecting all the logs and notifications in the world is useless unless the organization 
reviews the information and investigates and acts when necessary. However, given the 
high volume of events even in a small organization, human log review can become an 
insufferable burden. Although required in many cases, it should be supplemented by 
automated detection systems.
There’s a wide spectrum of tools and approaches to automated review. At the low 
end, security staff can develop in-house tools and scripts to search or summarize log 
information. We can hire an MSSP to monitor our networks, firewalls, and other systems 
or logs we give it access to; the MSSP will certainly employ automated log review and 
analysis on our behalf. We can also obtain a SIEM. At the high end of automated review, 
we can invest in automated machine learning and other security analytics techniques. 
Other advanced types of tools include network traffic analysis (NTA), anti-malware 
sandboxing, data leakage protection (DLP), user entity behavior analytics (UEBA), 
privileged identity analytics, database activity monitoring (DAM), and more.
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A large organization generally employs multiple approaches. It may retain an MSSP 
to monitor its firewalls and externally facing systems, leverage cloud- native tools such as 
the Microsoft Azure Security Center, and use a SIEM to monitor internal systems. Also, 
groups responsible for mission-critical custom applications or specialized tasks such as 
running DLP may develop homegrown scripts to parse through the logs or customize a 
general-purpose SIEM. For organizations that have limited budgets or lack most of the 
tools noted here, there is an opportunity to combine some security monitoring use cases 
(such as detecting login failures and certain types of vulnerabilities) with IT operational 
monitoring for service availability or early warning of logical or physical system failure. 
Automated tooling for operational monitoring can provide a rapid entry for automated 
security monitoring.
With so many events that could be monitored, businesses need to focus on 
important use cases such as
• Monitoring critical assets, such as any suspicious events on a large 
credit card database
• Monitoring controls to prove they are operating correctly for 
compliance or assurance purposes
• Monitoring activity against a baseline for anomaly detection: 
For example, alert on record spikes in network activity or root 
administrator access to servers from unusual locations at  
unusual times
Prioritize developing those use cases that solve the most critical issues or easy ones 
that have some value to implement. Also prioritize use cases that improve the security 
monitoring group’s capability (e.g., developing a new context source, log integration, 
monitoring tool capability, or staff skill).
9.4.1.4  Use Human Review to Supplement Automated Systems
Automated monitoring capabilities such as the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in 
security analytics may seem more glamorous, but the human element continues to 
comprise an important part of security monitoring. What security teams need to do is 
progress from tedious and repetitive log review to tuning and backstopping automated 
systems. Human expertise is required to
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• Review logs and notifications for indicators that can’t (yet) be 
automatically detected and spot check that automated systems are 
detecting what is expected
• Provide compliance signoff that logs have been reviewed manually 
and/or that automated monitoring is operating as intended
• Detect new threats or control failures that haven’t been instrumented 
for automated monitoring
• Complete deployment of automated monitoring use cases and fine- 
tune them
• Provide human oversight of monitoring change control processes
During early maturity stages, businesses tend to rely more heavily on manual 
review. Logging standards should include provisions for human log review. In addition, 
operations runbooks, or procedures, should contain checklists for administrators to 
verify that all monitoring capabilities are functioning. Looking forward, human expertise 
is also required to develop automated monitoring use cases.
9.4.2  Investigate and Triage Real-Time Alerts and Issues 
Found in Logs
By Murphy’s law (“What can go wrong, will go wrong”), once the organization begins 
logging, generating notifications, and performing automated or manual review, many 
issues get raised. But how does the organization determine which need action and what 
to do with them?
Issues from security monitoring may fall into the following classes, and the 
monitoring team should have instructions on what to do with each as shown in 
Table 9- 1.
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Issues relating to indicators of compromise or precursors remain with the security 
monitoring function and/or the IR function for further investigation and triage. As we’ll 
discuss in the “Respond to Incidents” section, businesses have different approaches 
for dividing work between the security monitoring and IR functions. Events requiring 
investigation can go into a “response identification” queue. Some issues should also go 
to the tiered risk assessment process discussed in Chapter 5.
9.4.3  Modernize and Scale Detection for Distributed 
Infrastructure
A White Paper for Rain Capital6 takes us to the frontier of automated detection in 
widely distributed public or private cloud infrastructure and application architectures. 
These architectures, especially when combined with ephemeral workloads or services, 
challenge traditional static security approaches. Detection must be automated, 
decentralized, distributed to the cloud-native control plane, adaptable to changing 
service fabrics, and instrumented with response capabilities.
6 “DevSecOps and Detection Engineering: New Approaches to Security,” Jamie Lewis, Rain 
Capital, December 2018, accessed at www.raincapital.vc/resources
Table 9-1. General Security Monitoring Instructions (SAMPLE)
What to Monitor What to Do
precursors to compromise, such 
as cyberattacks in progress
Investigate and/or escalate to CsIrt team
Indicators of compromise Investigate and/or escalate to CsIrt team
signs of control failure notify appropriate security operations 
support team
signs of system failure notify appropriate It operations support team
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DEVSECOPS AND DETECTION ENGINEERING: NEW APPROACHES TO SECURITY
“Technical solutions for problem detection in distributed architectures require new security 
solutions. These solutions require real-time visibility and iterative feedback loops for security 
measures to adapt continually to rapidly changing environments and conditions. Automated 
detection engineering must be built in to take continuous measurements and make real-time 
adjustments.
The emerging practice of security chaos engineering proactively probes for failures in security 
controls through controlled experiments such as randomly shutting down an instance or 
changing a protection setting. These experiments can be “controlled” in the sense that they 
occur within a limited blast radius and test failure modes the system is already supposed to 
cope with. Still, we recommend they be closely- supervised by skilled engineers and DevOps 
teams.”
Jamie Lewis, Venture Partner
Lewis also wrote that detection engineering in distributed architectures involves 
decentralizing operational security roles and functions. These conclusions align with 
those from Chapter 7, section “Upgrade IT Operations with DevSecOps and Disciplined 
Agile.” For business building or running large-scale distributed infrastructure, detection 
engineering and security chaos engineering could become core competencies and 
require alignment between skilled security, IT, and application engineering teams’ 
resources.
9.4.4  Hunt for Threats Proactively
Considering the “dwell time” survey findings discussed in the section on “Address 
Common Resilience Challenges,” businesses desperately need to overtake 
cyberattackers. Knowing that in large, complex enterprise environments some threats 
are probably always present, businesses under regulatory and security pressure should 
consider maturing their detection processes to proactively hunt for incidents in what is 
almost a continuous process of investigation and response.
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Threat hunting doesn’t just require tools (such as UEBA, advanced security  
analytics, etc.). It requires skilled and dedicated personnel to
• Increase investigation frequency and cadence to hone capabilities 
and anticipate adversaries
• Perform periodic indicator sweeps to find specific indicators  
or precursors of compromise based on threat intelligence such  
as suspect insider activity, suspect IP addresses or accounts,  
or malware types and configuration anomalies seen at  
compromised organizations
• Pivot or “clone” a hunt when searching for one indicator leads to 
signs of other indicators or precursors
9.4.5  Coordinate Detection with Users, Business 
Stakeholders, and External Parties
An organization’s IT systems, their logs, and their notifications may be the most 
important information sources for detection, but by no means the only sources. Security 
organizations can develop a Threat Actor Library (see Figure 9-3) identifying the 
categories of threat agents most motivated to attack the business and also analyze the 
types of threat events such agents could (or already have) created. 
9- 4
Engage knowledgeable internal and external sources to understand 
the risks and early warning indicators of compromise from each type 
of threat.
As they break threats down by category, and classify threat actions as shown in 
Figure 9-3, security and risk analysts can find many opportunities to improve detection 
by aligning with knowledgeable internal and external sources. Engage human users 
as sensors and develop processes for obtaining specialized security tips from other 
departments (such as HR, procurement, or facilities). Analysts should also take 
advantage of third-party security monitoring information or notifications and obtain 
threat intelligence from security information sharing bodies.
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9.4.5.1  Engage Human Users as Sensors
IT users, developers, business users, partners, customers, or even someone in the 
general public – that is, anyone outside the security organization itself – may be the 
first to notice something unusual in the IT environment or pick up on some other 
threat to the organization. In the case of social engineering or physical attacks, human 
intelligence (“humint”) may be the only notification source.
Establish well-publicized ways for users to contact or notify the security team 
about issues they observe. Notification methods can include ticketing systems, 
contact email addresses, and web forms. There may be a public-facing security 
contact mechanism. The security organization should also focus awareness 
training on IT or customer support functions (such as help desk and sales account 
representatives) to encourage such staff to look for security issues and report them 
through the notification process.









ity Physical Align with Physical Security and/or Facilities Maintenance staff for information on physical risks and response plans. 
Errors Support IT Operations and Business Continuity Teams who take the lead on dealing with outages.
Abuse
Engage the abused asset owner’s business or IT team. Align 
with HR on personnel-related actions. Align with User 







Align with user awareness and fraud team (if established) on 
awareness and prevention strategies.
Malware Contract and/or collaborate with anti-malware vendors, threat intelligence communities.
Hacking Contract and/or collaborate with network security or anti-malware vendors, threat intelligence communities.


















Engage with national 
diplomatic and 
security establishment 
on nation state attack 
issues
Figure 9-3. Aligning with Business and External Stakeholders to Detect and 
Respond to Threats
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9.4.5.2  Develop Collaborative Processes with Business Functions
In addition to using IT or customer support functions as notification intermediaries, 
security functions should work with other corporate administration functions such 
as HR, physical security, third-party risk management (TPRM), facilities, and sales to 
obtain early warning of security issues (or even risk scores on individual users, vendors, 
or facilities) as follows:
• Legal and HR may be the first to see early indicators of insider 
risk, such as formal disciplinary actions and complaints against 
staff. At a minimum, HR staff (or an employee’s manager) should 
give the security organization a “heads up” about certain types 
of issues with key users, e.g. a highly privileged IT administrator 
being formally disciplined. Consult the legal department, however, 
before monitoring or profiling internal staff. The rules may vary by 
jurisdiction and based on whether monitoring targets the user’s 
personal device or a company-issued device.
• Sales, marketing, research, and other business functions are 
the data owners and risk owners. They are often best positioned to 
identify sensitive data and decide when to block use or transfer of 
sensitive data.
• TPRM or vendor management should track negative press reports, 
financial reports, or complaints about suppliers or partners as 
a matter of course. At a minimum, it should notify the security 
organization when a vendor is in the process of being terminated.
• Facilities teams should track break-ins, reports of thefts, and other 
issues with facilities and make the information available to the 
security organization.
• IT and development functions are well positioned to discriminate 
alerts that are harmless anomalies from those that are precursors 
to compromise. One CISO we interviewed described a practice 
of holding contests7 for IT and security staff to develop original 
7 “Crowdsourced Splunking for Security Exploits,” Dan Blum, November 2014, accessed at 
https://security-architect.com/crowdsourced-splunking-for-security-exploits/
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correlation rules for the Splunk SIEM tool. Correlation rules had to 
use data from two or more logs, at least one of which was not under 
that author’s control.
• Vulnerability disclosure intake and bug bounties: Provide an easy- 
to- find web page and other contact points through which “white hat” 
vulnerability researchers, law enforcement personnel, and vendors 
can submit bug reports for custom business applications or tips on 
potential threats to the business.
Information from these sources should be evaluated by security monitoring 
or IR teams in case it poses immediate risk. In some cases, it should also go to the 
organization’s information risk team.
9.4.5.3  Integrate Workflows and Notification Processes 
with Contracted Detection Services
Contracted detection services – such as full-service MSSPs that monitor selected 
networks and applications and cloud security services like Azure Advanced Threat 
Protection or AWS GuardDuty – have useful capabilities, but rarely cover an 
organization’s full IT environment. When outsourcing security monitoring tasks, 
businesses must coordinate closely with the vendor on monitoring and investigating
• Internal areas that are difficult to instrument for MSSP sensors (e.g., 
custom applications) or highly sensitive (e.g., executive workstations 
and devices)
• Keeping MSSPs or cloud vendors up to date on asset disposition, 
points of contact, and other enterprise context information
• Coordinating alert triage or investigation and remediation workflows 
with vendors
• Jointly developing, maintaining, and testing new monitoring use case 
capabilities
• Monitoring MSSP or CSP performance against SLA’s and other 
contractual obligations
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9.4.5.4  Obtain and Share Threat Intelligence from Security 
Information Sharing Bodies
Threat intelligence (TI) is especially important for businesses within industries under 
high security pressure – such as financial services, government, or critical infrastructure. 
Examples of information sharing bodies include
• Security vendors and other organizations providing open source 
intelligence or providing threat telemetry for a fee
• Other vendors or partners reporting incidents or breaches they have 
experienced in their environments, or from your organization, either 
proactively or under contractual obligation
• Vulnerability researchers disclosing vulnerabilities or exploits 
(perhaps in response to the organization’s bug bounty program)
• Industry Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)
• National Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)
• Law enforcement organizations
In its Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (SP 800-61),8 NIST advises 
that organizations plan coordination with external notifiers and information sharing 
organizations in advance. The security organization can work with “coordinating teams” 
such as US-CERT or an ISAC for the relevant vertical industry. Businesses should also 
develop communication guidelines for sharing their own information with external 
parties. Often, sharing technical information such as a suspect IP address or malware 
sample is low risk and helps establish the organization as a valued member of the 
information sharing community (and thus making it more likely to receive  higher- 
quality TI). Sharing information about incidents that might have to be reported as 
breaches, certain kinds of control failures or security configuration information, and any 
user identity information should only be done with business and legal guidance.
8 “Special Publication (SP) 800-61 Rev 2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide,” National 
Institute of Standards (NIST), August 2012, accessed at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
detail/sp/800-61/rev-2/final
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9.5  Respond to Incidents
Most businesses have an underdeveloped and underfunded IR capability. Yet ironically, 
the ability to interrupt a cyberattack on the organization’s crown jewels, or even just 
provide a satisfactory response to an already large breach, could easily pay the full costs 
of a multiyear IR program.
Just as police must be able to solve most murder cases within the “first 48” hours, 
security responders need to stop or contain the spread of potentially dangerous 
cyberattacks within the first hour or even minutes. I spent considerable space in the 
previous section on Detection, which is the prerequisite to Response, and I’ll refer 
between these codependent functions often.
With that, let’s look at how to plan, establish, and evolve a well-planned phased 
response model, such as the SANS Institute’s six-step process9 shown in Figure 9-4, for 
many types of incidents.
9.5.1  Plan for Incident Response
Recall from the “Develop Contingency Plans and Cybersecurity Strategy for Resilience” 
section that the cybersecurity strategy should set directions for both IR and monitoring 
as well as for outsourcing to MSSPs and breach responders. However, detailed IR 
procedures for different types of incidents must be created through an ongoing process. 
Start by crafting an initial response plan that defines types of incidents, provides general 
guidance and objectives for responding to them, establishes lines of authority or 
decision rights, and organizes a robust IR function.
9 “Incident Handler’s Handbook,” Patrick Kral, SANS Institute, February 2012, accessed at  
www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/paper/33901
Figure 9-4. The Phased Response Process
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Define: What is an “Incident?” Per NIST SP 800-61: “An information security 
incident is a violation or imminent threat of violation of data or computer security 
policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.” For example, finding 
malware on a production server, getting a report of a lost company laptop, or discovering 
unauthorized accounts, data transfers, or applications (such as cryptomining) would all 
be considered incidents at many businesses. Security leaders should identify common 
types of incidents and others that correspond to the business’s top risks.
Provide guidance: How should the business respond? The business should already 
have direction on key staffing, outsourcing, and target IR maturity level decisions. Now 
it’s time to expand the strategy into detailed response plans. Develop plans for a phased 
response for each type of incident. (Consider one objective: Quickly eradicate malware 
using device reimaging tools and get staff working again. This requires strong backup and 
restore capabilities, but may trade off most efforts at forensics, evidence gathering, and 
prosecution to a later time when the IR process becomes more mature.)
Establish authority: Who is in charge of the IR function? Continuing at the most 
basic level, businesses must designate lines of authority for coordinating IR functions 
and leading the IR team. Considering basic types of incidents, responses, and impacts, 
what does the IR function have authority to do (e.g., monitor user accounts, shut down 
production servers, cut network links, call vendors or partners, notify law enforcement) 
and under what circumstances? IR authorities and responsibilities vary with the type of 
incident and are highly contextual to location and other factors. For example, IR leaders 
may be required to notify law enforcement immediately on discovering threats to human 
safety and child pornography on a company system but in all other cases defer law 
enforcement notification to the Corporate Counsel.
9- 5
Establish an incident response team to prepare response plans with 
business executives, legal, HR, vendor management, and public 
relations. Coordinate their responses during a breach.
Organize IR team: How can we build and maintain a healthy IR function 
within a security operations team? Security monitoring, technical response, 
and CSIRT functions require different – though overlapping – staff, skill sets, and 
personalities. Security monitoring can be somewhat repetitive and predictable, a 
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stable job. Technical incident response activities are more dynamic and exciting. 
CSIRT leaders must be able to play the politician, gain support for recovery or 
response internally, and be prepared to deal with law enforcement, the media, and 
irate partners or customers.
Figure 9-5 diagrams the interrelationships between the security operations functions 
supporting IR. The “resource flow” arrows show that although three different functions 
should exist in security operations, they must all support IR. Very few businesses 
permanently retain enough staff to cope with major incidents, so IR will tax all security 
operations functions whenever major incidents materialize.
Just as security leadership must align with the business before and after IR to prepare 
and coordinate, it must organize itself to endure the IR resource demand peak that 
occurs during major incidents. However, security leaders must also be aware that the 
effects of major incidents can persist for some time, especially in the event of legal issues, 
regulatory investigations, or repeated cyberattacks. With many security teams already 
under-resourced or under stress, take care to avoid excessive staff burnout and attrition.
Figure 9-5. Security Monitoring, Response, and CSIRT Functions
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Correctly structured, security operations can
• Give burned-out responders a rest when they can be spared; they 
can train others, update documentation, or work on automating 
monitoring processes
• Move bright but still junior monitoring staff seeking career advancement 
into the breach to augment responders during a major incident
• Provide learning opportunities, travel, conference tickets, appropriate 
time off, and reasonable work-life balance accommodation to all staff
• Work with the teams on developing job improvement strategies, 
response plans, and playbooks to give them the sense of efficacy that 
only a well-planned security program operating according to its plan 
can bring
Consider the guidance from Chapter 2, section “Hire, Motivate, and Retain Key 
Security Staff,” to be especially pertinent for the security operations and CSIRT teams.
9.5.2  Establish the IR Program
Based on the cybersecurity strategy and the initial response plans discussed so far, the 
business can establish a full set of IR policies, plans, and procedures as well as build out 
its security operations teams to cope with the ebb and flow of incidents.
Regardless of organization size, a business must prepare for response by specifying 
policy, identifying points of contact for incidents, and designating a response team. 
Establish relationships with external IR resources, such as law firms specializing in 
different types of incidents as well as expert cyber-breach responders on retainer.
Policy: Formalize response plans in a policy identifying IR authority, purpose/
objectives, scope, definitions and prioritizations, and basic team structure as well as 
guidelines for escalation, coordination with external entities, information sharing, and 
performance metrics. Because recovery should follow response, IR policies must be kept 
in sync with business continuity plans and policies.
Processes: Establish processes under the policy guidelines for escalation, case 
management, phased incident handling, and information sharing. Coordinate process 
development for dealing with suspected insider abuse, law enforcement, media, 
customers, partners, and facilities with HR, legal, public relations (PR), marketing, 
and facilities management groups, respectively. Design processes as living documents 
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implemented through continuously evolving security operations, CSIRT, and IT or 
development procedures and playbooks.
• TIP: Recognize that the CSIRT and security operations functions have 
major dependencies on the business functions identified in Figure 9-5’s  
sidebars as well as on IT help desk or support and other security 
specialists. Build business alignment integration points to fulfill these 
dependencies into processes and procedures. Strong management 
and communication skills are required for the CSIRT to coordinate 
with multiple groups affected during incidents. Organizations 
under high security pressure should provide role- specific awareness 
training throughout the business to prepare staff for IR needs.
Staff up: All but the very smallest businesses should have the three distinct security 
operations functions shown in Figure 9-5. The number of staff providing security operations 
and IR can range from a pair of employees with several roles covering all three functions 
to multiple teams totaling many more than 20 people for very large businesses with 24x7 
SOCs and per-incident leaders in the technical response and/or CSIRT functions. Ensuring 
sufficient resources are available to provide coverage for all three functions is critical; 
otherwise IR outcomes, staff retention during long-running incidents, and the ability to 
continue normal monitoring to head off further incidents could all be negatively impacted.
• TIP: Retain enough staff to handle the security monitoring workload 
plus technical response to ongoing incidents such as malware 
remediation, system restoration, and lost devices. Consider 
combining internal monitoring and response with a robust MSSP 
to reduce the need for in-house staff. Employ a core CSIRT team 
and (if risk warrants) technical response staff experienced in threat 
hunting. Institute job rotation and cross-training to get the best 
“mileage” from the security operations and CSIRT staff. Consider 
retainer contracts for specialized cyber-breach responder resources 
for further staff augmentation during major incidents.
Tool up: Most of the tools required are security monitoring tools identified in this book’s 
Glossary, such as SIEM, UEBA, DLP, anti-malware, and others. IR also requires a case 
management tool. At the low end, an ITSM tool can track incidents. However, specialized 
case management tools provide more IR-specific functionality, such as forensics support 
and connections to threat intelligence sources. At a minimum, ensure that IT help desk and 
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other support staff outside the CSIRT cannot access sensitive incident information. Finally, 
don’t forget that responders need adequate resources such as documented playbooks for 
common incidents, standard and investigative workstations and laptops, private conference 
rooms, redundant and protected communication methods, baseline virtual machine files 
available to quickly reimage or restore systems, and more.
9.5.3  Evolve the IR Program for Cyber-Resilience
The IR program is the centerpiece of cyber-resilience in the sense that it not only 
embodies Respond controls but also interacts with Detect and Recover controls. 
Response requires Detect controls to identify the threat (triggering response) and to 
verify containment and eradication. Then, Response initiates Recovery.
Businesses can evolve cyber-resilience capabilities up to Level 3 maturity (Defined) 
by creating contingency plans, IR policies, processes, and playbooks as well as basic 
automated monitoring capabilities. Level 3 IR already requires expanding staff, 
establishing the dedicated IR function, and spreading awareness of basic IR plans, roles, 
and responsibilities to security, business, and IT stakeholders.
Businesses under medium security pressure should consider – and those under 
high security pressure must – attain at least the Level 4 maturity (Managed) for security 
monitoring and IR. Getting to Level 4 requires yet more advanced tools and processes, 
including context- and correlation- enabled automated detection, alert investigation/triage, 
threat intelligence sharing, staffing a dedicated response function, and implementing all 
defined cyber-resilience processes more comprehensively across the business.
As the IR program evolves to Level 3 or Level 4 (Managed), it can develop the skills, 
resources, and playbooks for incidents the organization expects to eventually experience, 
as well as frameworks to address unexpected incidents. Conduct simulated incident 
exercises to prepare staff. Ensure response capabilities cover multiple IT environments 
including private clouds, public cloud such as AWS or Azure, and enterprise applications 
or SaaS. In some cases, CSPs such as Amazon10 or Microsoft Azure11 provide cloud-based 
detection and response tools and processes; customers should use these capabilities but 
must keep driving the response process themselves.
10 “AWS Security Incident Response Guide,” Amazon, June 2019, accessed at  
https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws_security_incident_response.pdf
11 “Tutorial: Respond to Security Incidents,” Microsoft, August 2018, accessed at https://docs.
microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/tutorial-security-incident
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Standard operating procedures or playbooks for incidents should describe in detail 
how to identify, contain, and eradicate the incident-inducing threat. Make sure that 
playbooks identify all the integration points (contacts and procedures) that align IR to 
other business functions. For example, IR processes will hand off the technical response 
function to IT groups when it is time to “recover.” Provide detailed guidance and decision 
trees in the playbooks on how and when to communicate with law enforcement, the 
media, and other third parties. Use NIST 800-618 Appendices A.1 and A.2 as starting 
points; the Appendices provide a list of questions to leverage for playbooks on multiple 
types of incidents.
9.6  Recover from Incidents Caused by Cyberattacks 
and Operational Outages
Recovery is different for incidents caused by cyberattacks than for those caused by 
IT system outages. In the case of a breach from a cyberattack, the technical security 
response team takes the lead during the IR recovery phase and may later hand off 
to IT or business continuity teams to lead recovery. In the case of an outage, IT and 
business continuity teams handle the recovery, and security operations may not need 
to be involved. Figure 9-6 depicts the high-level sequence of response through recovery 
activities for breaches and/or outages.
Figure 9-6. Breach and/or Outage Response and Recovery
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Incident and impact:
• Cyberattack scenario: Figure 9-6 depicts a breach – such as theft 
of personal or confidential information. Once it is discovered, staff 
should perform an investigation to assess the impact of the breach 
and deny the attacker reentry, but in this case may not need to take 
down production systems.
• Logic bomb scenario: Suppose the same malicious actor causing the 
breach also left a logic bomb that damages production systems. This 
incident requires the IR team to lead a response, but because it also 
causes an outage, BC/DR plans should be activated.
• Component failure scenario: Figure 9-6 also depicts an operational 
outage due to a component failure, which could have been caused by 
human operator error, hardware failure, or some aberrant interaction 
of software and services. No malicious actor is suspected.
Initial technical response: For all breaches and outages, it’s important to pinpoint 
the threat event. Why has the incident occurred, is it over, or is it just beginning? In 
the event of a cyber-incident, expect the worst from the malicious actor. Contain the 
cyberattack from causing further damage. Escalate notifications, support requests, 
or decisions to business functions such as legal, HR, IT, development, and executive 
management as required.
Reconstitution: Only after initial technical response and investigation completes 
can the IR functions fully reconstitute affected systems or applications by eradicating 
cyberattack artifacts such as malware, backdoors, compromised accounts, and so on. 
In some cases, systems are down and must be rebuilt to recover from an outage due to a 
cyberattack. In other cases, systems don’t go down but some must be taken offline and 
surgically rebuilt to ensure no trace of malware remains. When rebuilding systems in 
this way, be sure to perform thorough scans and take other measures to validate they 
are clean. Reconstitution involves returning systems to fully operational states. It reflects 
mission and business priorities and may be driven by recovery point/time objectives and 
other metrics.
Crisis management, BC/DR activities: Any major breach of confidential 
information can provoke a crisis. In the case of an identity data breach, the IR team must 
coordinate notification of authorities, partners, the affected persons, and the media.  
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In the case of a breach of trade secrets, the business must notify partners where 
contractually required, and may have to scramble to contain further legal and market 
impacts.
Treat crisis management as the tactical problem that it is. The sequence of steps 
required to investigate and remediate the breach, notify interested parties, or make 
restitution vary with the type of breach. Response plans rarely cover 100% of the 
actions needed during a crisis but should lay down guidelines, requirements, and 
responsibilities to facilitate and speed decision making.
Recovery: Although business systems such as ecommerce sites may never actually 
shut down during the breach and the recovery goal is usually to continue normal 
operation, few businesses emerge from a breach unscathed. Post-breach businesses may 
move into a “new normal” of partner dissatisfaction or regulatory scrutiny that requires 
short-term changes to pricing, business practices, and supporting technologies. Over 
the long term, the business must work to rebuild damaged reputation, market share, and 
regulatory confidence.
9.6.1  Activate Business Continuity and Disaster  
Recovery Plans
BC/DR activities: In the event of an operational outage, BC/DR plans kick in. These 
plans should call for a root cause analysis, though this may be a quick process for 
outages that are due to a known and expected failure mode. Based on the BC/DR plans, 
determine the best course of action to restore normal operation: Failover has the least 
impact and may be possible for known incidents to critical systems with a hot standby 
capability. Restoring or rebuilding systems has more impact but continues to be an IT or 
development-led project.
9.7  Call to Action
The core recommendations for security leaders from this chapter are to develop 
cyber-resilience as follows:
• Identify critical assets through a BIA and create a BC/DR plan.
• Identify top risk scenarios through enterprise risk assessment and 
document risk appetites.
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• Identify contingency plans for response and recovery.
• Identify strategic decisions (or phasing) for use of MSSPs, cyber- 
insurance, breach response services, and 24x7 SOC.
• Create detection capability by
• Standardizing basic logging, log collection, and log review across 
IT environments
• Developing basic automated event and alert monitoring
• Engaging knowledgeable business and external stakeholders to 
understand and help monitor for threats
• Advancing security analytics, detection engineering, and 
proactive threat hunting (required for organizations under high 
security pressure)
• Prepare response capability by
• Designating a dedicated CSIRT role or forming a team; 
coordinating response plans with business executives, legal, HR, 
TPRM, public relations, and so on
• Developing playbooks and procedures for technical response, 
investigation, escalation, and stakeholder notification during a 
breach
• Ensuring response (and recovery) plans include a lessons learned 
phase in which gaps can be identified and procedures updated
• Lay the groundwork for recovery by
• Planning separate but overlapping processes for responding to 
cyberattacks and operational outages
• Ensuring that senior business stakeholders support the business 
continuity program and that the key IT team members who work 
“hands on” with mission-critical services are engaged
Action – Make a quick assessment of the organization’s cyber-resilience
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Ask yourself the following short set of questions and score the answers in the Success 
Plan Worksheet’s12 Section 3, Table 3. Base your score on whether you would answer 
most of the questions with a strong “no” (1), a strong “yes” (5), or something in between.
 1. Does the business have
 a. Log standards?
 b. A security operations center (SOC) and/or an MSSP?
 c. A security information and event management system (SIEM)?
 d. A Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)?
 2. Does the business have incident response plans and playbooks?
 a. Have these plans and playbooks been proven effective in real  
incidents or tests?
 3. Does the business have an asset inventory and a current business 
impact assessment (BIA) identifying critical assets?
 4. Does the business have a business continuity and disaster 
recovery (BC/DR) plan and program?
 5. Has the BC/DR plan been tested?
Action – Define 1–3 improvement objectives for cyber-resilience
Note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 10, of the worksheet. The following 
are some sample improvement objectives.
• Review contingency plans for incident response for the business’s top 
risk scenarios or critical assets. Identify and list which are missing. 
If none are complete, develop a detailed outline for at least one plan 
and discuss it with affected stakeholders.
• Review incident response policies and procedures with affected 
stakeholders to ensure they are up to date and still agreed on.
• Review BC/DR plans with affected stakeholders to ensure they are up 
to date and still agreed on.
12 “Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, May 2020, 
accessed at https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet
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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license  
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
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CHAPTER 10
Create Your Rational 
Cybersecurity Success 
Plan
This has been Rational Cybersecurity for Business: The Security Leaders’ Guide to 
Business Alignment. I’ve made this guidance as detailed and specific as possible because 
all too often, we get only platitudes or generalizations on the topic. We can’t afford that 
anymore. Misalignment between security and the business has a corrosive effect on any 
security effort it touches. And as organizations transform into digital businesses, they fall 
under increasing IT-related risk and regulation. Aligning security to business leaders and 
business processes is exponentially more important now.
In this final chapter, let’s go through what we’ve covered in the book and help you 
complete a Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet1 to record your progress 
pursuing cybersecurity- business alignment.
The Success Plan uses a simple methodology with just a few steps:
 1. Scope out priority focus areas.
 2. Make a quick assessment of your current state.
 3. Identify stakeholders (in security-related business roles).
 4. Define improvement objectives (within your priority focus areas).
 5. Identify metrics.
 6. Track progress.
1 “Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan Worksheet,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, May 2020, 
accessed at https://security-architect.com/SuccessPlanWorksheet
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The priority focus areas, or priorities, always refer to the six Rational Cybersecurity 
Pareto Priority areas described in Chapter 1 and throughout the book.
Action: Don’t skip this chapter! Even if you’re an extremely busy CISO it will be worth 
your while to work through these exercises (or delegate them to a trusted staff member 
and monitor the learnings and improvement opportunities).
 Print out or open a copy of the Success Plan Worksheet to edit online as you go 
through Chapter 10.
Note If you have already filled in parts of the worksheet during earlier chapters, 
use this chapter to recheck or complete your work on steps 1–4, then proceed to 
steps 5 and 6.
10.1  Scope Out Your Priority Focus Areas
Not all readers head up the whole security program. Not all CISOs or security leaders have 
the same starting point or wish to work on all the priority focus areas simultaneously. 
Starting where you are, here’s how to calibrate the scope of your Success Plan. New CISOs 
or CISOs with a mandate to expand or reshape the security program should consider 
acting on all six Rational Cybersecurity priorities. Other security leaders – such as well-
established CISOs just wanting to tweak their program, part-time interim CISO caretakers, 
or security managers under the CISO – should primarily focus on the priorities within 
their own area of responsibilities or where they see the greatest gaps and opportunities.
Action: Check mark your priority focus areas in Table 1, Section 1, of the Success 
Plan Worksheet.
10.2  Identify Stakeholders
Chapter 2’s section “Clarify Security-Related Business Roles” and Table 2-2 contain 
a list of typical stakeholder roles. In a small business, some of the roles may not exist 
and others will be combined in a few people. In a large business, multiple people 
may fill some of the same roles across business units. Prioritize relationships with all 
stakeholders or just with the ones covering your priority focus areas.
Action: Fill in the name of the person holding each role identified in Table 2 of Section 
2 in the worksheet. If a role doesn’t exist or is called something else at your organization, 
then remove, edit, or annotate the rows in Table 2 as necessary. In the Contact Plan 
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column, note whether the person should be contacted now or later and who will be the 
relationship manager (i.e., you or someone else from the security team). Fill in the Notes 
column with any known projects, issues, or pain points to cover with the stakeholder.
10.3  Make a Quick Assessment of Current State
The following exercise doesn’t replace a more in-depth, formal assessment, but it can 
help set quick, actionable improvement objectives.
Make a quick assessment of the current state of security practice for each of your priority 
focus areas. Base the scoring criteria for each area on how you’d answer the majority 
of the questions for it provided in the following “Sample Criteria to Consider During 
Scoring”: Strong “no” (1=strongly disagree), qualified “no” (2=disagree), a balance of 
“yes, no, maybes” (3=neutral), qualified “yes” (4=agree), or strong “yes” (5=strongly agree).
If you can’t provide an educated guess at the 1–5 rating for an area, leave it blank and 
proceed to the next exercise. You’ll be able to come back and finish this once you’ve had 
more time to think about it and/or talk with specialists or stakeholders. Also, if you’re 
actively working on improving security practices and business alignment in a focus  
area, return to the worksheet to make changes in your assessment at later milestones  
(3 months or 6 months).
Action: Mark the scores from 1 to 5 for each row in Table 3 of Section 3 in the 
worksheet corresponding to your priority focus areas. Record any notes about your 
assessment score for each priority focus area in Table 4. Be brutally honest – no one has 
to see this except you.
Sample Criteria to Consider During Scoring for each focus area:
Develop and Govern a Healthy Security Culture:
Security governance:
 1. Does the security governance structure align well with the way IT 
and the business are organized?
 2. Is the business’s definition of security (mission, structure, and 
operating principles) captured in the security charter, and is it 
reflective of the way the business really works?
 3. Does a security steering committee meet regularly; do security, IT, 
corporate administration, and LOB representatives with signing 
authority regularly attend it; and is it effective at addressing cross-
functional security issues and moving security projects forward?
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 4. Does a risk management forum exist and does it hold business 
risk owners accountable for risks and serve as a useful venue for 
reviewing top risk analyses and treatment recommendations?
 5. Are security policies, standards, processes, and procedures 
generally up to date and do day-to-day practices in the business 
generally follow them?
 6. Is the security budget centralized, or are multiple security budgets 
rationalized in the sense that relatively little overlap exists?
Security culture:
 1. Do business executives prioritize and support cybersecurity (i.e., 
consider it strategic)?
 2. Do business, IT, and development managers provide resources to 
security projects and help enforce security policies?
 3. Do security team members have positive relationships and 
communications with business stakeholders?
 4. Does the CISO treat communicating with IT and business leaders 
as being a top priority?
 5. Are security leaders incentivized to
 a. Maintain regular communication with IT and business 
leaders in their functional area?
 b. Improve their communication skills and those of their team 
members?
 6. Does the security organization have a user awareness function 
sized to the business?
 7. Does the user awareness and training function
 a. Communicate in an efficacious manner (“we can do this,” 
“here’s how others have been [safe, successful]”)?
 b. Target awareness programs to specific audiences?
 c. Coordinate programs with the audiences’ leadership?
 d. Provide role-specific training?
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 e. Recruit champions among the target audiences and “train the 
trainers”?
 f. Provide information or free tools that will help staff and their 
families improve cybersecurity at home?
 g. Coordinate with the marketing organization’s internal 
communications program?
 h. Use innovative and entertaining communications mediums, 
products, or services?
 8. Does the security leadership or awareness program itself measure 
whether awareness and training programs are improving
 a. Security-related behavior?
 b. Attitudes and perceptions about the security program?
 c. Understanding of policies, tools, and procedures (cognition 
and compliance)?
 d. Compliance audit results?
Manage Risk in the Language of Business:
 1. Are business owners held accountable for information risk?
 2. Are business, IT, and security teams using consistent terminology 
for discussing risk and consistent criteria for assessing risk?
 3. Are stakeholders coming to security for guidance or advice before 
taking important decisions that could create risk?
 4. Are risk assessments used to prioritize security projects, manage 
third parties, or make other decisions?
 5. Is a quantitative risk analysis methodology in use?
 6. Are issues, risks, exceptions/acceptances, and top risks monitored 
in an issue management system; IT governance, risk, and 
compliance (IT GRC) tool; and/or risk register?
 7. Are top information risks being regularly communicated to 
executives and the Board, and is the dialogue constructive?
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Establish a Control Baseline:
 1. Does the business have a “control framework” and/or a “control 
baseline” document that lists the control objectives for IT and the 
business?
 2. Does the security organization have published guidance mapping 
the control objectives to the required control activities for different 
levels of risk or different situations (e.g., data classifications, use of 
third-party services)?
 3. Is the control baseline mapped to requirements documents and 
solution architectures for critical operational systems in IT and 
security environments?
 4. Is the control baseline updated and followed?
 5. Do IT, security, or third-party management groups have a shared 
responsibility framework to aid in evaluating third-party services?
 6. Does an architecture document specify how the controls should 
be deployed?
 7. Does the business have an assurance or an audit function to verify 
controls are operating?
Simplify and Rationalize IT and Security:
 1. Does the business have a simplified and rationalized IT 
environment?
 2. Is there a published, up-to-date IT strategy?
 3. Has the security strategy aligned to the IT strategy?
 4. Is the business use of a hybrid multicloud environment governed 
well?
 5. Does IT publish a service catalog and are security services 
included in it?
 6. Does the security organization work closely with third-party 
management to assess third-party risk early in the commercial 
evaluation process?
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 7. Is the security organization working with DevOps teams to 
develop DevSecOps processes?
Control Access Without Creating a Drag on the Business:
 1. Does the business have a cross-functional identity and access 
management (IAM) team?
 2. Does the IAM team report to or coordinate with security?
 3. Does the business have coherent access policy models (roles, 
rules, and groups) in key IT environments?
 4. Can IAM systems quickly enable new digital relationships for new 
applications or business partners?
 5. Does the business have someone working on data governance?
 6. Does the business have a Chief Privacy Officer or a Data 
Protection Officer?
 7. Are data stewards, or data owners, assigned for sensitive or 
business-critical information?
 8. Does the security department know where all the sensitive  
data is stored?
 9. Are privileged access rights (i.e., root account or domain 
administrator) restricted to small groups of users?
 10. Is privileged access controlled or monitored?
Institute Resilient Detection, Response, and Recovery:
 1. Does the business have
 a. Log standards?
 b. A security operations center (SOC) and/or an MSSP?
 c. A security information and event management  
system (SIEM)?
 d. A Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)?
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 2. Does the business have incident response plans and playbooks?
 a. Have these plans and playbooks been proven effective in real 
incidents or tests?
 3. Does the business have an asset inventory and a current business 
impact assessment (BIA) identifying critical assets?
 4. Does the business have a business continuity and disaster 
recovery (BC/DR) plan and program?
 5. Has the BC/DR plan been tested?
10.4  Identify Improvement Objectives
Consider each of the Rational Cybersecurity priorities you’ve selected or all of them. 
Define one to three improvement objectives for each priority and enter them into the 
Identify Improvement Objectives table row for each priority. As much as possible, 
emphasize quick-hitting improvement objectives to keep this effort fluid, maintain 
momentum, and expose problem areas sooner.
The following subsections provide some example improvement objectives for each 
priority focus area. The reader can consider the examples, but understand they are only 
a few of many possible areas to improve.
In general, the examples focus on improving the kinds of issues a security 
organization with low maturity in the Focus Area could have. They also emphasize work 
that can be done in alignment with stakeholders outside the security organization.
Choose improvement objectives that fit the business’s current gaps, maturity level, 
and priorities. It should be possible to accomplish each objective in the short term (less 
than 90 days). If necessary, break critical but large improvement objectives down into 
smaller chunks.
10.4.1  Develop and Govern a Healthy Security Culture
Action: If “Develop and Govern a Healthy Security Culture” is one of the selected 
priority focus areas, note improvement objectives in Section 4, Tables 5a and 5b, of the 
worksheet. Use the examples in this section to help choose three to six improvement 
objectives based on Chapters 3 and 4.
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Security governance:
• Create or revisit the security charter and work on getting business 
buy-in for a definition of security that is fully aligned with the 
business needs.
• Review Chapter 2’s Table 2-2 listing security-related business roles 
to find any that seem appropriate for a business like yours but 
aren’t being fulfilled. Communicate with stakeholders and find 
out the reason.
• Plan for a security policy refresh and identify business stakeholders 
affected by the current policy documents and potential new ones.
• Review the minutes or records from the last 6–12 months of security 
steering committee (or other coordinating group) meetings, review 
its strengths and weaknesses, and propose improvements.
• Work with the business finance office to collect information on all 
security budgets, sources of funding, and funded project charters. 
Call out any obvious gaps or overlaps.
Security culture:
• Continuously maintain the worksheet stakeholder engagement 
information in Table 2.
• Assess your communication style or habits and improve at least one 
practice.
• Get the security team to assess group communication styles or habits 
and improve at least one practice.
• Create and manage at least one practice for user awareness and 
training improvement (e.g., task key team members to collect 
feedback from one to three business or IT stakeholders on security- 
related communications).
• Prepare an informal briefing on security culture (using this chapter as 
a resource) and present or discuss it with at least one of your business 
or IT executive sponsors.
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10.4.2  Manage Risk in the Language of Business
Action: If “Manage Risk in the Language of Business” is one of the selected priority 
focus areas, note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 6, of the worksheet. Use 
the guidance and examples in this section to help choose one to three improvement 
objectives based on Chapter 5.
If the business doesn’t yet have a formal information risk management program, 
look for improvement objectives in section “Establish the Context for the Risk Program.” 
For example:
• Perform a PESTLE analysis4 to understand and document the risk 
program’s business context and discuss it with at least one business 
or IT executive sponsor.
• Task security and risk team members unfamiliar with FAIR to read 
section “Open Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR)” and the Open 
Group Standard: Risk Analysis (O-RA)7 and other FAIR resources.2
To improve a risk management program that’s up and running, consider the 
following sample improvement objective:
• Review the organization’s asset inventory program and identify an 
IT champion willing to work with the risk management function on 
devising a method to capture asset risk scores and risk metadata as 
described in section “Implement Asset Risk Profiling.”
To improve identification of top information risk at the executive level, consider the 
following sample improvement objective:
• Meet with executive stakeholder(s) responsible for reporting risk to an 
Audit Committee (or other risk management forums). Identify or discuss
• Who are, or could be, accountable risk owners for categories of 
information risks
• Potential overlaps between information risks and top enterprise 
risk scenarios
2 “FAIR Resources,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, January 2020, accessed at https://
security-architect.com/RiskManagementResources
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Readers seeking more assistance or guidance on building a risk program can contact 
us via our website (https://security-architect.com/contact-us) or visit our risk 
management resources page.3
10.4.3  Establish a Control Baseline
Action: If “Establish a Control Baseline” is one of your priority focus areas, note 
improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 7, of the worksheet. Use the guidance and 
examples in this section to help choose one to three improvement objectives.
As you’ll recall, the purpose of a control baseline is to create the minimum viable 
list of controls from the security control domains that apply to the business, map the 
controls to the business IT environments, and develop applicability guidelines for them. 
From Chapter 6’s section “Address Common Challenges,” however, we found many 
issues and gaps in the way businesses typically address controls. The following are 
suggestions for quick-hitting improvement objectives:
• Evaluate the current control baseline document(s) to see if they can 
be used as is or as a draft starting point.
If the business requires a new or rewritten control baseline:
• Create an initial detailed outline for a new control baseline using 
a spreadsheet or a governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) tool. 
Populate the draft using information from the 20 security control 
domains in Chapter 6.
If a current and credible security assessment is not available:
• Perform a rapid enterprise risk assessment based on the 
methodology from Chapter 5, section “Perform Enterprise Risk 
Assessments to Identify Top Risk Scenarios,” using available data to 
identify at least a rough list of top information risks.
3 “Risk Management Program Review,” Dan Blum, Security Architects LLC, January 2020, accessed 
at https://security-architect.com/RiskManagementResources
Chapter 10  Create Your ratIonal CYberseCurItY suCCess plan
308
• Perform a control gap assessment against the control baseline 
and the list of top information risks. Depending on the size of the 
business, rapid or deep security assessments4 can be performed 
within a 30-60-90-day period.
Note a good security assessment is a control assessment aligned to a list of top 
information risks.
10.4.4  Simplify and Rationalize IT and Security
Action: If “Simplify and Rationalize IT and Security” is one of your priority focus areas, 
note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 8, of the worksheet. Use the guidance in 
this section to help choose one to three improvement objectives based on Chapter 7.
Understand that a secure digital business must be one that continually plans, 
curates, and aligns IT capabilities in a defensible architecture. From Chapter 7’s section 
“Address Common Challenges,” however, we found many issues with technical debt, lack 
of IT strategy, and difficulty keeping pace with LOB requirements and shadow IT. The 
following are some example improvement objectives:
• Locate document(s) labeled as an “IT Strategy” or serving that 
purpose. Provide security organization commentary on them and 
discuss with the IT stakeholders. Align them with the current security 
project portfolio or road map as appropriate.
• Help the IT organization operate in the “IT-as-broker” mode by 
collecting information on cloud-based security services options 
(e.g., vulnerability scanning, multifactor authentication, etc.) it could 
provide or encouraging adoption of services already provided.
• Analyze development tool chains in use and discuss potential 
DevSecOps solutions with development managers.
4 “Security Assessments,” Security Architects, LLC, May 2020, accessed at: https://security-
architect.com/SecurityAssessmentResources
Chapter 10  Create Your ratIonal CYberseCurItY suCCess plan
309
Evaluate the opportunity to set up  Security Championship Program(s) in IT. 
Discuss the idea with senior IT managers that might support the idea and/or identify 
staff members in IT that might be good candidates in championship roles.
10.4.5  Control Access with Minimal Drag on the Business
Action: If “Control Access with Minimal Drag on the Business” is one of your priority 
focus areas, note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 9, of the worksheet. Use 
the guidance and examples in this section to help choose one to three improvement 
objectives based on Chapter 8.
Access control and data governance are critical for enabling digital businesses to use 
applications and tools productively, to form new digital relationships with customers 
and other external parties, and to stay in compliance with regulations. From Chapter 8’s 
section “Address Common Challenges,” however, we found many IAM infrastructures are 
outdated, IAM and data governance processes are immature, and IAM teams lack cross- 
functional buy-in.
Of all the Rational Cybersecurity priorities (with the possible exception of risk 
management), IAM and data governance are the most complex ones.
• Conduct a rapid security assessment focused on IAM and data 
governance5; together they constitute a large and critical piece of the 
security program.
• Identify quick-hitting IAM improvement projects. Use the business 
impact assessment (BIA), the enterprise risk map, or other sources 
to find critical assets and risk owners; map the IAM and data 
governance control baseline (per Chapter 8, Table 8-1) against the 
assets and connect with one to three stakeholders to learn their IAM 
and data governance pain points.
5 “IAM Assessments,” Security Architects, LLC, May 2020, accessed at: https://security-
architect.com/IAMResources
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If you are the CISO (or “Head of Security”) but the IAM team reports to another 
organization and isn’t closely aligned to security:
• Strengthen the dotted-line reporting relationship of the IAM team 
to security. To do this, work with the CIO or other higher executive 
functions over IAM.
10.4.6  Institute Resilient Detection, Response, 
and Recovery
Action: If “Institute Resilient Detection, Response, and Recovery” is one of your priority 
focus areas, note improvement objectives in Section 4, Table 10, of the worksheet. Use 
the guidance in this section to help choose one to three improvement objectives based 
on Chapter 9.
As we discussed in Chapter 9, section “Business Unpreparedness for Incident 
Response and Recovery,” businesses in 2020 will continue to face an elevated threat 
environment. Due to unpreparedness or immaturity as well as “Lack of Visibility 
or Access to All IT Systems,” IT and security leaders may not have their defensive 
priorities clearly focused on critical systems. It’s inevitable that “Protect” controls will 
sometimes fail.
The following are examples of cyber-resilience improvement objectives:
• Review contingency plans for incident response for the business’s top 
risk scenarios or critical assets. Identify and list which are missing. 
If none are complete, develop a detailed outline for at least one plan 
and discuss it with affected stakeholders.
• Review incident response policies and procedures with affected 
stakeholders to ensure they are up to date and still agreed on.
• Review BC/DR plans with affected stakeholders to ensure they are up 
to date and still agreed on.
10.5  Specify Metrics
Some improvement objectives are one-time projects. But others require recurring 
activities or processes.
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Note any ongoing improvement objective whose progress you’d like to track in the 
Specify Metrics in Table 11, Section 5, of the worksheet. For each, list one to three top 
metrics. I filled in examples for the “Increase CISO and security team communication 
with stakeholders” objective:
• #Stakeholder 1 on 1 meetings
• #Stakeholder team briefings
“Cybersecurity is a contact sport.”
Craig Callé, CEO at Source Callé, LLC
10.6  Track Progress
Action: For each priority focus area where you have improvement objectives
• Use Section 3’s Tables 3 and 4 to update your quick assessment 
ratings of the priority focus areas at the 30, 60, and 90 days’ marks.
• Use Section 5’s Table 11 in the worksheet to track your progress with 
each of your identified improvement objectives’ metrics.
10.7  This Is Not the End
Cybersecurity-business alignment is an ongoing effort. We do it because security is an 
inherently cross-functional activity. Per Chapter 7, Harvard Business Review research 
found that 75% of cross-functional teams are dysfunctional, but that projects with strong 
governance support have a 76% success rate. The cross-functional challenges – and 
the potentially disastrous consequences of business disengagement – are why security 
leaders should prize alignment so highly and constantly work to make it happen.
But maybe you finished the book and wonder, what now? Hopefully not, because 
if you took the opportunity to work through the Success Plan, you’ll have written down 
some action items. I’ve concluded the book in an actionable manner precisely so you 
wouldn’t have put it down with that “So what?” feeling.
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We have much to do just to accomplish the six Rational Cybersecurity priorities. 
That’s why the Success Plan encourages setting quick-hitting improvement objectives 
and provides a framework to track progress. Don’t try to boil the ocean with your first 
Rational Cybersecurity Success Plan; make it an iterative process. If you stick with 
it, you’ll still be here 90 days from now moving forward with cybersecurity-business 
alignment. Step by step. “Baby steps can take us up Mount Everest,” as my life coach likes 
to say.
You’ll want to continue taking action after 90 days, setting successively more 
impactful improvement objectives.
Meanwhile, I’m hoping that the work of Rational Cybersecurity continues to evolve. 
Together, we can create additional iterations of the guidance in the “Define Rational 
Cybersecurity Improvement Objectives.” In the published edition you’ve just read, I’ve 
assumed we’re just getting started and suggested very basic improvement objectives. But 
I have to believe that – if security leaders focus on cybersecurity-business alignment – 
our capabilities will mature significantly and improve business’s cybersecurity 
outcomes. If we reach the point where the example improvement objectives in this 
chapter seem like baby steps and more advanced ideas online take them up a few levels, 
we will have succeeded.
There is a great opportunity for the security leader with strong communication skills 
and an understanding of what's needed to make cybersecurity more strategic to the 
business and better aligned with stakeholders. Be that leader. You don’t have to do it 
alone. Engage your staff in the vision of a Rational Cybersecurity program. Engage with 
a community of others in a journey of continuous learning about how we can become 
more effective at aligning and running our cross-functional projects.
10.8  This Is the Beginning of an Open  
Information Flow
Rational Cybersecurity for Business has been released via Open Access under the 
Creative Commons license so that we can create an open information flow to fully use 
and build on this material. As readers, you can continue to evolve the work. You can 
take pieces of this material, improve it, and please do share it (with attribution) for the 
rest of us. And, since good reviews are invaluable to help a book be found by potential 
readers, please review it on Amazon and/or your preferred social media outlet.
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The journey of this book doesn’t end with publication, it begins. I will be doing more 
in the coming months and years to connect us. For now, here’s how we can connect.
Connect with me on LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/dan-blum-author- 
architect/
Join the LinkedIn Security Architecture Group: www.linkedin.com/
groups/3394596/
Follow me on Twitter: Daniel Blum @RationalCybrSec
Subscribe to the Security-Architect.com blog





Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license  
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
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 Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
This glossary defines many terms and acronyms used in the text of Rational 
Cybersecurity for Business. It organizes terms and acronyms into three groups and 
alphabetizes them within each group:
• Security concepts
• Tools and technical capabilities
• Governance or process capabilities
 Security Concepts
Accountability-based controls: Controls that promote a sense of 
accountability in users by heightening awareness or motivation to 
comply with business policies and create a deterrent effect against 
violating policies by imparting the sense that monitoring systems 
are in place to catch abuse. These kinds of controls are considered 
beneficial because they enable the business to allow users a 
broader set of capabilities than would otherwise be advisable.
Critical systems (or assets): Systems identified in a business 
impact analysis (BIA) or well known to the business as being 
of high value due to their revenue-producing nature or the 
dependence that other systems have on them.
Cyber-resilience: The ability to detect, respond, and recover 
quickly from cyberattacks or outages.
DevSecOps: The integration and orchestration of security tests 
or checks into the software release pipeline from development to 
production.
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Digital: The use of electronic information technology for personal 
or business activities, interactions, and processes.
Digital business: A business that relies heavily on digital 
capabilities to generate value and exchange goods or services with 
customers, suppliers, and trading partners.
Digitalization: The process of becoming a digital business. 
See Chapter 1, section “Risk and the Digital Business,” for more 
discussion on digitalization, the digital business, security, and risk.
Restrictive controls: Controls that restrict users from accessing or 
using information or systems that haven’t been pre-approved by 
management in advance. These controls are considered beneficial 
because, provided they operate correctly, users cannot violate or 
abuse management policies.
Risk: The probable frequency and probable impact of loss events.
Risk management: The process of identifying, analyzing, 
evaluating, treating, monitoring, and communicating information 
about risk scenarios. Risk treatment can include accepting, 
avoiding, mitigating, or transferring risks.
Security pressure: The level of risk that a business has due to 
threat actor interest, regulations, public scrutiny, and other 
circumstances. See Chapter 1, section “Security Pressure,” for 
more definition.
Single sign-on (SSO): The ability to log in, or authenticate, to a 
system or a domain (aka “identity provider”), and thereby also be 
authenticated to other systems.
Threats: Individuals, organizations, or forces of nature that 
could exploit a vulnerability of an asset to create loss events for a 
business.
Vulnerability (FAIR): Per FAIR, vulnerability is the probability 
that an asset will be unable to resist the actions of a threat agent.
Vulnerability (common security industry usage): A defect, such 
as a software bug, in software or hardware.
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Zero trust: A security model that requires strict identity 
verification for every person and device trying to access resources 
on a private network, regardless of whether they are sitting within 
or outside of the network perimeter.
 Tools and Technical Capabilities
Anti-malware sandbox: An isolated computing environment 
that executes unknown applications, prevents them from 
compromising the target system, and monitors the applications to 
determine if they are malicious.
Cloud access security broker (CASB): An on-premises appliance 
or cloud-based security policy enforcement point that monitors, 
mediates, or controls communications between cloud service 
consumers and cloud service providers as cloud-based resources 
are accessed.
Cloud service provider (CSP): An IT service provided to 
customers from a vendor’s Internet data center, generally using 
a pay-as-you-go billing model. It includes SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS 
service delivery models.
Data loss (or leakage) prevention (DLP): Security policies, tools, 
and procedures to monitor or prevent unauthorized transfer 
of information from a business-controlled environment to 
unauthorized persons or destinations.
Database activity monitoring (DAM): A security technology 
operating independently of the database management system to 
provide database monitoring, auditing, and real-time protection.
Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS): A category of cloud 
computing service that provides the hardware, computing, 
network, and storage platform enabling customers to use 
virtualized computing resources over the Internet.
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Identity governance and administration (IGA): A core IAM 
component, usually provided through a software suite. It enables 
policy-based user identity administration, account provisioning, 
role model management, role administration, and access 
certification. It includes workflow capabilities and (in some cases) 
access analytics.
IT service management (ITSM): Tools or approaches to 
enable the design, planning, delivery, operations, and control 
of IT services and systems. Often equated with the Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) framework. Leading 
ITSM tools are marketing as suites incorporating a workflow 
management system, configuration management database 
(CMDB), change management, incident management, and other 
modules.
Network traffic analysis (NTA): Tools or solutions that enable 
security and network administrations to collect and analyze 
network flow data to detect security threats, potentially in near 
real time. They may include full packet capture capabilities 
enabling detection of malicious or policy-violating activities after 
the fact.
Platform-as-a-service (PaaS): A category of cloud computing 
services that provides an application and OS compute platform 
enabling customers to develop, run, and manage applications 
without the complexity of building and maintaining computer OS 
infrastructure.
 Privacy-Enhancing Controls: Tools or techniques that 
inherently reduce the individuals’ loss of privacy through their 
interaction with the business; these include tokenization of 
personal data items such as national identifier numbers, the use 
of private pairwise identifiers in federated identity relationships 
between providers, minimization of stored personal data in 
business respositories, and other controls.
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Privileged access (or account) management (PAM): A tool or 
approach for managing and auditing accounts, permissions, and 
administrative actions by privileged user or services.
Privileged Users: Users, such as cloud subscription managers, 
system administrators, or database administrators that have the 
power to define the access rules for themselves and others within 
an IT environment.
Security information and event management (SIEM): Tools 
that collect security notifications and log events for the purpose of 
notifying security operations teams about abnormal or suspicious 
activity. SIEM systems also provide real-time analysis of security 
alerts generated by applications and network hardware.
Software-as-a-service: A software licensing and delivery model in 
which software is licensed on a subscription basis and is centrally 
hosted by a CSP.
User entity behavior analytics (UEBA): A category of security 
tools that use machine learning to build a baseline model of how 
users and services in an IT environment normally behave and 
detect and prevent (or alert on) abnormal behavior. 
Vendor relationships management (VRM): Tools or processes 
used within Procurement, or third party management to track 
vendor risks, relationships, contracts, and other information. 
Zero-knowledge proofs: A zero-knowledge proof is a 
cryptographic technique or protocol through which one party 
can prove to another party (the verifier) that they know a value 
X, without conveying any information apart from the fact that 
they know the value X. Zero-knowledge proofs can be used as 




 Governance or Process Capabilities
Access control: A technique that regulates who or what can 
view or use IT resources. Physical access control limits access to 
physical IT assets or facilities. Logical access control limits access 
to networks, files, and data.
Access governance: Access governance is the process of 
managing access controls and the policies or processes through 
which access controls are managed (i.e., managing the roles in 
role-based access control).
Agile risk management: A risk management methodology 
aligned with FAIR and developed by Security Architects Partners 
that includes models and processes for tiered risk assessment and 
risk treatment.
Business continuity/disaster recovery (BC/DR): A set of 
processes and techniques used to help an organization recover 
from a disaster and continue or resume routine business 
operations.
Business impact analysis (BIA): A process to identify critical 
business operations and critical business assets and to identify the 
potential effects of their interruption or non-availability. Performing 
a BIA is the first step to developing BC/DR plans for a business.
Business rules: Business rules define or constrain some aspect 
of business and always resolve to either true or false. They can 
assert business structure or control the governance and behavior 
of security-related tools and processes, such as access governance 
by an IGA system.
Chief Risk Officer (CRO): A position most often found in 
financial services companies. The occupant is responsible for 
assessing and mitigating significant competitive, regulatory, and 
technological risks to a firm's capital and earnings. Organizations 




Chief Information Security Officer (CISO): The senior-level 
executive within an organization responsible for establishing and 
maintaining the enterprise security vision, strategy, and program.
Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT): A team of 
one or more persons responsible for coordinating and supporting 
the response to a computer security event or incident.
CXO: An abbreviation for a corporate executive at the “C-level” 
whose job title starts with "Chief" and often ends with "Officer."
Cybersecurity (Oxford dictionary definition): The state of being 
protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic 
data or the measures taken to achieve this.
Data governance: A collection of practices and processes to 
oversee or manage the valuation, classification, ownership, 
stewardship, and protection of information assets within an 
organization.
Data owner: An organizational role typically occupied by 
business leaders or teams that “own” (produce, market, and 
use) an information asset. Accountable for defining the policies 
required to maintain the business value and compliance required 
of the asset.
Data steward: An organizational role typically occupied by 
IT or business administration professionals. Responsible for 
maintaining the business value and compliance required by the 
policies or regulations covering the asset.
Enterprise architecture: The organizational role or team 
responsible for conducting enterprise-level analysis, design, and 
planning as well as overseeing implementation of the business’s 
IT strategy. Also consulted on the development of the IT strategy.
Enterprise risk management (ERM): The methods and 
processes used by organizations to manage the business risk 
universe (e.g., financial, operational, market) as well as to seize 
opportunities related to the achievement of their objectives.
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Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR): A taxonomy (or 
model) of the factors that contribute to risk and how they affect 
each other and a method of quantitative risk analysis using the 
FAIR model.
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A European Union 
(EU) law on data protection and privacy that gives control to 
individuals over their personal data and simplifies the regulatory 
environment for international business by unifying privacy regulation 
requirements within the EU. GDPR also addresses the transfer of 
personal data outside the EU and European Economic Areas.
Identity and access management (IAM): The technologies 
and processes to manage digital identity information for 
people, devices, services, and things (subjects). It also covers 
subject authentication and the use of identity information for 
authorization or access control as well as auditing identity 
administration or access events.
Line of business (LOB): A business unit, or part, of an 
organization that provides a product or service on behalf of 
the organization, for example, financing LOB at an automotive 
company, brokerage LOB at a bank.
Lightweight risk assessment (LRA): The name for a quick risk 
assessment in the ARM methodology. An LRA can calculate a risk 
scenario’s order of magnitude to determine whether a business or 
IT team’s local risk adviser can sign off on risk treatment (for lower 
risks) or whether the risk has to be escalated to a business unit 
executive and/or the centralized risk team.
Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed (RACI) Matrix: 
Describes the form of participation by various roles in performing 
a project or business process. The Responsible role does the work 
to complete the task. The Accountable role may approve the work 
and is answerable to higher authorities, such as the public, for the 
result. Persons in the Consulted role provide subject matter expertise, 
guidance, or opinion supporting the work. Persons in the Informed 
role are kept up to date on progress but not asked for input.
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Risk owner: The individual who is accountable for ensuring the 
risk is managed appropriately.
Roles: An organizational designation for a set of responsibilities or 
authorities to perform tasks or work within a business process.
Secure (or software or systems) development lifecycle (SDLC): 
The definition of distinct work phases which are used by systems, 
software, or security engineers to plan, design, build, test, and 
deliver information systems.
Stakeholder: A leader or key member of a group without whose 
support a project or business process would cease to exist.
Glossary of Terms and acronyms
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call to action, 254–256
challenges
accountability, 235–237
cloud/privacy rights, 231, 232
IAM, 233–235
immature data governance, 230
core IAM services or capabilities, 229
cross-functional activities, IAM/data 
governance, 252, 254




digital relationships, 238, 239
interoperability/agility, 241
PII, 239
identity-related events/context, 242, 243
inform access management  
function, 249, 250
security leaders, 228
Advanced persistent threat (APT), 269
Agile risk management (ARM), 136, 139
Align, Plan, and Optimize (APO), 56
Amazon Web Services (AWS), 207
Anti-money laundering (AML), 6
Application program  
interface (API), 191, 238
Artificial intelligence (AI), 275
Audit management, 40






secure behavior, 110, 111
security-related behaviors, 109
B
Backup and Data Recovery Control 
Domain, 182
BitSight, 215
Bring your own device (BYOD), 41, 94, 241
Business Continuity Control Domain, 182
Business continuity/disaster recovery (BC/
DR), 40, 260, 270, 292, 294, 304
Business continuity  
management (BCM), 23, 40
Business engagement, 52, 53
Business impact assessment (BIA), 256, 
265, 304, 309




corporate administration, 41, 42
326
CXOs, 38




Capital and operating expenses (CAPEX 
and OPEX), 65
Centralized security governance  
model, 66, 67
Challenges, cybersecurity
CISO’s job tenure, 46
crisis conditions, 49
cross-purposes, 43, 44
dysfunctional security programs, 49
poor coordination, 45
strategic, 44
under-resourced security teams, 47, 48
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), 36
Chief Financial Officer (CFO), 38
Chief Information Officer (CIO), 33, 38
Chief Information Security  
Officer (CISO), 12, 31, 33
executive briefing, 107
hiring program effective, 51
motivating and retaining security 
resources, 50
primary issues, 50
Chief Operations Officer (COO), 38
Chief Risk Officer (CRO), 39, 62
Chief Technology Officer (CTO), 99
Cloud access security  
brokers (CASBs), 184, 214
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), 159
Cloud service providers (CSPs),  
80, 94, 185, 202
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 6
Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs), 39, 283
Computer Security Incident Response 










align control deployment/business 
functions, 192, 193
business culture, 163




too many controls, 161
without unifying architecture, 162
control framework, 158, 159
definition, 160
domain (see Domain)
lines of defense model, 184
scale, 190, 191
security leaders, 157
shared responsibility, 185, 188
target architecture, 183











security steering committee, 41
smaller organizations, 41
COVID-19 virus, 49
Cross-functional security coordination 
function or steering  
committee, 77, 78
Culture change challenges
awareness training courses, 96
business executives, 93
change, 95
ineffective communication  
styles, 95, 96
odds with IT/security, 93, 94




BC/DR plans, 270, 271, 292
BIA, 265
breach/outage response and  
recovery, 290
businesses, 259
contingency plans, 267, 268
critical assets, 265
detect and recover controls, 289, 290
framework, 260, 261
incident/impact, 291
initial response plan, 284, 285
initial technical response, 291, 292
IR (see Incident response (IR))
monitoring (see Security monitoring)
recovery plans, 259
security monitoring, response, and 











business leaders ( Business leaders)
compliance regulations, 5, 6
countermeasures, 11
cross-functional reality, 31
digital business, 3, 4











soft communication skills, 31
threat actors, 10
vulnerabilities, 10
Cybersecurity Pareto Priorities, 17
D
Database activity monitoring (DAM), 274
Data leakage protection (DLP), 165,  
175, 274
Data Security Standard (DSS), 6, 185
Decentralized security governance  
model, 67








SDLC process, 220, 221
timing, impact and scope, 218
Digital transformation, 3
Disciplined Agile Delivery (DAD) model
Domains
effective response capabilities, 181
NIST CSF, 167, 168
outages, recover from, 181
protect information systems/assets, 
172, 174–178
rational cybersecurity, 164, 165
situational awareness, 168–170
text identifies, 166
threat, rapid detection, 178
E
Encryption key management, 207
Enterprise architecture (EA) function, 205
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), 202
Enterprise risk management (ERM),  
8, 39, 266
Enterprise Strategy Group (ESA), 46
Evaluate, Direct, and Monitor (EDM), 56
Executive-level risk management 
committee, 77
F
Factor Analysis of Information Risk 
(FAIR), 9
Fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD), 96
Firewalls, 31
Focused risk assessments (FRAs), 140, 148
G
General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), 5, 98, 233





hybrid IT model, 215
service catalog, 216, 217
shadow IT, 212
third-party management program, 214, 
215
H
Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), 6
Human resources (HR), 41
I, J
IAM systems and consumer IAM (CIAM) 
systems, 239
Identity and access management (IAM), 
22, 67, 227, 303
Identity-as-a-service (IDaaS), 241
Identity governance and administration 
(IGA) tools, 231
business rules, 248, 249
hybrid IGA/PAM, 246, 247
IGA and PAM systems, 244
model role, 248, 249
PAM/JIT, 246
requirements, 244, 245
Incident response (IR), 259, 284
Industry Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISACs), 283
Index
329
Information Sharing and Analysis  
Centers (ISACs), 39





IT strategy, 207, 208
International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), 157
International Security Systems 
Association (ISSA), 264
Internet of Things (IOT) security, 227
ISO 31000 Risk Management
IT/security
challenges




digital business initiatives, 200, 201
cross-functional role, 200
cybersecurity function, 199
digital business initiatives, 199
strategy (see Strategy, IT)
K
Key risk terminology, 124
Know your customer (KYC), 6
L
Lightweight risk assessment (LRA) 
methodology, 139
Line of business (LOB), 42, 67
Logging and Log Review Control  
Domain, 179
M
Managed detection and response services 
(MDRs), 268
Managed security services providers 
(MSSPs), 268
Matrix security governance structures








communication styles, 117, 118
security leaders, 117
Mobile device management (MDM), 241
Monitor event logs, alerts, and reports
AI, 275, 276
automated review, 274, 275
collecting data, 273
context information, 273, 274
security teams, 272
Multifactor authentication (MFA), 230
N
National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD), 34, 35
National Institute of Standards (NIST), 20








Open Factor Analysis of Information Risk 
(FAIR) model, 127
Operating systems (OSes), 206
P
Payment Card Industry (PCI), 6
People-centric security (PCS), 236





risk of gathering dust, 81
types of, 83
Policy management process, 81
Privacy and compliance management, 40
Privileged access  
management (PAM), 163, 246






institute resilient detection response 
and recovery, 303
IT/security, 302
manage risk, language, 301
security culture, 300, 301















risk management, 19, 20
scaling factors, 24
security budgets, 21




Rational Cybersecurity success plan
assessment (see Quick assessment)
business, 312
CISOs, 298
control access, 309, 310
control baseline, 307
develop and govern a strong security 
culture, 304
Institute Resilient Detection, 
Response, and  
Recovery, 310
IT and security, 308










Recovery time objectives (RTOs), 266
Refactoring security services, 210
Resilience challenges





Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, 
Informed (RACI), 54, 55, 252
Risk assessment





information risks, 142, 143
issues, 137
lightweight method, 138, 139
Risk management, 19
challenges, 124
analysis or assessment  
practices, 126
control assessment, 125





ISO 31000, 127, 130
risk assessment process, 129, 130
monitoring issues, 148, 149













business leaders, avoid risk, 145




Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 5




action executive oversight, 101
awareness and training programs, 116
bottom line, 102








secure IT users, 102
self-sustaining patterns, 97













budgeting and resource allocation, 84























Security information and event 
management system (SIEM),  
264, 303
Security leaders, 56, 57, 91
Security monitoring
collaborative processes, business 
function, 281, 282
contracted detection services, 282
coordinate detection with users, 279, 280
haystack, 271
human users as sensors, 280
hunt for threats, 278, 279
real-time alerts/issues, 276, 277
scale detection, distributed 
infrastructure, 277, 278
TI, information sharing bodies, 283




business continuity management, 40
business leaders, 33




privacy and compliance management, 40
risk management, 39
Service-level agreements (SLAs), 40, 146
Single sign-on (SSO) mechanisms,  
214, 230
Software-as-a-service (SaaS), 97
Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) 
process, 241




Board communication, 151, 152
Business risk owners, 150, 151
Business staff/associates, 149, 150













security road map, 209, 210
Structured Cross-Domain Identity 
Management (SCIM), 241
T
Third-party risk  
management (TPRM), 281
Threat actors, 10
“three lines of defense” metamodel, 184
Tiered risk assessment process, 214
Traditional patch management, 210
Transport Layer Security (TLS), 175
U
User Account Monitoring Control 
Domain, 180
User entity behavior analysis (UEBA), 274
V
Virtual CISOs (V-CISOs), 38
Virtual private network (VPN), 270
W, X, Y, Z
Web application firewall (WAF), 176
Index
